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ABSTRACT 
The impact of change and transformation on small businesses has compelled 
them to face a multitude of new challenges. The successful application of the 
selected strategies depends largely on an understanding of the predisposing 
and prevailing business dynamics and variables that impacts on their 
profitability, continued sustainability and future growth. There is increased 
attention that is focused on the turnover factor of small business in South Africa 
and this gives added need for extensive qualitative and quantitative analysis. 
International experience suggests that small businesses are a pervasive feature 
of the economic landscape in the developed world. The intensity and growing 
proportions of small business failure in South Africa is alarming. The problem 
not only presents management with new dilemmas, but also presents a 
challenge to researchers who are faced with the task of identifying through 
rational and scientifically valid processes, the underlying causes of the high 
failure rate amongst small businesses. 
Previous studies suggest that government regulations and franchised business 
have proven to be successful due to the infrastructure support offered by the 
franchisor. Since retail service station dealers operate within a highly regulated 
industry and within a franchised environment, this study examines the reasons 
for failure and success within the Retail Fuel Industry sector in South Africa. 
It was anticipated that there are a number of factors that influence success and 
failure from both within and outside the control of the fuel entrepreneur. While 
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some researchers have identified gender, education levels and age as critical 
success factors, others suggested that management factors and occupational 
experience are key drivers. The fuel retail industry is regulated and seeks to 
reward efficiency through a retail fuel margin. This study provides new insights 
and important clues concerning the failure amongst fuel retailers. The closure of 
the business did not result in the physical disappearance of the establishment 
but rather in a transfer to new ownership. 
The purpose of this study is to conduct a more in-depth and comprehensive 
qualitative research using the case study methodology, which will investigate 
the causal factors that lead to the high mortality rate of fuel retailers in South 
Africa. 
The non-fuel aspect of the business comprises the shops and quick service 
restaurants and presents another dynamic to fuel retailing. This was 
investigated to fully address the research question. The case study analysis 
also attempted to quantify the level of support that franchisees received. 
There was sufficient evidence from the research findings to nullify the rival 
proposition that success and failure of fuel retailers was only a function of sales 
and volume. The case study evidence supported the research proposition that 
the reasons for failure and success were due to factors other than size. 
The 47% per annum failure rate recorded in the study was attributed to a 
number of factors from both within and outside the control of the fuel 
entrepreneur. While gender, education levels and age were not found to be 
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critical success factors, the ability to manage the key components of target 
costs was critical. The management of manpower costs and the efficient 
application thereof was found to be the most significant variable in the cost build 
up and differentiated successful and failed retailers. 
There was also evidence of substantial imposed costs from both the regulatory 
environment and the franchisor. The monthly adjustment of fuel prices had an 
impact on working capital and generally resulted in net stock price losses. Both 
these variables were not factored into the calculation of the retail fuel margin 
resulting in the understating of the true costs. The loose regulatory environment 
also marginalised the fuel retailer. 
It was found that the oil companies optimised their fuel delivery regimes at the 
expense of the small business owner through the automatic replenishment 
system of wet stocks, controlled through a central ordering system. While, wet 
stock control mechanism was in place for the fuel business, the non-fuel 
business received limited support for stock and shrinkage management. 
The case study evidence also supported the retailers view on the inadequate 
level of business support and training. This was an important finding and such 
poor orientation negatively influenced the quality of the due diligence checks 
and business valuation. In many cases, the budgeting was optimistic with little 
or no recourse for remedial action leading to eventual failure. 
Statistical analysis indicated that the two groups differed significantly with 
regard to the mean difference between Shop sales and Budgeted Shop sales. It 
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appears that in the case of the success group that the shop sales mean was 
much higher than budgeted mean, while in the case of the failure group the 
mean was lower than budgeted mean. Failure to achieve the shop budgets did 
contribute to failure. 
Important recommendations are made based on the case study findings. This 
includes the establishment of a central training unit, an industry valuation model 
and a more relevant regulatory regime aimed at removing the imbalances 
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CHAPTER 1 
OVERVIEW OF THE STUDY 
1.1 INTRODUCTION 
Small business development has become an area for intensive research with 
regard to business viability, profitability, sustainability and growth. One of the 
current and most striking observations of small business is the high mortality 
rate of a large proportion of small businesses. Previous studies like Jovanovic 
(1982:649-670) and Hall (1985:59-66) have highlighted some common 
potential pitfalls and contributory factors to small business failures. The 
purpose of this study is to conduct an in-depth and comprehensive scientific 
research, which will investigate the causal factors that lead to either the high 
rate of mortality in the retail fuel sector or to its success and viability. This 
research will endeavor to enhance and broaden the basis of previous studies, 
which examined aspects of small business failure. 
1.2 THE NEED FOR THE STUDY 
The democratization of the Republic of South Africa has ushered in numerous 
challenges and opportunities. The increase in foreign trade and investments 
continues to exponentially increase the welfare benefits and the general living 
conditions of all South Africans. Economic restructuring has taken place 
against the background of a constitution that is conducive to a market based 
economy. However, while the policy framework and groundwork has been laid, 
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the country continues to be challenged by high unemployment rates and 
crime. 
Indeed, the President in his 2006 State of the Nation address highlighted the 
importance that small business development plays in creating and maintaining 
jobs. The development and nurturing of the entrepreneurial spirit would go a 
long way in facilitating the ideals sought by government. 
An investigation into the high failure rate amongst fuel retailers, especially in 
the light of transformation challenges, will make an important independent 
contribution to the current debate. The industry is highly regulated with 
significant government intervention. The profit levels are preset. It operates 
within a franchised format, supplies one homogenous product as its core offer 
in a monopolistic competitive trading environment and its financial endurance 
is currently being debated between government and industry stakeholders. 
Interestingly, previous studies (Johnson 1999) have suggested that 
Government intervention and franchised formats are critical success factors 
for the survival of small businesses. While it is not possible to provide a 
guarantee against failure, the mortality rate can be reduced to ensure that the 
economic rebirth that exists is executed within a more reliable format. Other 
researchers like Bosman (1987), Clark (1983), Hope (1983) and Gape (2000) 
have suggested a multitude of reasons for small business failure and success. 
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Fuel retail bodies have indicated that service stations are operating within sub-
profitable levels and are forced to endure financial loss and ruin, potentially 
threatening their future existence and job security for their employees. 
The seriousness of the assertions is reflected in the reports that retailers 
intend absorbing fuel price reductions without passing it on to the motorist. 
This study would be useful to Governmental bodies, micro-business lenders 
and most importantly for future and existing entrepreneurs. The study would 
also be of interest to specialists who study and interact with small firms -
attorneys, bankers, educators, trade - associations, prospective entrepreneurs 
and owners and managers of small firms. This study would also provide an 
important starting point for further research. 
There is growing interest in small business policy formulation within 
Government, local Authorities and among larger companies. This interest has 
extended to academics within universities, polytechnical and technical 
colleges to the extent that research is being conducted. Why is the mortality 
rate amongst small businesses so high? The field of investigation is 
developing at a phenomenal rate and the RSA Government is encouraging 
public sector Authorities to take the small and medium business sector 
seriously as an aspect of economic development policy. The study will aim to 
provide answers to the following questions: 
• What challenges do small fuel retailers face in their efforts to function 
effectively? 
• What gaps exist in the promotion and development of small business 
within the fuel retail industry? 
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• What business management skills, processes and methodologies need 
to be used or enhanced? Does the franchise support structure work? 
• Does the lack of or provision of adequate resources, technology and 
business support affect the functioning of the small fuel retailer? 
• Do the employers and employees possess adequate business and 
technical skills to compete successfully in a highly competitive 
environment or is this a competitive environment? 
• Are there adequate government policies and support structures in place 
to support the small fuel retailer given that the industry is a regulated 
one? 
• Was the gearing level of the EFG business at the correct level? 
• What expertise, skills and knowledge can be imported from other first 
world countries for the development of the fuel retail business in South 
Africa? 
• What should be the role of tertiary institutions and oil company training 
courses in providing entrepreneurial and business support? 
1.3 OBJECTIVES OF THE STUDY 
The objectives of this research are as follows: 
• To identify and examine the causes of business decline and failure within 
the small fuel retail business. 
• To identify the symptoms that signal business failure and the particular 
patterns and trends observed in such situations to enable emerging 
entrepreneurs to take appropriate remedial or corrective action. 
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• To examine how small business managers can create a turnaround 
business in order to restore profitability and a return to the levels of 
performance that create profitability and viability. 
• To identify and elucidate on the variety of symptoms that signal or are 
indicative of business decline. 
• To examine the financial indices that can be effectively used as 
predictive indicators of business decline. Special emphasis and reference 
will be made to financial indicators in the Retail Fuel Industry that herald 
business decline. 
• To examine the causes of business decline by examining aspects such 
as poor management, inadequate financial control, competition, high cost 
structures, changes in market demand, marketing problems, capital 
projects and overtrading. 
• To examine trends, patterns and idiosyncrasies in the government 
regulated South African Petroleum Industry and to determine whether 
these contribute to, or exacerbate the decline of small business ventures 
in the Retail Fuel Industry markets. 
• To examine International trends and patterns that contribute to the 
success or failure of small businesses. 
While an attempt would be made to suggest methods of enhancing profitability 
the provision of any guarantee against failure is not possible. The dynamics 
and diversity of small businesses is too divergent to include such an area. 
5 
1.4 SCOPE AND LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY 
The scope of this study was confined to the South African Fuel Retail Industry 
and the following influenced a further refinement of the scope of the study: 
• Previous government publications and studies, although limited in nature, 
offer insights into the regulation and compensation of fuel retailers. 
• The emphasis in the present study is on researching the reasons for 
failure and success amongst fuel retailers using a case study approach. 
• The investigation in the present study of the empirical data obtained by 
means of an in-depth questionnaire designed for the field fieldwork, 
through personal interviews with the case respondents 
It is acknowledged that the qualitative case study approach may affect the 
generalisation of the study findings. Nevertheless, the study aims to make 
significant contributions by identifying the reasons for failure amongst fuel 
retailers and exploring the dynamics within this franchised and regulated small 
business sector. The limitations of this study were further influenced by the 
lack of previous research in this area and the theoretical complexity of topic. 
The study was exploratory in nature and focused on the Energy Finance 
Group case study. This decision was taken to facilitate the research objectives 
of conducting an in-depth study within this sector. 
1.5 STRUCTURE OF THE THESIS 
Chapter 1 provides an overview of research work. It presents the reasons for 
the study, the research objectives, limitations and scope of work. 
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Chapter 2 presents an overview of small business in South Africa focusing on 
government strategy followed by a review of the strategy implementation 
against the 2001 Global Entrepreneurship Report focusing on 
entrepreneurship in South Africa. 
Chapter 3 reviews the literature on small business failure pre-empted by a 
number of theoretical propositions on what motivates people to become 
entrepreneurs. 
Chapter 4 provides a preview on the small fuel retail business in South Africa 
and examines the role of government, margin determination within the policy 
and regulatory environment thus setting the scene for the research 
methodology. 
Chapter 5 details the research methodology adopted and the rationale for the 
case study approach. This chapter also covers the methodological issues. 
Chapter 6 presents the case study evidence as obtained from a number of 
multiple sources. The evidence is presented as collected and is then followed 
by a critical analysis allowing for independent assessment of the findings. 
Lastly, chapter 7 presents the conclusions of the case study research and 




It is anticipated that this study will provide useful strategies for mitigation 
against small business failure within the fuel retail sector. The positive 
economic developments in the country have created considerable 
opportunities for emerging entrepreneurs to compete equitably on the open-
market system as independent self-owned businesses. Regrettably, many 
small businesses have failed resulting in business decline or liquidation. This 
chapter is a succinct attempt to define the scope, primary objectives and 
limitations of the study. The following chapter provides a definition of key 
terms and an overview of the small business environment in South Africa. The 
intention is to extract from the cross case evidence support or rejection of the 
research proposition that success and failure are caused by factors other than 
sales and volumes. 
It is anticipated that there are a number of factors that influence success and 
failure from both within and outside the control of the fuel entrepreneur. While 
some researchers have identified gender, education levels and age as critical 
success factors others have suggested that management factors and 
occupational experience are key drivers. The fuel retail industry is regulated 
and seeks to reward efficiency through a retail fuel margin. Chapter four 
provides an overview of the dynamics within the fuel retail business sector in 
South Africa. 
Government has presented a small business Policy Paper in 1995 outlining 
the strategic directions that would be pursued to strengthen the institutional 
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and support structures for small business. This would be evaluated against 
both the achievements to date and the regulatory environment governing the 
fuel sector. 
The non-fuel aspect of the business comprises the shops and quick service 
restaurants and presents another dynamic to fuel retailing. This would be 
investigated to fully address the research question. The case study analysis 
will also attempt to quantify the level of support that franchisees receive and 
will be conducted to seek responses to the varied questions posed. 
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CHAPTER 2 
KEY DEFINITIONS AND AN OVERVIEW OF SMALL BUSINESS IN THE 
REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
The main objective of this chapter is to provide an overview of small business, 
business failure and success and to provide an overview of the state of small 
business in South Africa. The chapter reviews government support and 
mechanisms that use small business to absorb labour, penetrate new markets 
and to expand the economy in creative and innovative ways. 
Reference is made to the National Small Business Strategy as released in 
1995. Comparison is also made to the 2001 South African Global 
Entrepreneurship Monitor to test the strength of the institutional reforms and 
strategies implemented. These two references offer valuable insights into the 
small business sector in the Republic of South Africa. The fuel retail business 
operates as franchises in South Africa and the role of franchising as a small 
business structure is discussed. 
2.2 DEFINITION OF SMALL BUSINESS 
The scope of this research is limited to small businesses. There are many 
definitions of small businesses and it is important to place a definition within 
the context of this research work. There is much debate and varying opinions 
on what constitutes a small business. 
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According to Burns (2001:7-9), being a small firm is not just about size. Small 
firms have important defining characteristics. Firstly, the small firm has a small 
market influence. It is therefore not able to influence prices or national 
quantities of the good or service that it provides. Secondly, the small firm is 
independent in the sense that it does not form part of a larger enterprise and 
the owner is free from outside control in taking principle decisions. Lastly, 
small firms are managed in a personalised way and not through the medium of 
a formalised management structure. 
Various definitions of small business are used amongst researchers. The 
differentiations were based on the number of employees and the sales 
volume. Carland and Carland (1990:10-12) defined a small business based on 
qualitative criteria as follows: 
• It is independently owned 
• It is independently operated 
• It is not dominant in the market 
• It is characterised by a single business unit 
Industries comprising two or more of the above characteristics are classified 
as a small business. In the USA, the definition is based on the Small Business 
Act of 1953 (Hodgetts and Kuratko 1989:3). A small business is one that is 
independently owned and operated and is not dominant in its field of 
operation. 
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The Bolton Committee Report of 1971 on Small Businesses concurs with this 
definition. (Internet 1: www.dti.gov.uk/sme4/define.htm) 
The international definitions differ as well. In the UK, the European 
Commission in 1996 adopted a single definition of SMME's, which is depicted 
in figure 2.1. 
FIGURE 2.1 
EC SME DEFINITIONS 
Criterion 
Max no. of employees 
Max. Annual turnover 
Max. Annual balance sheet total 
Max %owned by one, or jointly 

















Source: (Internet 2: www.dti.gov.uk/SME4/Define.htm) 
It would appear that the definition could be applied as widely or generally 
across small businesses. The definition used by the US Committee of 
Economic Development would seem more applicable and realistic. For the 
purposes of this study, a small business in the retail fuel sector is defined as 
follows: 
• All Retail fuel service stations in the Republic of South Africa as the study 
are limited to fuel retailers in South Africa. 
• The asset base is of no relevance, as the oil company owns most of the 
assets. 
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• Ultra City fuel sites and One stop service station are included in the 
study. 
• Service stations with a turnover exceeding R50 million per annum are 
excluded to prevent any distortions. 
• The staff complement is not in excess of 80 employees. 
Burns (2001:8) states that, Bolton's definition looks naive, outdated and was 
probably influenced by the economist's definition of perfect competition. Kirby 
and Watson (2003:182), concluded that the importance of small business as 
an economic generator, is compromised due to the different criteria used for 
definitional purposes. While the definitions of small business differ, there is 
consensus on what determines failure and success 
2.3 DETERMINATION OF FAILURE AND SUCCESS 
In the United Kingdom, the Inter-Departmental Business Register (IDBR) 
monitors the failure and success rates of small businesses using the 
registrations and de-registrations of companies for Value Added Tax. (Small 
Business Research April 2001:109). 
This is not entirely a scientific basis for measurement, as a fair amount of 
small businesses is believed to operate below the threshold for value added 
tax submissions. This is especially true in the Republic of South Africa where 
registration is compulsory for companies with a turnover exceeding R300 000 
per annum. In the cases used in this study, all service stations are registered 
as value added tax vendors. 
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On the other hand, Barclays Bank in the United Kingdom, produced business 
survival rates based on bank accounts that open and closes. This is a more 
inclusive approach, as every small business has to have a bank account. 
(Internet 3: www, businesspark.barclays.com/bulletins/bulletin10/index.htm) 
According to Hewitt's (2003:2) speech to the UK parliament, small business 
created 12 million jobs for the United Kingdom economy, contributed to more 
than half of the country's output and generated nine out of every ten new 
business ideas. There were an estimated 3.7 million businesses in the UK at 
the start of 1999 and it is expected that small business will grow to 4.5 million 
within the next decade. 
Kuehl and Lambing (1994:18), challenges the general definition of failure 
stating that, "a closer look at the statistics of failure proves that this is quiet 
misleading". The use of the word "business failure" and "business continuity" 
synonymously, leads one to mistakenly believe that all businesses that are 
discontinued are business failures. This is not the case as a business can 
close due to the retirement of the owner. 
For the purposes of this research failure and success is defined as the 
financial inability and ability to continue respectively. The inability to continue 
trading and to pay for product will be classified as a failure. Any changes to the 
original capital structure or ownership constitute a failure for the purposes of 
this case study. 
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2.4 ASSESSMENT OF BUSINESS FAILURE 
Business failure can be assessed from four standpoints namely, social, 
economic, legal, and managerial. The social perspective highlights the human 
suffering resulting from business failure. Pahn (1993:5) noted that, "amongst 
those who do become entrepreneurs, very few succeed". The cost of failure 
extends beyond the monetary considerations. It could lead to demotivation 
and loss of confidence. 
Economists believe that failure represents a situation where the realised return 
on invested capital is significantly lower and continuously lower than the 
prevailing rates in similar investments. According to Porter (1990:125), 
entrepreneurship is the heart of economic advantage for a country. It leads to 
the provision of new good and services and the prospects of higher returns is 
the primary driver for business activity. These individuals exploit business 
opportunities for personal gain (Sexton and Bowman-Upton 1991:11). Failure 
can result in economic ruin and the experience can be an inhibitor for future 
economic activities. Small businesses failure make an important contribution 
to society through the creation of jobs 
A legal failure arises when one or more of the following situations arise 
namely, failure to meet debt obligations, the firm does not continue trading, but 
is only able to meet its financial obligations on termination. Kuehl and Lambing 
(1994:18), refers to failure as a tale of doom. While the classification of a 
failure may not be entirely accurate, "everyone in the private sector is 
concerned about small business... the reason behind this concern is that 1000 
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small businesses quit everyday. They simply close their doors, swallow their 
losses, pocket their pride and give up". Closing the doors usually results from 
the failure to meet debt obligations. 
The managerial perspective on failure is that business decline is symptomatic 
of a failure of management. Where significant losses are incurred over several 
years, one may expect the shareholders to demand a change of management. 
Wright (1995:48-63) disagrees with the conventional view that the lack of cash 
leads to failure. Entrepreneurs are often themselves to blame. Good 
management is a critical requirement for business success. 
It is imperative that we address business decline, failure and turnaround by 
first establishing what the terminology relates to in context of the small 
business environment. Recession invariably arouses increased interest in the 
possibility of business failure. The indications are that failure is on the increase 
across the industrialised world within a recessionary period. This is evident 
from the information available from the Japanese and American economies, 
which both have the largest micro-economies in the world. 
It is doubtful whether one can accurately quantify business failure despite 
increased collection and analysis of official statistics. Hall (1995:125), 
investigated the relationship between success and a whole host of factors. 
The findings only indicated where attention should be paid without isolating the 
individual factors that lead to failure. 
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In South Africa, this is due to the number of informal businesses that establish 
and close within short periods. While the registration and de-registration for 
Value added tax in South Africa can provide some indication, many of the 
small businesses are not required to register for Value added tax, hence no 
records are available 
According to Hall (1995:125), the reasons why holistic answers to the question 
on failure is not readily forthcoming, is that only a narrow range of variables 
are examined 
Cochran (1981:50-59) in his research on the mortality rate of small businesses 
concluded that, "Although much is written about small business failure, reliable 
information about who fails, why, and at what rate is hampered by differences 
in definitions, data sources and methodologies. The myriad studies of 
business mortality, with their various conceptions of failure and different 
purposes and research designs speak to the subject with a babble of 
tongues." 
Cochran (1981:50:60) further noted that dependable data is required for the 
following reasons: 
• To alleviated failure, the barriers to understanding the reasons for failure 
must be removed. 
• Accurate evaluations of policies and to help small businesses are difficult 
without a yardstick to measure the efforts of Government and other 
institutional agencies. 
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• Our knowledge of and ability to predict business cycles are deficient 
without information on the rate and extent of failure. 
• Alternative forms of enterprises such as co-operatives and community 
development projects might be judged more fairly and realistically, if, 
there existed a measure of small business mortality with which to 
compare their performance. 
Kuehl and Lambing (1994:18) noted that, no one should start a business 
convinced that it cannot possibly fail. It was also noted that a business could 
close down for non-financial reasons. The word failure has several synonyms 
and can be used to mean death, termination, discontinuance, insolvency or 
bankruptcy. For the purposes of this study, all of the synonyms are applicable 
and failure is used as a composite term. The following gives an indication of 
why it is relevant. 
2.4.1 BUSINESS DECLINE 
According to Pearce and Robbins (1982:624), when a business has 
experienced a successive decline in real earnings for a period of not less than 
two years, that business may be said to have experienced a decline in its 
fortunes. The significance of the working definition is that there needs to have 
been successive periods of earning decline. 
18 
2.4.2 BUSINESS FAILURE 
Timmons (1994:10) referred to failure as the inability of the business to meet 
its financial obligations or the discontinuation of a business. From a 
managerial perspective, business discontinuance is indeed a failure, as the 
management team has not adequately risen to the challenge of competitive 
advantage. 
2.4.3 TURNAROUND 
Pearce and Robins (1982:624) noted that, a turnaround situation might be 
defined as the period during which the firm is engaged in turnaround efforts 
that are intended to restore profitability. A process of expenditure control, 
asset retrenchment and rigorous revenue pursuits, characterise this situation. 
Turnaround may be said to have occurred where there has been a return to at 
least the level of performance experienced prior to decline. 
2.5 SYMPTOMS OF BUSINESS DECLINE 
Managers respond differently to warning signals that are symptoms of 
business decline. Most managers display a subconscious denial of impending 
doom brought on by the symptoms of decline. Wright (1995:48-63), noted that 
erratic movements in the customer base, as an example, can cause the small 
business to remain unstable and it, "totters on the brink of disaster through its 
lifespan". 
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The symptoms indicative of business decline, representative of both the early 
and dramatic warning signals include the following: 
2.5.1 DECLINING PROFITABILITY 
Pearce and Robins (1982:624-628) noted that, profitability can be defined as a 
return on investments and assets. Where a growth in sales is not translated 
into a growth in profits, there is evidence of decline. Often a proliferation of 
products and the resulting building of inventory can disguise the decline. 
Smaller firms do not account for inventory holding costs. In this way, the 
product proliferation may suggest growth, but in reality, it hides declining 
margins. Kuehl and Lambing (1994:20), noted that, businesses can fail during 
boom periods because the prices they must pay for goods and services rise 
faster than the prices that they can pass on to their customers. 
2.5.2 DECREASING SALES VOLUMES 
When sales volumes decline, it is possible to keep profits constant if costs are 
tightly controlled. The management accounts of many smaller enterprises lack 
sophistication and can disguise this decline in real profitability. Wright 
(1995:48-63) noted that, too little effort to market the business is a cause of 
failure. While a lot of attention is paid to manufacturing and sales, little effort is 
invested in attracting and keeping customers. 
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2.5.3 DECLINING MARKET SHARE 
Hall (1995:152) found a positive statistical correlation between market share 
and profitability where the market share falls or remains stagnant; there is 
sufficient reason to investigate a decline in performance. The erosion of a 
firm's market share is often the result of competitor actions or a shift in market 
conditions. 
2.5.4 DECLINE IN WORKING CAPITAL 
Hall (1995:47) found that owners of small businesses often lay the blame for 
their failure on under-capitalisation. While increasing debt can be a feature of 
growth, it is also indicative of a decline in performance. This is especially true 
when short-term credit is used to finance the operations of the business. 
Liquidity ratios measure the sufficiency of working capital. The most common 
liquidity ratios are the current ratio and quick ratios: 
• Kuehl and Lambing (1994:530) defined the current ratio of a business 
as the proportion of current assets relative to current liabilities and is an 
overall measure of liquidity. While the quick ratio is the acid test of the 
business and excludes the value of stock, from current assets, before 
evaluating the proportion of current assets to current liabilities. 
It must be emphasised that ratio analysis only has merit if the ratios are 
expressed relative to a known performance standard, or if they are seen to 
represent a trend. Trends can be interpreted, but ratios on their own are 
inadequate predictors of decline. The management of debtor days, creditor 
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days, and stock turnovers cannot be overemphasised as noted by Wright 
(1995:48-63). 
2.5.5 RAPID MANAGEMENT TURNOVER 
Staff turnovers are indicative of a troubled environment and where 
management turnover is rapid; there is a strong likelihood of disagreement 
amongst managers. This leads to the exit of key staff. Kuehl and Lambing 
(1994:21) noted that, the majority of failures amongst small businesses are not 
caused by the economy, high interest rates or a bad product. Failure is caused 
by the owner's incompetence in specific areas, including the management of 
key staff. The entrepreneur must be able to instill confidence in his workforce. 
2.6 COMMON CAUSES OF BUSINESS DECLINE 
According to Van Aardt, Van Aardt and Bezuidenhout (2000:249:257), the 
most common causes of decline are as follows: 
2.6.1 POOR MANAGEMENT SKILLS 
When an entrepreneur has other business interests, his interest may wane 
because the day-to-day management efforts are often sidestepped. Generally, 
entrepreneurs are not necessarily super managers, because they are 
entrepreneurial in their approach to business management. They still need the 
skills and foundations to the principles of management. It is crucial for 
business success that the entrepreneur should control a wide range of 
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business functions, including marketing, sales, financial management and 
administration. 
2.6.2 THE IMPORTANCE OF PROPER FINANCIAL CONTROL 
Poor financial control means that there is insufficient or poor planning, poor 
budgetary control and poor costing. A set of monthly management accounts 
does not constitute adequate financial control. This is merely aggregate data 
for an accounting period and must be interpreted and acted upon to constitute 
financial control. The opportunity or risk of small business enterprises can be 
summarised from its financial statements. Wright (1995:50) noted that, a good 
lesson for success is, "good record keeping". 
2.6.3 RISK ASSESSMENT 
Small businesses lack the capacity to proactively plan and cater for the 
statistical probability of failure. Strategies need to be formulated on an on-
going basis to mitigate risks. Plan 'B', which is the contingency plan should set 
out in advance an estimate of things that could go wrong and what measures 
are in place to avert such failures. Hall (1995:67), characterised the 
entrepreneur as willing to take risks, both in the sense of degree of 
uncertainty, in which the business gamble is taken and the size of the penalty 
for making the wrong decision. 
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2.6.4 COMPETITION 
Product and price control are frequently causes of decline. Product 
obsolescence is a feature of a world characterised by rampant consumerism. 
A decline due to product competition arises from a new introduction that fails 
to revise the product portfolio. In addition to severe price competition, there is 
the global business environment. The small business may not be equipped to 
deal with severe price competition. Prahalad and Hamel (1990:79:91) noted 
that, a firm must actively deal with its environment to be competitive and it 
should possess a specific core competency. 
2.6.5 HIGH COST STRUCTURE 
A business operating at a cost disadvantage to its competitors will always be 
exposed to the risk of decline. Cost disadvantages may often arise from an 
absence of scale economies - small businesses do not always reap the 
benefits of economies of scale. Timmons (1994:10), showed strong evidence 
that a high failure rate resulted from excessive debt and extremely high 
operating expenses. 
2.6.6 CHANGES IN MARKET DEMAND 
The demand for a company's products or services are subject to seasonal 
variations and trends, which require careful planning, especially by small 
businesses that lack skills in forecasting. New technological developments and 
innovations can also result in decreasing profitability, especially when the 
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more astute small entrepreneur is not skilled to effectively handle the changes. 
Kirby and Watson (2003:180) noted that, it was important for small businesses 
to help themselves and find ways to improve the organization of their 
businesses and find adequate means to adapt to the market requirement and 
expectations. 
2.6.7 MARKETING SKILLS 
Many small businesses lack marketing skills and these are reflected in poor or 
little advertising, a poorly managed and inefficient sales team, outdated or no 
promotional materials and little or no research. Research studies indicate that 
poor coordination of the marketing effort results in market penetration by 
accident rather than by design. Wright (1995:53) suggested that a marketing 
strategy should be formulated and market research and analysis should be 
continuously done. 
2.6.8 CAPITAL PROJECTS 
Small businesses often undertake large capital projects without proper 
planning or cash flow analysis. In addition, they lack skills in contingency 
planning and often overrun scheduled completion dates, thereby resulting in 
delays and cost overruns. Kuehl and Lambing (1994:140) suggested that the 
use of outsourcing could be used to keep investment costs low. 
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2.6.9 OVERTRADING 
Overtrading is a situation where a firm or small business is unable to finance 
growth that is achieved through an increase in sales volumes. Unfortunately, 
the consequence of trading beyond the company's capacity to generate cash 
is illiquidity, resulting in additional pressures from creditors. The situation does 
not necessarily end in disaster, but frequently does. Wright (1995:48:63) 
identified that poor management skills is a key reason for this. 
2.6.10 NATURAL CAUSES 
Very often small business is family owned and operated and the death of a 
key person could cause failure. Kuehl and Lambing (1994:99) noted that, as 
the owner's children enter the family business they are frequently challenged 
to overcome considerable skepticism on the part of non-family employees. 
Acceptance and credibility are important considerations. 
2.7 BOUNCING BACK FROM THE BRINK 
Pearce and Robbins (1982:624) noted that, not all businesses fade into 
obscurity. A select portion are resuscitated by a series of stringent 
management actions - recognised and defined as retrenchment or turn 
around. The following diagrams demonstrate a schematic flow chart of the 
steps and processes that may be followed in order to assist businesses to 
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Source: Pearce and Robbins (1982:624) 
Pearce and Robbins (1982:624) assimilated prior research to develop a model 
for the turnaround process. It involves implementing corrective actions, setting 
performance standards and then measuring such standards. The turnaround 
phase involves cost reduction, retrenchment and asset reduction leading to 
recovery. This turnaround process is the methodological approach 
recommended by authors who document a recipe for arresting declining 
business performance and recovering a position of profitability. 
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2.8 THE RECOVERY PHASE 
Pearce and Robbins (1982:623) describe efficiency maintenance and 
reconfiguration as actions taken to re-establish differential competitive 
advantage. Where the root cause is related to marketing, these issues need to 
be addressed through a comprehensive and coordinated marketing strategy. 
Where the cause of decline is related to financial matters, a sound financial 
plan requires to be put into place. Perhaps most difficult of all, where the root 
cause is entrepreneurial ineptitude and managerial incapacity, the problems 
must be addressed by introducing external skills and reframing the 
entrepreneur's potential contribution. 
2.9 THE IMPORTANCE OF SMALL BUSINESS IN SOUTH 
AFRICA 
The issues of economic growth and empowerment remain key strategic 
imperatives for government, as reiterated in the Presidents 2006 State of the 
Nations Address. The high unemployment rate has spurred government efforts 
in the direction of small business development to generate sustainability and 
equitable growth. The impact and contribution of micro businesses in the 
Republic of South Africa can best be illustrated by the following facts supplied 
by the University of Natal, Faculty of Economics and Management, 
Department of Accounting and Finance (Course Notes Ace 1C: 1997:7): 
• More than 95% of businesses in RSA are small and medium businesses. 
• Approximately 46% of overall economic activity can be accredited to 
small and medium businesses. 
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• Small and medium enterprises provided 84% of all private employment. 
• Small and medium enterprises in the formal sector contribute a larger 
proportion to the countries gross domestic product than all the corporate 
giants put together. 
2.9.1 SIZE AND DIVERSITY OF THE SECTOR IN SOUTH AFRICA 
According to the White Paper on the National Strategy for the Development 
and Promotion of Small Business in South Africa (1995:7-8j, the size and 
diversity of the sector is summarised as follows: 
• Although South Africa has a poor statistical data base of small business 
information, indications are that there are 800 000 small and medium 
businesses in the country absorbing about twenty five percent of the 
country's labour force of 15 million people. This excludes the 3.5 million 
people involved in some or other type of survivalist enterprise activity. 
• The small business sector is very diverse, covering retail, manufacturing 
and mining, with structures, problems, growth potential and access to 
support differing widely between the segments. 
• There are four categories of small businesses namely, survivalist, micro, 
small, and medium business that pervade the South African economy. 
Survivalist enterprises are activities conducted by people unable to find a paid 
job or to enter into an economic sector of preference. Poverty and an attempt 
to survive are the main characteristics where income generated is lower than 
the minimum wages and there is little capital investment with virtually no skills 
and training, exasperated by limited growth opportunities. 
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Micro businesses are very small businesses owned and operated by the 
owner and some family members with only a few paid employees, if any at all. 
They usually lack formality in terms of statutory registrations like value added 
taxes, trading licenses and accounting procedures. Most have a limited capital 
base with rudimentary technical or business skills. 
Small enterprises constitute the bulk of the established business, with 
employment ranging between five and fifty. They are generally owner 
managed and are likely to operate from business or industrial premises 
meeting statutory compliance requirements. Lastly, medium enterprises in 
South Africa constitute a category difficult to demarcate. It is still owner or 
manager controlled employing about 200 people with a capital asset base of 
about R5 million. 
It would appear that the four different categories would require different policy 
and support approaches. Compounding the challenge is the need to pay 
special attention to the particular problems and needs of enterprises owned 
and controlled by previously disadvantaged groups including women and 
marginalised groups living in remote rural areas. 
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2.9.2 THE ROLE AND CONTRIBUTION OF SMALL BUSINESS 
In spite of the diversity and the uncoordinated approaches of various support 
agencies as acknowledged by the Draft White Paper (1995:9), small 
businesses continue to flourish and grow and their particular contributions can 
be listed as follows: 
• Small business plays a critical role in the economic and social 
development of a country as illustrated by many developed economies 
amongst which Japan and United States of America are prime examples. 
Although South Africa is no different, the small business sector has been 
neglected in much of the century following the discovery of diamonds and 
gold and the establishment of a modern, capitalistic economy with almost 
exclusive white control. 
• While the role and importance of big business cannot be denied, there is 
sufficient evidence that the labour absorption capacity of small business 
is high and the average capital cost per job created is usually lower than 
big business and its role in technical and other innovation is vital for 
many of the challenges facing the South African economy. 
• Given South Africa's legacy of big business domination, constrained 
competition and unequal distribution of income and wealth, small 
businesses tend to generate employment, exploit niche markets and 
enhance productivity and technical change thus stimulating economic 
growth. 
• Small business plays a crucial role in people's efforts to meet basic 
needs to survive especially within a South African context where there 
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are many female heads of households and marginalised groups living in 
poverty-stricken areas with no social grant systems. 
2.9.3 CONSTRAINTS FACING THE SMALL BUSINESS SECTOR 
Given the limited support infrastructure for small business in South Africa, the 
constraints are numerous and relate to the legal and regulatory environment, 
limited access to markets, finance and business premises at affordable rents, 
the acquisition of skills and managerial expertise, access to technology and in 
some cases the tax burden. In addition to the sector-based constraints, the 
historical constraints placed on Black people limited their participation and 
deprived them and the country of viable business opportunities as follows: 
• Bantu education restricted opportunities for technical and professional 
skills acquisition. 
• There was no entrepreneurial education or sensitising of young people to 
adopt a culture of entrepreneurship. 
• Apartheid also confined millions of people to homelands with limited 
business opportunities and the lack of a dynamic business environment. 
• The system also prevented joint ventures and partnerships between the 
races allowing the leveraging of capital and skills sets. 
• Segregation also increased the living distances between work and home 
thus increasing the cost and risk of conducting business. 
• The curtailment of property ownership rights made it impossible to 
acquire assets that could be used as collateral for loan financing. This 
inhibited the long run process of capital accrual and growth through rising 
property values. 
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• Apartheid also left women with no real space of business involvement as 
the marriage laws reduced women to unions with no contractual capacity 
2.9.4 ELEMENTS OF THE SUPPORT FRAMEWORK 
The Draft White Paper (1995:23-59) notes that a wide range of interventions 
are required to support small business development as follows: 
CREATING AN ENABLING LEGAL ENVIRONMENT 
Government has promulgated numerous pieces of legislations to reinforce its 
strategy and focus on small business. Firstly, the National Small Business Act 
of 1996 was promulgated and provides for the establishment of a National 
Small Business Council and The Ntsika Enterprise Promotions Agency. Other 
interventions include the streamlining of regulatory conditions, investigations 
by the Competitions Board about the possible small business constraints 
inherent in the current competitive structure, increasing the number of small 
claims court and increasing the level of claims falling within its jurisdiction and 
establishing a user-friendly environment for the simplification and 
standardization of documents. 
ACCESS TO INFORMATION AND ADVICE 
Government's efforts are focused on getting quality data and sector specific 
information to small business owners. To date the number of enterprises 
effectively reached remains small compared to the vast number of people 
involved in self-employment efforts in both urban and rural areas. 
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ACCESS TO MARKETING AND PROCUREMENT 
Small business usually regard market constrains and the inability to sell their 
products and services as a significant obstacle. Efforts include procurement 
quotas, voluntary commitments and simplification of the tender processes in 
public and parastatal tender authorities, export support programmes and 
export credit guarantee schemes. 
ACCESS TO FINANCE 
Unlike most developed countries, South Africa's commercial banks in the past 
have been reluctant to provide comprehensive services for the fragmented, 
risk prone and geographically dispersed small business sector. Support is 
required for initial start up equity, concessionary and low interest rate loans 
and ongoing subsidization or matching grant finance. Other initiatives included 
are the establishment of venture capital funds, credit guarantee schemes, 
deposit-taking by lending Non Government Organisations, alternative 
collateral and information on access to finance. 
THE PHYSICAL INFRASTRUCTURE 
The development and financing of business and industrial premises, like 
shops, factories and market stands is necessary for small business 
development and success. This also includes the need for industrial 
incubators and industrial zones. 
STIMULANTS FOR SMALL BUSINESS GROWTH 
Training in entrepreneurship, skills and management is critical for success. In 
addition, literacy and entrepreneurial awareness are particularly important to 
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DIFFERENTIAL TAXATION AND OTHER FINANCIAL INCENTIVES 
It is acknowledged that much has to be done to reduce the tax burden of small 
business in South Africa. Amongst the mechanisms to be considered are a 
lower rate of corporate tax, exemption of a minimum of profit from taxation, 
more generous depreciation allowances, exemption and rebates on import 
duties on manufacturing inputs and a review of the Regional Council services 
levies. 
The South African executive report of entrepreneurship, (GEM Report 2001) 
was used as a benchmark to compare Governments progress in achieving its 
strategy position as the survey was independently done six years after the 
strategy was released in Parliament. 
The Gem Report by Driver, Wood, Segal and Herrington (2001:14) shows that 
only one in eighteen South African adult is an entrepreneur and only one in 
twenty three adults is an start up entrepreneur while only one in sixty seven 
adults is a new firm entrepreneur. 
The GEM report was produced from data collected through key informants 
interviews, surveys and questionnaires. The major limitations are the small 
number of respondents and the dependence on government sources for most 
of the information. 
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GRAPH 2.1 
INTERNATIONAL COMPARISON OF TOTAL ENTREPRENEURIAL 
ACTIVITY AND REAL GDP GROWTH RATES FOR 2000-2001 
Source: Global Entrepreneurship Monitor (2001:14) 
South Africa ranks 14th amongst the 29 countries surveyed on total 
entrepreneurship activity and its rate of entrepreneurial activity is the lowest 
amongst the developing countries. The Global Entrepreneurship Report 
(2006:13) reports that South Africa's ranking has dropped to 30 out of 35 
countries. This suggests that the enabling environment that government 
strategy refers to may not have been as successful. While there is not a 
straightforward relationship between the GDP growth and levels of 
entrepreneurial activity, South Africa's GDP growth is much higher than the 
business activity participation again suggesting that all is not well in the small 
business sector in South Africa. The following graph 2.2 further illustrates this 
phenomenon. 
GRAPH 2.2 
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Source: Global Entrepreneurship Monitor (2001:15) 
Graph 2.2 shows that almost all countries have a higher start up index than 
new firm index. This is expected, since there is an inherent drop out rate 
amongst entrepreneurial ventures, as not all of them succeed. South Africa's 
new firm index relative to the start up index, suggests a lower survival rate 
amongst start-ups than is typical internationally. The 2005 results indicate a 
similar trend. This again places in question government's strategy in terms of 
support. Why does the Republic of South Africa have such a higher failure 
rate? This research attempts to provide a perspective on this management 
dilemma. 
To increase the country's level of entrepreneurial activity, both a strong 
business birth rate and survival rate is required. Simply increasing the 
business birth rate in South Africa, with the absence of a support system 
would simply increase the number of business failures. An indication that the 
government strategy has not sufficiently addressed the challenges of small 
business is further illustrated in the Global Entrepreneurial Report (2001:19). 
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Responses to the question of availability of business opportunity and requisite 
skills sets are graphically illustrated as follows. 
GRAPH 2.3 
INTERNATIONAL COMPARISON OF ENTREPRENEUR'S PERCEPTIONS 
AND CAPACITY 
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Entrepreneurial capacity is about the ability and will to respond to business 
opportunities. Unlike the high levels of self esteem and entrepreneurial 
capacity that exists in most countries as indicated in graph 2.3, a relative small 
proportion of South Africans believe that they have the necessary skills to start 
a business or see good business opportunities. While supporters of 
government strategy may argue that pessimism about business opportunities 
probably has more to do with the lack of ability to recognise opportunities than 
the actual lack of opportunities, people in countries like Belgium, New Zealand 
and Mexico have far higher confidence in their ability and experience than 
South Africans do. 
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The DWP strategy to encourage women entrepreneurs and young participants 
must be commended but reinforced through a skills and education plan. The 
South African Global Entrepreneurship study (2001:20), found that twice as 
many males become entrepreneurs compared to females and the levels of 
participation is highest in the 35-54 age groups for both men and women. 
These age and gender patterns are similar to other countries surveyed. The 
South African challenge is a country specific one and requires country specific 
interventions. 
It was also found that those with matric and a tertiary qualification are more 
likely to own and manage a start- up than those without a matric as illustrated 
in graph 2.4. 
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But if Government strategy is to target the youth, how will such persons 
access capital? In addressing this question the findings from the Global 
Entrepreneurship study 2001 becomes significant. 
GRAPH 2.5 
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The graph 2.5 shows that the most common source of finance is the 
entrepreneur personally. This is true regardless of race, gender, location or 
education level. Forty-five percent of start up entrepreneurs reported that they 
would invest their own savings or income in the business. The Small Business 
Act provides for financial assistance through dedicated state institutions. The 
expectations of government finances are significantly higher in rural and 
country towns, where economic activity is most needed. 
In concluding the evaluation of government strategy against actual 
entrepreneurial findings, a policy implementation perspective of potential 
entrepreneurs is discussed. The Global Monitor survey (2001:46-47) reported 
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that 39% of the experts interviewed identified government policies as one of 
the three main inhibitors for small business growth. 
TABLE 2.1 
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The main problem in the area of government policy is the administrative 
burden placed on firms by compliance with the combination of tax, labour and 
other legislation. This remains so in spite of the DWP strategy to address this 
as a high priority intervention in 1995. Administrative burden placed on 
informal businesses is a disincentive to become formalised, which in turn 
would have implications for tax and small business development. 
Government has made substantial progress in reducing the time taken to 
register a business to 30 days as compared to the average of 63 days in a 
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2.10 FRANCHISING 
Franchising is a relatively new concept in South Africa and has been the 
subject of much debate. This section outlines the role that franchising plays in 
ensuring success in small business. While Carland and Carland (1990:373) 
stated that, the lower failure rate for franchises is due to the marketing-
management expertise and training offered by the franchiser, Stanworth and 
David (1998:56) stated that, the majority of young franchises are typically 
small scale entrepreneurial ventures facing considerable challenges. 
Perspectives on this argument are also included. 
2.10.1 DEFINITION OF A FRANCHISE 
Siropolis (1994:139) defined a franchised relationship as, "an agreement 
between the seller and the buyer - an agreement that permits the buyer 
(franchisee) to sell the product and service of the seller (franchisor)". 
Carland and Carland (1990:373) defined a franchise as, "a business that has a 
contractual relationship with another business in which marketing and 
management services are provided in return for initial and ongoing fees". 
Kuehl and Lambing (1994:110) provides an alternative definition that is 
somewhat simpler. They refer to a franchise as an "arrangement by which the 
owner of a product, process or service allows others to distribute the product, 
use the process or offer the service". 
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From the definitions, it is clear that the franchisor allows the franchisee, to use 
the complete business package containing all the elements necessary to 
establish a previously untrained person in a franchised business. This enables 
the franchisee to run the business on an ongoing basis, according to the 
guidelines supplied, efficiently and profitably. 
The franchising concept appeals to a venturing entrepreneur as provision is 
made for training and support and the venture is not perceived to be a wholly 
individual effort. The franchisor has a proven record of accomplishment in a 
specific business. There is no emphasis on previous experience or 
qualifications thereby making it an appealing business option. 
According to Kuehl and Lambing (1994:111), there are three types of 
franchising arrangements. Firstly, there is a product or trade name franchising 
that permits the new entrepreneur to use the franchisor's trade name in 
exchange for fees and royalties as well as an obligation to sell only the 
franchisor's products. Examples of this type of franchising are car dealers and 
fuel retailing service stations. 
Business format franchising permits the franchisee to use the franchisor's 
entire business concept. This would include the trading name, goodwill, 
products and services, packaging, marketing strategies, expertise and support 
facilities. The franchisee would pay an initial fee and ongoing management 
support fees. Lastly, manufacturing franchises gives the dealer the exclusive 
right to produce and distribute product in a particular area. 
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2.10.2 IMPLICATIONS FOR SMALL BUSINESS 
llletschko (1991:12-13) reports that about one third of all retail sales in the 
United States are carried out through franchised outlets. It would be possible 
to spend an entire life utilising franchised services. One could be born in a 
franchised clinic, helped into the world by a franchised mid wife and taken 
home in a franchised vehicle. One could then go to a franchised play school, 
attend franchised educational institutions or build a home using franchised 
builders. One's entire life from birth to death could potentially be "under 
franchise" - including being buried by a franchised undertaker. 
Ordinary people generally undertake this wide-spectrum of activity. What then 
makes franchising so successful? According to Stanworth and Purdy 
(1998:56), franchising removes a good part of the risk associated with starting 
of a new business. It gives the new entrepreneur the support and advice 
required, during the most trying parts of setting up and operating a small 
business. 
2.10.3 FRANCHISING AS A FORMAT FOR SMALL BUSINESS 
Siropolis (1994:139-140) suggests that, franchising thrives because it merges 
the incentives of owning a small business with the management skill of big 
business emphasing that personal ownership is one of the best incentives 
created to spur on hard work. 
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While tremendous growth is seen in the franchising industry, many personal 
franchise failures are disguised in the process of franchise transfers through 
outlet ownership changes. Growth is partly due to the fact the large 
corporations are using franchising as a way of unbundling and expanding. It is 
seen as an alternative to staff retrenchment and a valuable mechanism today 
to enhance Black Economic Empowerment in South Africa. 
Stanworth and Purdy (1998:56) state, that franchising is an avenue into self-
employment offered by franchisors. It is a blend of big and small business -
the fusion of energy and commitment of the individual with the resources, 
power and strength of a large company. It is widely perceived as a relatively 
safe way for people to get into business for themselves but not by themselves. 
According to the British Franchise Association (1996:2), "you are five times 
more likely to succeed as a franchise, than if you start a comparable business 
independently." 
Sub contracting and outsourcing are on the increase because of the need for 
flexibility and decreased overheads structures of large corporations. Examples 
include the use of accounting firms, legal firms and employment agencies by 
huge corporations. 
2.10.4 THE BENEFITS OF FRANCHISING 
The benefits of franchising are numerous. Johnson (1999:72) in researching 
franchising as a mechanism for economic empowerment in South Africa, notes 
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that the ability to raise capital becomes exponentially improved within a 
franchised format. The lenders of funds are comfortable to deal with a credible 
franchise as apposed to dealing with an individual. The franchisee is assisted 
in running all aspects of the business, as it is also in the interest of the 
franchisor, that the franchisee is successful. Franchised businesses have 
good accounting systems and controls that enhance the businesses ability to 
perform better. 
This is not necessary the case for the franchisor. Trutko, Trutko and Kostecka 
(1993:7) portrayed a different picture for franchisors starting out. They noted 
that, the development of a business from a proven concept through to the sale 
of its first franchise is typically a long, expensive and risky process for the 
franchisor. 
Johnson (1999:72) also noted that, franchisors generally identify potential 
market areas and establish franchise outlets in those geographic locations to 
exploit the market opportunities. Through the establishment of a franchised 
network, markets grow and the franchisor utilises collective resources. In most 
cases, the franchisor secures an order and uses the franchisee to execute the 
supply function. Consumers are familiar with particular brands of products and 
services and become brand loyal. A privately owned business has an absolute 
disadvantage in this respect. 
However, the research work conducted by Shane (1996:216-234) found that a 
new franchise system brings with it the high probability that the new franchisee 
will not be around in future years, because over half of the new franchises 
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ceased to franchise during the first four years of operation. It appears that the 
benefits that Johnson (1999:72) refers to, are mostly applicable to established 
franchises. 
The findings of Johnson (1999:72), is similar to the findings of Rodkin 
(1996:16-18), in that the success of franchised business is largely dependant 
on the skills transfer that takes place between the franchisor and its 
franchisee. The franchisor provides knowledge, business experience and 
start-up support to ease entry into the business. 
This is a critical contributory factor for the success of franchise businesses. 
The new entrepreneur acquires the valuable expertise and experience of the 
franchisor. A proven franchise may eliminate many problems that are 
associated with the initial start-up. The franchisor, for instance, assists the 
franchisee with the site selection, planning, staff training, opening of business 
and its consequent smooth running. Prospective franchisees are thus able to 
start a business with little or no previous training in a given industry. 
Kuehl and Lambing (1994:113), emphasised the benefit of instant recognition 
as apposed to a one-man business, whose ability is limited in influencing 
suppliers and other service providers. A franchisee is part of a larger network 
of businesses. Franchisees can therefore demand and secure a wider range 
of services at lower prices. This could include health care, pension funds, 
saving facilities and insurance. The lean early years that cause many small 
businesses to fail are less applicable to franchised businesses. 
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Cross (1994:2-4) noted that the benefit of association is only valid if the 
franchisor's responsibilities are met. Insufficient support of franchisees is a 
common cause of franchise failures. 
Johnson (1999:72) further identified the ability to buy and advertise as a 
critical benefit in franchising. Generally, the franchisee sells a product or 
service that is well known by consumers. If the product or service is already a 
proven success then the franchisee can focus on the day-to-day operations of 
the business rather than being preoccupied with the promotion of the product 
or service. It is also a fact that many small businesses cannot afford to 
advertise extensively. The franchisee buys this advantage from the franchisor. 
As the number of franchises increase so does the public awareness of the 
product and service. Franchises within reasonable location from each other 
can jointly advertise thus reducing operating costs. 
2.10.5 THE DISADVANTAGES OF FRANCHISING 
There are as many disadvantages as there are advantages. Hall (1995:109) 
stated that, initiative might be severely restricted. Franchisors may allow very 
little scope for their franchisees to exhibit any innovation in what or how to sell. 
Johnson (1999:72) agreed that conformity to the franchisor's system is critical 
if consistency amongst franchisees is to be maintained. This invariably leads 
to a trade-off between an individual's business creativity and the forced 
compliance of the franchisor's demands. The control exercised by the 
franchisor to regulate the provision of a service or the production of a product 
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to the consumer leaves little opportunity for the entrepreneur to impose his 
own personality on the business. 
According to Johnson (1999:72), the capital costs for research and design of a 
product can be exorbitant. Generally, the franchisor has a stepped fee 
structure in exchange for not providing any guarantees of success for the 
franchisee. This non-profit initial fee and slow-to-accumulate royalties may in 
the short-term place a financial constraint on the franchisor. 
Ellingham (1996:79-84) concurs with Johnson's (1999:72) observation and 
suggested that to take an already profitable franchise pilot operation to break-
even point as a fully-fledged franchise network, requires at least USD 150 000 
and the recruitment of 30-40 franchisees over a 4-year period. Any 
sluggishness in the recruitment of franchisees may result in the franchisor 
entering year six of the post pilot operation, still not having reached break-
even point. 
Siropolis (1994:144-145), described as a myth that franchisees are 
independent businesspersons. Franchisees are not free to run their 
businesses as they see fit and are often hamstrung by the franchisor's 
policies, standards and procedures. Franchisor's do not want their franchisees 
to improve the way they do business - they often look for persons who 
understand their systems but do not have any wish to improve them. 
Johnson (1999:72) concurs and reiterated that the basic assumption that the 
franchisor has all the requisite expertise and skills can become a serious point 
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of contention, should the reality not reflect this. Should the franchisor's support 
infrastructure not be suitable to fulfill the expectations of the franchisee, then 
the business relationship can be strained and unsuccessful. 
Johnson (1999:72) notes that, the ultimate risk, like a privately owned 
business lies with the franchisee. Should the franchisor's image become 
tarnished then the negativity is permeated across the franchisee network. The 
franchisee is perceived by the public to be the representative of the franchisor. 
Franchisees are also subjected to a financial risk. Many franchisors require 
substantial investment in the business by the franchisee. 
There is no guarantee of success in the franchise industry. Researchers 
Castrogiovanni, Justis and Julian (1993:105:115) examined data on franchise 
failures and concluded, based on legal disclosure obligations, that franchise 
failure rates ranged from 2.1 to 5.2 percent. 
Theoretically, franchising should reduce the probability of failure due to the 
non-franchise causes, on condition that the franchisors' responsibility are met 
and that the appropriate back- up services, expand at the rate sufficient to 
cope with any growth in the franchise network. Cross (1994:2-4) identified that, 
persistent franchisor-franchisee conflict, poor franchisee screening and 
insufficient support of franchisees are amongst the main reasons for 
franchisee failure. 
Siropolis (1994:145) found that, the fast growth of franchises has spawned a 
number of myths. The most popular one is the promise of instant wealth. The 
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nature of a franchise relationship places a call for equal effort by both parties. 
The franchisee's expectation of huge profitability in the initial stages may not 
be realised and the franchisor's expectancy of a hard working and dedicated 
franchisee may not be realised. This would lead to failure of the franchise 
initiative. Kirby, Waites and Bagri's (1996:5) report on franchising, claimed 
that, "franchising start up costs are high, it is often difficult to find the 
appropriate advise, which is perceived to be expensive and the banks appear 
to treat developmental franchises as they do new small firms". 
It is clear that the advantages far outweigh the disadvantages. The oil 
company uses franchised insignia, brands the Retail service station business 
and visuals, have dedicated franchised support systems and brand specific 
advertising. This research work will attempt to test the advantages listed 
above against the experience of the case respondents. 
2.11 CONCLUSION 
This chapter covered the definitions of small business, small business failure 
and other key definitions. It also included an overview of governments national 
strategy published in 1995 that was compared to the findings in the 2001 
South African Global Entrepreneurship Monitor. The chapter examined the 
importance of the small business sector in South Africa, the size and diversity 
of the sector and the constraints faced. 
The government strategy paper did not consider the benefits that franchising 
can play and the chapter concluded with an analysis of the potential 
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CHAPTER 3 
SMALL BUSINESS PARTICIPATION AND REASONS FOR FAILURE 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
This section explores the theoretical foundations for small business 
development. Why do people want to become small business owners? 
Entrepreneurship is about people who realise new opportunities and are 
persistent, passionate, adaptable and able to take risks in pursuit of those 
opportunities. Researcher's perceptions about criterion for success vary and 
these varying viewpoints are discussed. 
This chapter also addresses the critical success factors for small business. In 
order to determine the factors that contribute to success or failure of small 
business, it is necessary to identify the key issues within the environment that 
small business operates in. An attempt is made to address some of these 
issues from the extant literature. What motivates people to own their own 
businesses? Four main theories of motivation dominate literature in relation to 
possible reasons for small business participation. These are Maslow's 
hierarchy of needs, Herzberg's two-factor theory of motivation, Vroom's 
expectancy theory and Adams' equity theory. 
3.2 MASLOW'S HIERARCHY OF NEEDS 
Maslow (1943:370-376) devised a theory around human nature that proposed 
a hierarchy of needs that were required to be satisfied. These needs can best 
described as follows: 
• Physiological needs refer to the absolute basic needs of individuals for 
food, shelter and sleep. 
• Safety and security is a higher-level need. Here the individual seeks to 
be protected from physical and psychological threats. Individuals would 
seek for their physical safety, freedom from fear and for certainty, 
regarding the future. 
• Social needs of human beings include the need for love and affection, 
friendship and social interaction. 
• Ego needs refers to an individuals self-respect, self-esteem, confidence, 
power and status. 
• Self-actualisation - this is the highest level of needs on the hierarchy of 
human needs. Here individuals seek to achieve individual growth, a 
sense of achievement and the realisation of ones potential. 
Maslow suggested that individuals would seek to satisfy their lower level 
needs first and then progress to rise up the hierarchy, as illustrated by figure 
3.1, to ultimately satisfy the final level of self-actualisation. 
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FIGURE 3.1 
MASLOW'S HIERARCHY OF NEEDS 
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Source: Maslow (1943:370-396) Management by participation 
Pillay (2000:21) suggests that entrepreneurs venture into their own businesses 
to fulfill stage two requirements as classified by Maslow. He suggests that self-
employment is a form of safety and security sought by most individuals 
entering the micro business sector. Actually, persons could also enter into 
small business to fill their basic need for food and shelter as is evident in many 
survivalist type business activities in South Africa. 
Johnson (1999:66) suggests that only 55.7% of persons surveyed in her 
research, involved themselves in franchise business operations because an 
opportunity was presented to them - they did not actively seek out those 
businesses. Only 9.1% of franchisees surveyed indicated that their previous 
job failed to provide the degree of fulfillment and job satisfaction sought. This 
means that persons may not enter business life due to the "need" to do so but 
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simply because an opportunity presented itself. In other cases, persons could 
enter into small business to fulfill their self-actualisation needs. 
Handy (2001:22) addresses the new capitalism issue in the USA and makes 
some pertinent points that are relevant to this research work. He submits that 
the critical and worried voices are not evidence of failure of capitalism, but 
they do suggest that as capitalism moves into a new phase, there would have 
to be some major adjustments in society and more thought needs to be given 
to cope optimally with the new challenges. He metaphorically refers to the 
challenge as, "the age of elephants and fleas". 
Elephants are large corporations that increasingly dominate our economies as 
competitors become globalised. In so doing, the elephant are driven to marry 
or swallow each other in order to increase resources or spread their reach. 
Fleas on the other hand are small ventures, the sub-contractors, start-ups, 
self-employed specialised consultants, entrepreneurs and the small family 
business that is the back- bone of the USA economy. Successful capitalism 
undoubtedly, needs both. 
Handy (2001:22) further elabourated that elephants offer efficiency, resources 
for developing guarantees of reliability and employment. However, elephants 
are cumbersome, slow to give birth to new ideas and can miss the niches of 
opportunity in pursuit of bigger game. Fleas sit on these niches and on the 
backs of elephant's, they are nimble and quick to change, providing ideas and 
specialised skill that elephants often lack. Some fleas grow to become 
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elephants but more often elephants would swallow the fleas if they seem 
interesting. 
Many have discovered that the way to riches is on the back of an elephant. 
The former US labour secretary, Robert Reich, has argued that big companies 
will eventually become more of a giant brand than an organization, a brand 
backed by a host of small fleas - small semi-autonomous teams and project 
groups. Many have been lured away from elephant careers to flex their might 
and become entrepreneurial fleas. 
However, fleas are subject to nature's law of abundance. Too many seeds are 
produced by nature because so many fail to germinate. The USA's tolerance 
of entrepreneurial failure is recognition of this law. The USA leads the way in 
germinating the counterbalancing abundance of new fleas through its culture 
of newness, individual responsibility and wealth as a sign of net worth. 
Handy (2001:22) suggests that the USA government needs to pay more 
attention to immigration policy in addition to the technical aspects like start up 
capital and bankruptcy laws. Conversely, the immigration laws in the Republic 
of South Africa are being relaxed to attract people with requisite capital and 
skill. 
Handy (2001:22-25) proceeds to highlight the dilemmas ahead. Fleas are 
passionate and busy, self- absorbed and even self-obsessed. They have little 
time for community participation. Their loyalty is first for themselves, their 
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careers and their family members- corresponding to social needs referred to 
by Maslow. 
Elephants promise employability rather than employment and generally end up 
preparing their staff for the life of a flea. Elephants slim down, outsource and 
sub-contract thus growing the population of fleas. In the USA, only 40% of the 
labour force is on lifetime employment contract while the remaining 60% are 
self-employed, part-time or a temporary flea of some sort. Although Maslow's 
analysis of human needs is an acceptable postulation for human activity, 
relating to business, it is not without criticism. 
A number of researchers have probed the validity of Maslow's hierarchy. Their 
findings does not consistently support the rankings postulated. Hofstede 
(1980:42-63) found that, social needs as apposed to self-actualization needs 
was the primary motivation of employees desiring a better quality of life. 
Howell, Strauss and Sorenson (1975:225-227) found that, the needs of 
managers in Liberia were concentrated on security and self-esteem and this 
differed from their counterparts in developed countries. 
Buera and Glueck (1979:113-123) compared the needs of managers in Liberia 
and the United States and found that the rankings differed, because of the 
different cultures. These conflicting research findings suggest that while a 
hierarchy does indeed exist, the needs are different across the economic and 
cultural spectrum of society. 
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Another criticism is that there are examples of people who exhibit the very 
least aspects of self-actualisation and are far from satisfying their lower level 
needs. While babies are best examples of human self-actualisation, Maslow 
saw it as something that was very rarely achieved by the young. 
While Maslow's theory makes sense from an intuitive standpoint, there is little 
evidence to support its hierarchical aspect. In fact, there is evidence that 
contradicts the order of needs specified by the model. For example, some 
cultures appear to place social needs before any other needs. Maslow's theory 
also fails to address the case of the "starving artist" in which a person neglects 
lower needs in pursuit of higher ones. Finally, there is little evidence to 
suggest that people are motivated to satisfy only one need level at a time, 
except in situations where there is a conflict between needs. 
3.3 HERZBERG'S TWO-FACTOR THEORY OF MOTIVATION 
According to the Two Factor theory of Frederick Herzberg, people are 
influenced by two factors, Hygiene factors and motivation factors. Typical 
hygiene factors include working conditions, quality of supervision, salary, 
status, security, company, job, company policies and administration and 
interpersonal relations. These factors, if addressed play a role in preventing 
dissatisfaction and demotivation but are incapable of motivating staff. 
Motivation factors on the other hand include achievement, recognition for 
achievement, responsibility for task, interest in the job, advancement to higher-
level tasks and growth. The two-factor theory is illustrated in figure 3.2. 
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FIGURE 3.2 
HERZBERG'S TWO-FACTOR THEORY OF MOTIVATION 
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Source: Value based Management (Internet 6:www.valuebasedmanagement.net) 
Combining the hygiene and motivational factors result in four scenarios: 
• High hygiene and high motivation: Ideal situation where employees 
are highly motivated and have few complaints. 
• High hygiene and low motivation: Employees have few concerns but 
are not highly motivated. The job is perceived as a pay back. 
• Low hygiene and high motivation: Employees are motivated but have 
many complaints. A situation where the job is challenging and satisfying 
but working conditions and remunerations are not up to par. 
• Low hygiene and low motivation: This is the worst situation. 
Unmotivated employees with lots of complaints. 
It seems obvious that the two-factor result is observed because it is natural for 
people to take credit for satisfaction and blame dissatisfaction on external 
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factors. Furthermore, job satisfaction does not imply a high level of motivation 
or productivity. 
The research into Herzberg's theory suggested that its universality could not 
be assumed as specific factors that acted as motivators or hygiene factors 
differed between cultures. In the context of this study, it would be of particular 
importance to assess whether persons dissatisfied with their work conditions 
would pursue small business interests. 
3.4 VROOM'S EXPECTANCY THEORY OF MOTIVATION 
Lord (1993:50) noted that, in the 1960's a considerable body of process type 
theory existed in the area of workers motivation. These theories provided a 
dynamic theoretical basis for the structure of work design strategies. They 
considered the relationship between employee's efforts, performance and 
reward. Lord (1993:50) noted that, Vroom proposed that an individual's 
motivation to perform tasks was a function of the product of two factors, being 
his "expectancy" and his "valence" in respect of the likely outcomes thereof. 
Vroom's theory is based upon the following three beliefs: 
• Valence refers to the emotional orientations, which people hold with 
respect to rewards, and includes the extrinsic variables like money, 
promotion, free time, benefits and intrinsic variable of satisfaction and 
rewards. 
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• Expectancy refers to the individual's degree of expectation that the 
anticipated outcome (financial reward or promotion) would actually be 
provided upon completion of the task. 
• Instrumentality is the perception of employees whether they would 
actually receive what they desire - management must fulfill their 
promises of reward. 
Schuler (1980:331-340) in testing a role and expectancy perception model of 
participation in decision making, found positive relationships between 
participation in decision making and the performance - reward expectancy of 
employees. 
Lord (1993:50-60) further notes that, the effect of perceived work-goal difficulty 
has frequently been founded on expectancy principles. Examples of studies 
indicating that an employee's commitment reduced, as his perceived chances 
of attaining his work-goal diminished, includes Shalley and Oldman (1985:628-
640). 
Erez and Zidon (1984:69-78) conducted a labouratory experiment with 
technicians, who were shown a set of high-level objectives in their work 
environment. The technicians' goal acceptance and performance declined 
significantly, because of the perceived difficulty of these targets. Is it possible 
that when the expectancy needs are not fulfilled that such persons would seek 
to influence the outcomes by becoming their own bosses? 
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In attempting to address the research question for the reasons for failure and 
success amongst fuel retailers, careful attention will be paid to what motivates 
people to enter the small business environment and become entrepreneurs. 
3.5 ENTREPRENEURIAL FACTORS 
This section seeks to identify the reason that motivates a person to become an 
entrepreneur. A broad definition of entrepreneurship, with the intention of 
isolating the "being" of the entrepreneur, is provided. Do these individuals 
have specific qualities that distinguish them from the general population? Are 
characteristics a differentiating factor for success and failure? 
3.5.1 DEFINITION OF AN ENTREPRENEUR 
The owner or the entrepreneur is the soul of the business. Small businesses 
are born through the desire of the entrepreneur and the lifespan is intrinsically 
linked to the ability of the owner to ensure its sustainability, growth and its 
ultimate existence. 
Timmons (1994:7-8) defined entrepreneurship as, "creating and building 
something of value from practically nothing. Fundamentally, entrepreneurship 
is a human creative act. It involves finding personal energy by initiating and 
building an enterprise" 
Most contemporary authors like Burns (2001:6) agree, that the entrepreneur is 
a business leader and plays a pivotal role in fostering economic growth. 
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Entrepreneurs use innovation to exploit or create change and opportunity for 
making profit. They shift economic resources from an area of lower 
productivity into an area of higher productivity and greater yield. 
While there is agreement that entrepreneurs are opportunistic and self-
motivated, Burns (2001:25-27) cautions that linking character traits of an 
individual to business success cannot be generalised. Whether a clearly 
definable set of entrepreneurial characteristics exists remains a controversy. It 
appears that successful people like politicians and athletes possess similar 
traits as was confirmed in the research work of Chell, Haworth and Brearley 
(1991:34). 
The most likely candidates for entrepreneurs are inventors; unfulfilled 
managers (as potential entrants based on Maslow's, Herzberg's and Vroom's 
theories) displaced managers and young professionals. This corresponds to 
the research findings of Glas (1996:389-423), who examined the profiles of 
Slovenian entrepreneurs and concluded that, entrepreneurs came from 
various social groups like former employees of middle and large state owned 
enterprises, successful craftsmen, former top and middle managers and 
graduates of self-employment programmes. 
Zimmerer and Scarborough (1998:12) offer another interesting perspective for 
entrepreneurial interest. They cite the American lifestyle where successful 
entrepreneurs are seen as heroes, the high quality of entrepreneurial 
education at colleges and universities, the ideal of an independent and self-
sustaining lifestyle and international opportunities. 
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3.5.2 CHARACTERISTICS AND MOTIVATIONAL FACTORS FOR 
ENTREPRENEURS 
Researchers have suggested a number of reasons for entrepreneurial 
participation. Developing a detailed list of characteristics is difficult as there 
could possibly be too many to mention or as described by Van Aardt, Van 
Aardt and Bezuidenhout (2000:9), "No single researcher has been able to 
pinpoint the personality traits of a successful entrepreneur". However, some 
perspectives are necessary given the important role entrepreneurs play in 
small business development. 
CHILDHOOD FAMILY ENVIRONMENT 
According to Hisrich and Peters (1998:25), the childhood family environment, 
education, personal values, age and work history are some factors that shape 
an entrepreneurial mind. 
The family environment of the entrepreneur includes birth order, parent's 
occupation and social status. The first-born or an only child receives extra 
attention and love thus developing the child's self-confidence. Hisrich and 
Peters (1998:25) found that, from a national sample of 408 female 
entrepreneurs in Europe, 50% were first-born. 
Van Aardt, Van Aardt and Bezuidenhout (2000:10), describe as a myth that 
entrepreneurs are born and not made. They accept that while entrepreneurs 
are born with certain innate characteristics, the talent in them is like, 
"unmoulded clay or an unpainted canvas". The making of an entrepreneur 
takes place by accumulation of relevant skills and know how. 
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However, many other studies of male and female entrepreneurs show no 
correlation to first-born status. According to Frese (2000:25), children of 
entrepreneurs get a positive role model of entrepreneurship starting at an early 
age. Having a father who is an entrepreneur is a strong inspiration for the 
child. The independent nature and flexibility of self-employment has an 
ingrained effect on the child. The overall parental relationship is the most 
important aspect of the family environment in establishing the desirability of 
entrepreneurial activity within an individual. 
AGE 
Age as a factor of entrepreneurial activity has been carefully studied. There is 
a general belief that there is a direct relationship between age and success in 
business. The greater energy levels and physical vigor of youth is thought to 
ensure greater success. This was validated by the research findings of Hall 
(1995:48-62), who investigated failure and success in the United Kingdom 
construction industry using personal interviews as a data collection tool. 
It was found that owners of surviving companies were younger than those of 
failures. This finding is somewhat surprising - if people gain knowledge, skill 
and experience as they become older, then following Javanovic (1982:649-
670), one would expect that these increases in human capital reduce the 
probability of their companies failing. Perhaps young people are open to new 
ideas and have more energy. 
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However, in research conducted by Bates (1990:551-559), it was found that 
the rate of small business closures shows an inverse relationship to age. The 
age group between 45-55 years was found to be positively correlated. 
Simmered and Scarborough (1998:12) started their businesses between the 
ages of 30-40 years. They view their business ventures as alternatives to 
employee status. It is also possible that older people are subject to age 
discrimination and go into business to create self-employment, especially in 
cases where adequate provision for retirement does not exist. 
Lastly, in the research done by the University of Port Elizabeth by Venter, Tait 
and Venter (1996:122) it was found that 59.8% of the respondents entering 
small business were over the age of forty with only 18.9% being under the age 
of twenty-nine. There is clearly no consensus amongst researchers on the role 
that age plays in differentiating entrepreneurial success and failure. 
EDUCATION 
The education level of entrepreneurs has also received significant research 
attention. Contrary to popular belief that most entrepreneurs are less educated 
than the average person is, research finding suggest otherwise. 
According to Frese (2000:25), human capital is the accumulation of knowledge 
and skills. While Rauch and Frese (1998:190-200) showed that human capital 
is slightly correlated to entrepreneurial success in western countries, Bates 
(1990:551-559), found that entrepreneurs with a college education were more 
likely to see their firms survive than those less educated. 
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Education should play a dual role in that it instills the initial confidence required 
to start ones own business and it also plays a major role in helping the 
entrepreneur cope with the day -to - day challenges and pressures of business 
life. 
In the research done by Hisrich and Peters (1998:25), the findings show that 
nearly 70% of all female entrepreneurs sampled had a tertiary education. 
Hisrich and Peters (1998:25) found that both male and female entrepreneurs 
have cited an educational need in the fields of strategy, finance, marketing and 
management. Education facilitates good communication and customer 
orientation. Entrepreneurial studies conducted in the Port Elizabeth Metropolis 
by Tait and Venter (1996:120), reflects that only 34.8% of respondents had a 
matriculation exemption and that 34.1% obtained a diploma or certificate on 
leaving school. 
The earlier research work conducted by Frese (1995:112-124) in South Africa 
and Uganda, found that education did not play a significant role. Some of the 
most successful entrepreneurs had relatively little education. While poor 
education was found to be a barrier, once the entrepreneurs became business 
owners, it was found that education did not play an important role for success. 
Lastly, Hall (1995:59) concludes that possession of a degree would not 




Many studies conducted, had concluded that personal values are important for 
entrepreneurs. However, many of these studies have failed to differentiate 
entrepreneurs from managers, unsuccessful entrepreneurs or the general 
populace. Borman and Motowidlo (1993:71-98) stated that, personal initiative 
contributes to organizational effectiveness. Entrepreneurship is about seeking 
opportunities and turning them into economic benefits. The entrepreneur is 
both goal and action orientated. 
Frese, Fay, Hilburger, Leng and Tag (1997:139-161) agreed that, 
characteristics like aggression, benevolence and creativity are important to 
entrepreneurs. The high initiative entrepreneur acts as a role model for his or 
her employees. 
Lumpkin and Dess (1996:136) argued that, entrepreneurial orientation 
consists of five dimensions, namely, autonomy, innovativeness, risk taking, 
competitive aggressiveness and pro-activeness. The nature of the enterprise, 
opportunism and individuality of the entrepreneur differ significantly from the 
bureaucratic organization and the planning, rationality and predictability of its 
managers. A successful entrepreneur is frequently characterised as a winner, 
implying that the desire to win is a pre-requisite for a person becoming an 
entrepreneur. 
However, Van Aardt and Van Aardt (2000:10) noted that, it is a myth that 
entrepreneurs are are their own exclusive bosses and seek power and control 
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over others. While they are driven by goals, the efforts are managed in an 
orderly way. 
NEED FOR ACHIEVEMENT 
Entrepreneurs are greatly concerned with personal performance levels. 
Successful owner-managers thrive on feedback mechanisms - a technique to 
increase their achievement. The research results of Rauch and Frese 
(2000:15) showed that, there is a clear-cut relationship between the need for 
achievement and entrepreneurial success. Successful entrepreneurs scored 
high on power and achievement motives. 
Burns (1998:28) concurs with this view. Entrepreneurs have a high need for 
achievement and often money is the "badge of achievement" to the successful 
entrepreneur. Public recognition of achievement is also important to some 
entrepreneurs and can lead to certain negative and unwise decisions like 
excessive risk taking and over spending. 
Entrepreneurship has different status connotations in different societies. This 
is especially true when one looks at the minority Asian groups in America. 
Status is not fully consequent on wealth and capital manipulation but on 
traditional values. 
While there is agreement on the attributes making up the achievement 
motivation, namely locus of control, independence, drive, involvement and 
moderate risk - taking, the concept of achievement motivation is open for 
interpretation and therefore the measurement of data and their interpretation 
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are not consistent. McClelland and Burnham (1995:127-139) argue that, 
power and achievement are great motivators for entrepreneurship. 
Longenecker and Moore (1991:13-14) noted that, entrepreneurs faced 
different risks when starting a business. These include financial risks as 
entrepreneurs invest their life savings and guarantee their bank loans., career 
risks as a failure would make re-entry into the job market difficult, family risks 
due to the emotional stress of coping with failure and psychic risk as the 
entrepreneur identifies so closely with the venture that a business failure is 
seen as a personal failure. 
Burns (2001:26) noted that, individuals with a high need for achievement also 
have moderate risk taking propensities. This means that they prefer risky 
situations where they can exert some control on the outcome, in contrast to 
gambling situations where the outcome is based on luck. 
Longenecker and Moore (1991:15) also found that, many entrepreneurs are 
motivated by an "escapist" mindset. Firstly, there is the "foreign refugee" who 
escapes political, economic or religious constraints of their homelands and 
cross the borders for a better life. Frequently, such individuals face 
discrimination or handicaps in securing salaried employment and go into 
business as a last resort. 
Secondly, the "corporate refugee" flees the bureaucratic environment of big 
business by going into business for himself or herself. Some organizations 
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spawn so many entrepreneurial off springs that they can be described as 
"incubator organizations". 
White and Brown (1996:40-45) suggested that, teaching decision-making skills 
aids in developing entrepreneurs and nurturing the need for achievement. The 
findings were suggestive that entrepreneurship can be trained. In a policy 
document released by the UK government, the authorities there have 
acknowledged the role it needs to play to stimulate enterprise, to encourage 
innovation and reward success. These factors stimulate a higher need for 
achievement (Internet 4: http://ukonlineforbusiness.gov.uk). 
The policy document outlines the importance of encouraging entrepreneurship 
and is wary of the fact that effective role models are required and that the 
perception of the risk of failure and its consequences may dissuade people 
from pursuing their own businesses. 
The UK government (Internet 4: http://ukonlineforbusiness.gov.uk) has 
outlined a programme to promote the development of entrepreneurial skills in 
young people and to implement strategies that maximise the contribution of 
the education system and business participation in creating a more 
enterprising culture - a culture that thrives on achievement. 
While findings continue to be conflicting, the need for achievement is still an 
important characteristic. Shaver and Scott (1991:23-41) concluded that, 
although far from a perfect measure, achievement motivation remained one of 
the best theories supporting entrepreneurial-led new entrepreneurship. 
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PERSONALITY TRAITS AND LEADERSHIP 
In attempting to evaluate the relevance of this vast area, a very simplistic view 
of what constitutes "personality" is considered. Hall (1995:66) cautions that, a 
personality trait displayed by an individual can vary with the situation - "a bully 
at work can be bullied at home." 
Commonly, entrepreneurs are characterised as risk takers, a tendency to be 
innovative and an instinctive to search for new opportunities. In the research 
work quoted by Burns (2001:31), the researchers believed that entrepreneurs 
are "delusional". The decision making process of 124 entrepreneurs were 
tested against that of 95 managers of big companies. The entrepreneurs 
turned out to be much more confident - even in cases where they provided 
wrong answers to questions. The researchers concluded that entrepreneurs 
were more prone to both delusion and opportunism than normal managers 
were. 
This finding conflicts with the findings of other studies, which suggest that 
personality traits (risk taking, autonomy, change, cognitive structure, 
innovation and locus of control) are effective dimensions in distinguishing 
successful entrepreneurs from the general population. 
Personality and leadership can also be influenced by culture. Hofstede 
(1991:71) referred to "power distance" - whether the culture accepts and 
expects people who are more powerful to behave differently from the ones 
lower in the hierarchy. African cultures rank high on the power distance. The 
legitimacy of power is never questioned and the "boss knows best" idea is 
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generally applicable. While entrepreneurs from such backgrounds function as 
goal-oriented persons, they would defer in situations where their culture is 
practiced. 
Frese (2000:12) argues that in small businesses, the founder of the enterprise 
is the main decision maker - he influences the "general culture" and strategic 
orientation of the business. Rajagopolan, Rasheed and Datta (1993:349-384) 
concur that the pervasive influence of founders of businesses and their 
dominance on the decisions made are significant. 
It would appear from the above findings that the final act of business judgment 
and decision-making is somewhat intuitive and remains within the 
entrepreneur's area of influence. Collins (2001:70-76) provides an illustration 
of levels of leadership, as follows: 
Level 5 Executive 
Build enduring greatness through paradoxical combination of personal humility 
plus professional will. Lumpkin and Dess (1996:136) had earlier made a 
similar finding and described entrepreneurial autonomy as the "ability and the 
will to be self directed". 
Level 4 Effective Leader 
Refers to one who catalyses commitment with vigorous pursuit of a clear and 
compelling vision that will stimulate the group to high performance standards. 
Frese (2000:57) made a similar finding, that the high-initiative entrepreneur 
acts as a "role model for his employees". 
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Level 3 Competent Manager 
Organises people and resources towards the effective and predetermined 
objectives. Burns (2001:33) referred to this as having, "vision and flair". To 
succeed entrepreneurs need to have a clear vision of what they want to 
achieve. This helps lead employees in the pre-determined direction. 
Level 2 Contributing Team Leader 
Contributes to the achievement of group objectives, works effectively with 
others in a group setting. Entrepreneurs do not generally work with group 
objectives as they are individually driven. 
Level 1 Highly Capable Individual 
Make productive contributions through talent, knowledge, skills and good work 
habits. Frese (2000:56) stated that, stability and learning orientation means 
that the entrepreneur does not become emotional and despondent when 
things go wrong. 
Collins (2001:70-76) also found that leadership is an essential factor from 
moving a company from good to great but it was not the only one. Some of the 
key findings were as follows: 
• First Who: One would normally expect that good to great leaders would 
start with a vision and a strategy. Instead, they attend to people first, 
strategy second. They get the right people onto the bus, move the wrong 
people off, ushered the right people to the right seats and then figured 
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out where to drive the bus. This view is supported by Burn's (2001:251) 
idea of the entrepreneur being "once a learner, a teacher, a doer and a 
visionary". 
Stockdale Paradox: Admiral J. Stockdale received a medal of honour 
after surviving seven years in the Vietcong Prisoner of war camp by 
clinging unto two beliefs: his life could not be worse now, and that his life 
would one day be better than ever. Collins (2001:72-76) found that like 
Stockdale, people in the good-to-great companies confronted the brutal 
facts about their current reality and simultaneously maintained absolute 
faith that they would prevail in the end. They held both faith and facts at 
the same time - all the time. Timmons (1999:10) earlier concurred with 
Collins that entrepreneurs are "patient leaders, capable of installing 
tangible visions and managing for the long haul". There is a great 
tolerance of risk, ambiguity and uncertainty. 
Build-up - Breakthrough Flywheel: Collins (2001:70-76) also found 
that good-to-great transformations did not happen overnight. Rather the 
process resembled the relentless pushing of a giant flywheel in one 
direction. At first pushing, the flywheel turns once and with constant 
effort, it turns more frequently until breakthrough point has been reached. 
The research found that the comparison companies did not sustain the 
kind of break through momentum that good-to-great companies did -
they lurched back and forth with radical change programmes, reactionary 
moves and restructurings. 
The Hedgehog Concept: Collins (2001:72-76) used the parable of the 
fox and the hedgehog. The fox knows many things about everything but 
the hedgehog only knows one big thing very well. The research suggests 
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that breakthroughs require simple hedgehog-like understanding of three 
intersecting circles: what is the company best at, how does its economics 
work and what best ignites the passion for its people. Breakthroughs 
happen when you get the hedgehog concept and become systematic and 
consistent with it, eliminating virtually anything that does not fit the circle. 
Technology Accelerators: The Collins study (2001:72-76) also found 
that good-to-great companies had a paradoxical relationship with 
technology. While assiduously avoiding new technology bandwagons, 
they were pioneers in the application of carefully selected technologies 
making bold farsighted investments in those that are directly linked to the 
hedgehog concept. 
A Culture of Discipline: Good - to- great companies display three forms 
of disciplines: disciplined people, disciplined thought and disciplined 
action. When an organization has disciplined people, then it does not 
need hierarchy and with disciplined thought, there is no need for 
bureaucracy. Disciplined action would remove the need for excessive 
control. When the culture of discipline is combined with the ethic of 
entrepreneurship, a magical alchemy of great performance will result. 
Bowman and Faulkner (1997:45) considered management and 
leadership styles as important signals about appropriate behavior. How 
managers spend time sends signals about the priorities. 
While Collins (2001:70-76) does capture the reflections of highly 
successful individuals it is highly unlikely, that all people have the level 
five seed in them. The study is heavily slanted towards a description of 
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what makes a level 5 manager but with no credible list of actions to 
journey there. It does, however, provide the budding entrepreneur a peek 
into what an ideal standard would be. There is also the opportunity for 
the entrepreneur to accept some kind of mentoring. 
3.6 ENTREPRENEUR MENTORSHIP 
Another aspect of training and education is accepting a mentor. The primary 
reason for acquiring the expertise of mentors, is the pressure to perform with 
scarce resources. Ensher, Murphy and Vance (1995:99-108) suggested that, 
varying roles and functions of mentors, including emotional, vocational and 
role modeling support, will have many positive benefits for both 
entrepreneurial proteges and mentors. Selecting mentors with the right skill 
sets, gives the entrepreneur the opportunity to transform and to add value to 
his entire enterprise in the areas of strategy, processes, technology and 
people. 
Cope and Watts (2000:102-124) noted that, strategic benefits of using a 
mentor includes access to help the entrepreneur to interpret critical incidents 
as learning experiences. 
The management benefits include availability of high-level skill for transfer to 
employees and the freeing of staff to focus on projects that are more 
productive. The quality of staff productivity is also enhanced. From an 
operational perspective, strengths can be capitalised on while weaknesses are 
eliminated. The business is kept in the forefront of operational systems. 
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Evans and Volery (2000:333-350) found that, face-to-face contact is needed 
for as a primary form of communication and that internet provision is not a 
substitute. The entrepreneur must ensure that a good relationship or fit exists 
and that there must be a written agreement determining the scope of the 
assignment, the outputs and the costs. Typically, the agreement must provide 
penal clauses for non-performance. In choosing a mentor, the entrepreneur 
must clearly identify the area of skill and focus required. The mentor must 
have a good track record in terms of practical experience. 
The entrepreneur must be satisfied that the mentor subscribes to the highest 
level of ethics and is accountable for decisions taken. It is advisable that an 
interview is conducted to ensure that a good personality fit exists. 
3.6.1 THE PROCESS OF MENTORSHIP 
Van Biljon in People Dynamics (2000:45) mentions a number of stages in the 
mentoring process. 
STAGE ONE 
Initial interview and due diligence 
This stage is considered the most critical in the establishment of the 
relationship. The relationship fit is clearly identified at this point. The scope of 
the assignment, the specific outputs sought and access to the right members 




On completion of the due diligence checklist and information gathering tasks, 
the different strengths and weaknesses would be identified. The mentor will 
then apply his practical skills and knowledge to capitalise on the strengths and 
to eliminate the weaknesses. 
STAGE THREE 
Allocation of responsibility and Time schedule 
This is a critical part of the action plan and should only be constrained by 
financial limitation. The entrepreneur and the client must agree on the way 
forward and assign responsibilities to tasks identified in the solution chain. 
STAGE FOUR 
Implementation plan 
This is generally a very sensitive part of the solution process and demands 
that all participants be committed to the action plan. In this stage, everything is 
put to the test and is the stage where the mentor's intervention is most 
significant. 
STAGE FIVE 
Reaping the benefits 
The monitoring process would require very little input from the mentor. In the 
ultimate analysis, entrepreneurial characteristics are an important 
consideration to the providers of loan capital and finances. It is not uncommon 
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for the providers of capital, to grant loans conditional to acceptance, of a 
mentorship programme. 
3.7 BANKERS PERCEPTIONS OF SUCCESSFUL ENTREPRENEURS 
Obtaining funding has been reported to be the most significant hurdle in 
developing small business in South Africa. However, do entrepreneurs 
perceive the same characteristics as important or are there perceptual 
difference between bankers and small business owners on what constitute 
characteristics for entrepreneurial success? 
Hall (1996:56) questioned the value of investigating this complex relationship 
and concluded that it does not provide any valuable insight. If the owners of 
failures generally perceived banks as unhelpful, successful entrepreneurs 
would perceive them as helpful. 
Nevertheless, Zimmerer and Scarborough (1998:302) state that," raising 
money to launch a new business venture has always been a challenge for 
entrepreneurs". In understanding the reasons for failure and success amongst 
small firm, a discussion on the entrepreneur's ability to raise funds is 
necessary. 
An important part of small business success is adequate capital acquisition. 
Capital can be raised both internally and externally, but it is the external 
acquisition of funds through commercial loans that are most utilised by small 
business owners. 
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Kuehl and Lambing (1994:165) emphasised that, while debt financing is freely 
available for successful entrepreneurs that continue to grow, it is essential to 
develop a working relationship with the bank. 
FIGURE 3.3 
BANKERS' PERCEPTIONS OF SUCCESSFUL ENTREPRENEURS 
Ranks of all items for small business owners /Managers and bankers 


































Source: Dickenson: Perception of Entrepreneurial Success Characteristics: 




































































From the bankers perspective the above were a set of items considered 
relatively important but were considered less important by small business 
owners. These items include leadership, organising, delegation and 
organisational sensitivity. The contrast is clear. Bankers consider some of the 
traditional "big business" characteristics as critical for success. 
According to Zimmerer and Scarborough (1998:311), venture capital 
companies are private, for profit organisations that purchase equity positions 
in young businesses they believe have high - growth and high-profit potential. 
Zider (1998:132) notes that, from a venture capitalists point of view the ideal 
profile of an entrepreneur is as follows: 
• Is qualified in a "hot" area of interest; 
• Delivers sales or technical advances; 
• Tells a compelling story that is presentable to outside investors; 
• Recognises the need for liquidity; 
• Has a good reputation and can provide references that show 
competence and skill; 
• Understands the need for a team with a variety of skills and therefore 
sees why equity has to be allocated to other people; 
• Works diligently towards a goal but maintains flexibility; 
• Gets along with the investor group; 
• Understands the cost of capital and typical deal structures and is not 
offended by them; 
• Is sought after by many venture capitalists; and 
• Has realistic expectation about process and outcome. 
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Venture capital investments are more directed to the larger of micro 
businesses. They accept that on average, good plans, people and businesses 
succeeds only one in ten times. Their analysis is based on probability theory. 
Although a company might have an 80% probability of succeeding with each 
of the critical components in business, the averaged probability is less than 
20%. 
3.8 REASONS FOR SMALL BUSINESS FAILURE 
There is an exhaustive body of research on why small business fails. The 
most notable amongst them is the work of Argenti (1984:14), who places 
business failure into a sequence of events referred to as defects, mistakes and 
symptoms. Defects begin when the top management is autocratic, dominating, 
and not interested in accepting advice. Other key personnel are also weak and 
there is no proper control in place. There is generally a poor response to 
change, as evidenced by an ageing product, old premises and out of date 
attitude to employees. 
Mistakes start when the business gearing becomes noticeably high. The 
company grows faster than it has the financial ability to accommodate 
resulting in cash flow problems. Symptoms are evident in the financial 
statements and financial ratios, creative accounting, a retardation of quality 
and service coupled by summonses and staff resignations. 
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However, Burns (2001:373) concludes that most firms are born to stagnate 
and die. As the number of start-ups increase so too does the number of 
closures. He concludes that, "this never-ending cycle of start-up and exit is 
part of the dynamic of small business sector as small business responds to the 
ever changing marketing place". 
While the Bannock and Daley (1994:74) provide evidence in support of this 
never-ending cycle, from a statistical review of the United States small 
business economy, there is a tragic human story behind failures and a stigma 
that is attached to failure. 
Clearly, this is a management dilemma worthy of research. It is through 
research that future entrepreneurs can have the benefit of others experiences 
and possible adopt a pre-emptive approach. According to Atkin, Chell and 
Mason (1993:56), it would useful to broaden our knowledge of the factors 
associated with failure in the hope of gaining some understanding of the 
reasons why it takes place. 
Small businesses do not abruptly collapse. Argenti (1984:14) identified the 
following symptoms: 
CONFIDENCE AND MORALE ARE ERODED 
Survival becomes the objective and the undercapitalised firm is challenged on 
a continual crisis. Kuehl and Lambing (1994:552) cautioned that one of the 
most common mistakes entrepreneurs make is to assume that a profitable 
company will have sufficient cash on hand to meet all financial obligations. 
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Many small business owners are shocked to learn that a very profitable 
company may consistently be short of cash. The failure to fully grasp this 
concept leads to the loss of confidence. 
THE FINAL DAY OF RECKONING 
The entrepreneur is concerned that there is no money to pay the staff, that a 
critical supplier will no longer extend credit and cease deliveries and that the 
tax collector will knock on the door for the last time. Frese (2000:91) noted 
that, emotional coping maybe effective because it allows the entrepreneur to 
better concentrate on other aspects of the business that can be influenced. 
NO CONTINGENCY FUNDS 
Most entrepreneurs are unable to meet the unpredictable emergencies that 
haunt startup businesses. This is due to the limited cash resources that most 
small business have access to. Hall (1995:41) notes that, while the purchasing 
of a capital item can be planned for, it is difficult to know with certainty in the 
future, what the cash flow requirements would be. While large businesses 
have sophisticated forecasting techniques, small business owners rely on their 
intuition. 
THE BUSINESS CANNOT BUY TIME 
It cannot sustain expenditures that could pull it out of a temporary trough. The 
shortage of cash robs the owner-manager of the time required to think, act and 
talk his way out of the difficulties. All his efforts are concentrated on the cash 
crisis. Business Date (1996:7) reports that, inadequate initial capital leads to 
failure. The entrepreneur's efforts are limited to a sole purpose - that is to 
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raise additional funds. This is done at the expense of other aspects of the 
business management. 
THERE IS LITTLE MARGIN FOR OVERCOMING MISTAKES 
Most small businesses cannot squirrel away cash reserves to meet the fact-of-
life emergencies and to cushion inevitable error and misjudgment. Small 
business can be crushed by the loss of a key customer or an overly optimistic 
expansion plan. This optimism and lack of prudence was referred to by Wright 
(1995:52-53) who concluded that, amongst the reasons for cash flow 
problems, is that too much money is spent too soon on buildings, houses, 
machines, luxury cars and owners salary. 
A CASH CRUNCH PRECLUDES IMPROVEMENT 
A cash crunch precludes improvement and expansion-orientated profit 
programme. There are no funds for adequate advertising and promotion. The 
firm cannot afford to adequately market a good product. In its haste to get to 
the market, it is incapable of sustaining adequate research and development. 
The research results of Timmons (1994:10) indicated that, 38.4% of failures 
resulted from excessive debt, extremely high operating expenses and 
insufficient working capital. Funds are required for supporting marketing and 
business growth. 
UNWILLING TO TAKE CALCULATED RISK 
The owner manager is unwilling or unable to assume a calculated risk that is 
normally essential to generate growth and future stability. This finding by 
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Argenti is surprising as risk taking is the hallmark of the entrepreneur. 
However, Burns (2001:33) stresses that whilst all owners are willing to take 
risks and live with uncertainty, "true entrepreneurs are willing to take far 
greater risks and live with far greater uncertainty." 
UNREASONABLE PRICE INCREASES 
In desperation, the owner manager may raise prices beyond the markets 
willingness to pay for it. This could retard the cash flow situation even further. 
Higher prices will decrease demand and eventually sales leading to failure. 
STAFF ARE UNPAID 
Employees are the first casualties of cash strapped businesses. The firm does 
not have the ability to hire key personal. According to Frese (2000:167), the 
procedures of systematically training employees and motivating them are 
factors that are strongly related to success. Inability to pay staff would mean 
that training and motivation are secondary drivers. 
While the above symptoms may not necessarily lead to failure, they are good 
indications that failure is eminent. In reviewing the extant literature on 
business failure it was found that no clear consensus existed amongst 
researchers and in addressing the research question in this study, it is 
expected that this management dilemma could be solved. What are the 
reasons for failure and success? Researchers have suggested a multitude of 
reasons for failure as follows: 
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3.8.1 AGE AND SIZE OF BUSINESS 
Hall (1995:8) stated that, there is no doubt that the probability of a company's 
survival increases positively with its age and size. However, Dunne, Roberts 
and Samuelson (1989:495-515) found that the mean growth rate of survivors 
declined with size and age. The effect of age was less clear as growth rates 
apparently declined with the age of the small business. 
The economist Jovanovic (1982:649-670) undertook a significant economic 
research study. The model concludes that differences in firm size reflect 
different positions along the critical growth path with older firms having more 
time to learn about their costs thus enabling the business to make cost 
estimates with a greater measure of accuracy. 
In the R3 8th Survey of Personal Insolvency the result showed that individuals 
operating businesses, that are less than 4 years old are more likely to end up 
in bankruptcy (43.5% of business related bankruptcies related to business in 
this category). (Internet 5: www.r3.org.uk/8th). 
The rationale for this is that younger businesses are less likely to have the 
asset base and income streams to enable them to support a credible voluntary 
arrangement. 
It was empirically confirmed that modest changes in size increased the 
chances of survival. Philips and Kirchoff (1989:65-74) showed that, survival 
rate was greater in companies that had an absolute growth in employees. 
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The economist Jovanovic (1982:50), made an important contribution to the 
question of crystallising the reasons for corporate failure. Firms are assumed 
to make output decisions based on efficiency levels but are unaware of what 
these efficiency levels are. Over a period, firms learn more about their 
efficiency and those that are most efficient would enjoy a lower cost structure 
and would expand their output. The larger a firm the less likely that it will be 
taken by surprise by unfavorable cost levels and find its optimal output to lie 
below the failure boundary. 
Jovanovic (1982:50) suggested that older firms have more time to learn about 
their costs and would have better control. While the model provides an 
impressive set of conclusions it does not reduce the level of costs usually 
associated with learning curves. Bate's (1990:4) concurs that, previous 
knowledge of operating a business could also lower the degree of uncertainty 
about costs. 
It can also be argued that education and training could also help determine the 
correct efficiency levels. The Jovanovic model seems more applicable to 
manufacturing and production type firms and would be very difficult to apply in 
retail and service type organisations. However, the principle could be applied 
in the empirical work to be conducted for the South Africa Fuel Retailers in 
determining their mortality rate. 
Dhawan (2001:41) suggests that, small firms are significantly more productive 
but riskier than their larger counterparts. In a study carried out on a panel of 
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US firms the profitability of smaller firms (size was defined according to the 
firms assets) was 1.5% higher while the failure rate was twice that of larger 
firms. 
Dhawan found that the mean profit rate and standard deviation of the profit 
rate decline with firm size. The F-tests indicated that the profit rates differ over 
different size classes. The failure rate declines with size and the rate amongst 
smaller firms are 10 times higher than that of extra-larger firms. The small firm 
profit rate is approximately 1.6 times higher than that of larger firms. While the 
large firm failure rate is 6.42%, it is 50% lower than smaller firm is. The 
profitability and failure rate declined with firm size. 
FIGURE 3.4 
PROFIT RATE AND FAILURE RATE BY FIRM SIZE 
Profit Rate and failure rate by firm size, 1970-1989 
A B C D 
Type Mean profit rate std dev % failure rate % Adj Profit rate % 
Small 12.92 16.89 13.80 11.13 
Medium 11.95 6.70 9.50 10.81 
Large 11.15 6.52 3.60 10.74 
X-Large 9.93 5.55 1.30 9.80 
A - size is average value of total assets 
B - profit rate = operating income after depreciation per unit of total assets 
C - failure rate is the proportion of firms that exist due to bankruptcy, 
liquidation or ceasing to trade 
D - the adjusted profit rate = mean profit x survival probability 
Source: Dhawan, Journal of Economics 2001 
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The model suggests that the higher profitability rate is a result of the smaller 
firms being more productive - this collabourat.es Handy's explanation of 
companies that operate as fleas being more efficient and quicker to adapt to 
challenges. 
In spite of the consensus on the positive relation between age and size to 
success, it appears that the findings cannot be generalised across all small 
business sectors. 
3.8.2 OCCUPATIONAL EXPERIENCE 
There is a limited body of theory on the nature of a relationship between 
previous experience and failure but it would not be surprising if such a 
relationship existed. Work experience can be a negative displacement in the 
decision to launch a new entrepreneurial venture and plays a role in the 
growth and the eventual success of the new venture. The dissatisfaction with 
different aspects of ones job such as a lack of challenge or promotional 
opportunities as well as frustration and boredom often motivates one to 
venture out into ones own business. Burns (2001:73) argues that most people 
base their businesses on the experience gained from a previous job. While, 
both Maslow's hierarchy of needs and Herzberg's two-factor theory may 
explain entrepreneurial motivation, it seems that entrepreneurial pursuit based 
on previous experience and networks created while employed, is a sound 
enough reason for making the transition from employee to entrepreneur. 
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Hisrich and Peters (1998:72) noted that, technical and industry experience is 
of paramount importance once that decision is made. Experience in finance, 
product or service development, manufacturing, development of distribution 
channels and preparation of a marketing plan is important. As the venture 
becomes established and starts growing, managerial experience and skills 
become increasingly important. 
Although most ventures start, with managing ones own activities and those of 
a few part or full time employees, as the number of employee's increases 
along with size, complexity and geographic diversity of the business, the 
entrepreneur's managerial skills becomes increasingly important. 
However, the research study of 59 small businesses in Zambia conducted by 
Bruederl, Presisendoerfer and Ziegler (1992:227-242) stand in contrast to 
Hisrich and Peters (1998:72) research findings. The interview method was 
adopted to gather data and the study conclusively showed that there was no 
significant difference between those entrepreneurs who had business specific 
experiences and those who had no experience. 
While it is a fact that formal tertiary training does not in any way provide direct 
training for a business career, occupational experience would influence the 
conduct of a business enterprise. Sound decisions on capital requirements, 
sale and credit policies and general management are enhanced by direct 
experience or prior managerial experience within the same industry. 
95 
Storey's (1994:67-78) review on antecedent literature reflected a similar 
finding. Reviewing three multivariate studies, he found that there was a 
statistical significance between unemployment and the probability of starting 
up a new business. Unemployment gives one a strong impetus into self -
employment generally into the industry that one worked in. 
Frese (2000:171) refers to studies done in Zimbabwe, that show that small 
business owners who started a business due to unemployment, were 
generally more successful than those who had other motives like 
independence and profit. This confirms the views of Mead and Liedholm 
(1998:61-74), who argued that there is a higher start up during the time of 
crisis or high unemployment. 
Prior self-employment experience have also been linked to success by both 
Hisrich (1990:209-222) and Preisendoerfer and Voss (1990:107-129). 
According to Ford (1998:63), a strategy should be aimed at developing and 
maintaining the sum total of the company's knowledge and abilities. Clearly, 
this knowledge and ability has to be a function of previous experience 
amongst start-ups 
Bates (1990:72) agrees with the Jovanovic model (1982:649-670) and points 
out that previous knowledge of running a business could lower the uncertainty 
about costs and speed progress along the critical growth path. 
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It appears that experience is the best teacher. Indeed, another reason cited for 
failure in South African is the lack of appropriate skill sets. Whether this has a 
direct consequence for failure needs to be tested in this research work. 
3.8.3 SKILLS AND TRAINING 
The concept of managerial skills is supported in the study by Frese (2000:3) in 
his research investigating the psychological factors that lead to success and 
failure amongst small businesses. The study emphasised the importance of 
developing a school system that stimulates business ownership and the 
training of entrepreneurs. This finding is consistent with previous research 
findings that management competence is a key factor for success in small 
firms. 
Inadequate management skills were postulated by Business Date (1996:7), as 
the most common cause for small business failure. Managerial competence in 
marketing and planning were flagged as critical success factors. Kiggundu 
(1988:169-243) also noted, that the lack of accounting and financial 
management skills affects success negatively. 
Kolshorn and Tomecko (1992:53-56) cautioned that, while specific skills like 
writing a balance sheet, developing a marketing plan and stock taking are 
useful - these skills must be complemented by general psychological skills 
such as learning how to be proactive , planning, initiating and innovating. 
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The world bank advisor, Ellermen (1999:25-35) pointed out that, the 
"entrepreneur should learn those skills that allow him or her to deal with the 
environment on his or her own terms". 
The National Skills Task Force on "skills for all" has highlighted the fact that 
SMME's, in particular, those that employ 50 employees or fewer do not 
systematically invest in off-the-job training. The report also draws attention to 
the high proportion of owners and managers who either have no or low level 
qualifications. This is being addressed through the learning and skills Council, 
through Business Links, National training organizations and Investors in 
People UK. 
Small businesses are an integral part of the whole economy and it is therefore 
of paramount importance that they are technologically linked to the 
mainstream economic activities. In the International Benchmark Study 2000, 
conducted in the UK, France, Germany, Italy, Sweden, United States, Canada 
and Japan, the UK recorded significant improvements in the connectivity of 
micro businesses on email and website and thus to the digital market place. In 
a telephonic survey of 6000 businesses, as reported online on (Internet 4: 
www.ukonlineforbusiness.gov.uk), the UK indicated that 55% of all small 
business was digitally connected while Germany had recorded a 65% 
connection. 
Diehl and Stroebe (1991:392-403) suggested that psychological training is 
also important. One must become innovative about product and process and 
one must learn to increase the pure quantity of ideas to be successful. 
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However, West (1990:309:334) noted that, to be innovative one also needs a 
clear vision or idea of what one wants to achieve. 
It appears that there is a consensus amongst researchers that training and 
skills development is necessary for success. However, Burns (2001:39) 
concludes that, the influence of training cannot be proved - if we accept that 
entrepreneurs are born and made, and then we must accept that they can be 
influenced - training only serves to improve performance, it is not the primary 
cause of success. 
3.8.4 FAILURE DUE TO FINANCIAL REASONS 
When one considers the risk of individual persons snapping up credit 
opportunities and over extending their ability to repay such debt, then the 
implications for a larger organisation, like a small business becomes easier to 
grasp. According to Burns (2001:336), banks are all too aware of the failure 
statistics for business start-ups, which explains why it is difficult to obtain start-
up finance. 
The number of small businesses that become bankrupt is relatively small 
according to Kuehl and Lambing (1994:222). Amongst the various reasons 
cited for failure, the absence of financial controls is the most notable. Business 
Date (1996:7), found that financial failure could result from bad financial 
management, over-extension of credit, high gearing, and lack of budgeting, 
forecasting, and incorrect bookkeeping. 
99 
Hall (1995:20) quotes research carried out specifically amongst small 
enterprises in which it was found that failures had a lower gross profit margin 
than successful enterprises while neither had a history of losses. This 
contradicted the findings of Argenti (1984:14) where it was found that larger 
businesses did indeed have a history of losses. Hall (1995:20) also found that 
small businesses that failed, did not experience a steady decline in profits, 
although they did record greater volatility over time in their profitability. In 
considering the financial reasons for failure, the following must also be noted: 
CAPITAL STRUCTURE 
Atkin, Chell and Mason (1993:62) found that, there is a higher concentration of 
failure amongst businesses that are not sufficiently capitalised. In identifying 
the reasons for failure, they noted that,"undercapitalisation figured as most 
important followed by poor management of debt". 
In proposing future policy positions, Hall (1995:163) noted that, "surely the 
under capitalisation that was so frequently blamed by the victims of 
compulsory liquidation cannot simply be dismissed as a convenient 
scapegoat". Under capitalisation can result from an over investment in debtors 
and stock, over reliance on creditor finance or being under-capitalised at the 
outset of the business venture. 
GEARING RATIOS 
Burns (2001:337) notes that, bankers see small businesses as a riskier 
lending proposition due to higher gearing. Cressy and Olofsson (1997:87-96) 
cite that, the main reason for increased need of capital is the rising expenses 
100 
in research and development and the launching of new products. This leads to 
additional borrowing and higher gearing ratios, if sufficient cash reserves are 
not available. 
Kirby and Watson (2003:68) found that, there is a correlation between 
insufficient capital on one hand and the susceptibility to crisis on the other 
hand. Due to the inability to compensate for losses incurred one cannot 
generalise that high gearing will lead to failure but all indications are that lowly 
geared business have a greater chance of success. This postulation will be 
tested in this research work. 
EXTENSION OF CREDIT 
Write (1995:52-53) cites the extention of generous credit terms and the 
inability to ensure continuous collection as one of the reasons for cash flow 
problems and eventual failure. 
It appears that small firms are forced to extend credit to customers to generate 
higher revenues. This in turn increases their risk and places a heavy burden 
on the capital structure, thus leading to failure. Hall (1995:131) summarises 
this dilemma as follows, "...other things being equal, it is better to pay bills as 
late as possible and receive payment early, but this ignores the ill-will that 
such a hard nosed policy can generate". While a prudent entrepreneur may 
attempt to heed Hall's advice, an overly generous credit policy could cause 
financial ruin. 
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A major weakness cited by a number of studies, including Burns (1200:380) is 
the typical over dependence on a number of customers for too high a 
proportion of sales. While credit sales, are an intrinsic part of most businesses, 
it is the management of such debt that is more important. The retail fuel 
stations in South Africa are prohibited by law to sell fuel on credit according to 
the Rationalisation Plan in place. 
COST MANAGEMENT 
Profitability and success is a function of costs. Jaggard (2001:14) suggested 
that at least 60% of small business owners do not have the ability or have 
failed to put a ceiling to their cost management efforts. Runaway cost has 
been identified as a key contributor to the failure of micro-businesses. 
Cooper and Chew (1996:88-97) offers another perspective on cost control 
management. His research covered a sample of 20 Japanese companies. He 
found that when cost became an issue and when senior managers tried to 
drive costs out of their operations ex post facto or reengineering downstream 
processes, they often discovered that as much as 70% to 80% of a products 
cost were effectively immutable after it left the design stage over which they 
have no control. 
Competitive companies are therefore determining the ideal selling price of a 
product, then establishing the feasibility of meeting that price and then control 
costs to ensure that prices are met. Cooper and Chew (1996:88-97) refers to 
this system as target costing. 
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Timmonds (1994:10) refers to a study conducted in the United States among 
small businesses to determine the causes of failure. It was found that 38.4% 
failed due to extremely highly operating expenses. Inability to manage 
expenses leads to a drain on cash reserves and eventual failure. While these 
research results cannot be generalised across the small business sector, the 
assumption that this remains, as one of the primary reasons for failure will be 
tested in this research. 
Target costing has immense applications for the fuel retailer in the Republic of 
South Africa. Firstly, the Department of Minerals and Energy uses target 
costing to arrive at dealer margins. The margins or dealer profitability levels 
are preset to industry average costs. Secondly, the dealer operating costs 
would determine the level of dealer's profitability. In a sense those service 
stations with controlled costs structures, that match the benchmark costs in 
the industry would return the appropriate levels of profitability. 
While the idea of target costing is applicable to the retail fuel industry, it is of 
paramount importance that transparency prevails. It is equally important that 
the cost-reduction objectives are achieved and realisable. Setting the bar too 
high can be tantamount to having no bar at all. The methodology applied by 
the Department and analysed in this case study is questionable. 
The sample size appears inadequate. The spread of the sample tends to thin 
out the industry almost to the point where it could become irrelevant. One 
would accept that a good sample would represent the "center of the crowd". 
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It is alleged that at least 60% of the dealer network operate "inefficiently" i.e. 
they are unable to operate within the suggested costs structures. There is 
however, no independent study to confirm that that the costs suggested by 
government are indeed reflective of the costs that are being incurred by fuel 
retailers. The retail industry operates within a franchised structure and it 
seems that oil companies do not have a set of ideal costs in spite of having 
access to aggregate data. 
3.8.5 OWNERS AGE AND EDUCATION 
Longenecker (1991:17) concluded that, the ideal age to start a business lies 
between the late twenties and early forties. His conclusion is based on the 
premise that there is a balance between gaining the necessary experience on 
one - hand and family commitments and obligations on the other. This finding 
is contradicted in Halls (1995:20) research work, where it was found that 
owners of surviving companies were always younger than those of failures. 
It is also a fact that teenagers start successful small businesses young while 
retired persons also pursue small business in search of a better quality of life 
having access to pension payouts and life savings. In research done on 180 
entrepreneurs in Latvia, Kuzmina (1999:92) found that, more than half of the 
Latvian entrepreneurs were between the ages of 35 and 50. This contradicts 
the findings of both Hall and Longenecker. 
Nevertheless, Longenecker (1991:17) reports that, proper preparation for 
entrepreneurship requires some mixture of education and experience although 
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no indication is provided on the how much education and how much 
experience is required to ensure success. While he concludes that formal 
education of new business owners is superior to that of the general adult 
population, there are many examples of uneducated entrepreneurs making a 
great success of their small business ventures. 
In many instances, the closure of the business does not result directly from the 
financial challenges nor can such failure be attributed directly to the 
entrepreneur. Lumpkin and Dess (1996:135-172) noted that, entrepreneurs 
have to be more entrepreneurial^ orientated in a complex, dynamic and 
hostile environment to be successful. There are a number of small business 
closures that are due to non-financial exogenous reasons. 
3.9 EXOGENOUS VARIABLES 
There are reasons for failure and successes that cannot be directly attributed 
to the small business owner, some examples include: 
3.9.1 NATURAL CAUSES/NON-FINANCIAL REASONS 
The closing of a business is not always indicative of unsuccessful operations. 
Kuehl and Lambing (1994:18-22) noted that, there are many reasons, other 
than failure, for business closure. This could include, death and in the case of 
female proprietors, pregnancy. Poor health is a major threat to solvency and 
business success. Small business ownership requires long hours of work, 
105 
leaving little time for family. Consequently, an entrepreneur often decides to 
close or sell the business in order to, "spend more time with his or her family". 
3.9.2 ECONOMIC FACTORS 
Kuehl and Lambing (1994:20) described as a myth that business failures are 
high during recessions and low during good economic times. While economic 
factors do have a role to play in the success and failures of small businesses, 
it would be incorrect to conclude that economic factors have an absolute 
effect. Very little has been written about the effects of economic variables on 
failure and success. Small businesses may flourish during times of low interest 
rates and low inflation - and not solely because of the economic upswing. 
Management's ability to exploit the opportunity could enhance profitability or 
their inability could result in the competition attracting the lion's share of the 
market. 
Wadhwani (1986:96) examined the effect of inflation on the incidence of 
compulsory and creditors' voluntary liquidations. He concluded that, in an 
imperfect capital market, inflation could influence the volume of corporate 
failures by its disproportionate effect upon the value of interest payments. 
To illustrate the effect of inflation an adoption of Wadwani's (1986:96) example 
is as follows: Assume that the real interest rate (p) is 1 per cent and that a 
company had borrowed R1 000. In inflation-free environment, the company 
would pay R10. Now suppose inflation (p) increases to 10% and that the 
nominal interest rate (r) is given by the formula (1+r) = (1+p) (1+p). Then (r) 
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would rise to 11.1 percent and the total interest payment to R111. Although 
the revenue had only increased by 10 percent, interest payments rises eleven 
fold, causing cash flow problems. 
The above illustration would be irrelevant if the company could borrow another 
R100, leaving it to find only R11, a rise of ten percent, equal to its own 
increase in revenue. In an inefficient capital market, banks would not 
accommodate this and companies are likely to face an increased probability of 
failure. 
Hall (1995:28) comments that Wadhwani (1986:96) did not introduce inflation 
directly into his regressions, but used nominal and real interest rates. The 
former would seem to have a stronger influence on the incidence of 
liquidations, but statistical significance of real interest rates would seem to 
have been affected by which other variables were included in the model, which 
does not suggest a strong relationship. 
Simmons (1989:99) developed Wadhwani's (1986:96) model further but his 
empirical findings does not strongly suggest that inflation influences business 
failure. Simmons believed that business failure was synonymous to personal 
bankruptcies and in conducting tests on four sectors found that the incidence 
of bankruptcy fell with increases in the price level. 
The results of both Wadhwani (1986:96) and Simmons (1989:99) research are 
not standardised in any way and one cannot draw an absolute conclusion from 
their findings. The relationship between the inflation rate and mortality of small 
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business would be subject to further empirical tests in this research work. 
Logically, one would accept that highly geared service stations would be 
subjected to higher instances of failure. This assumption would be tested in 
this study. 
However, Kuehl and Lambing (1994:21) asserted that most small business 
failure is not caused by the economy, a bad product or high interest rates -
rather most business failures are caused by the owners themselves, due to 
incompetence and lack of experience. This assertion will be tested in this 
research work. 
3.9.3 GOVERNMENT REGULATIONS 
In a policy statement released on the website (Internet 4: www.ukonlinefor 
business.gov.uk) the UK government has set an ambitious goal that by the 
year 2005, it would become the world's most attractive destination to start and 
grow a business. 
The critical success factors have been identified as easy access to advice, 
training and finance, sufficient workspace, labour with the appropriate skills 
and information. Kirby and Watson (2003:189) identified the inability to access 
information as one of the key reasons for failure of small business in Bulgaria. 
The UK policy statement noted that small business would require a tax and 
regulatory environment that is fair, simple and straightforward. The policy 
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guideline outlines the stance that needs to be adopted to ensure that small 
business grows and survive. 
The policy document calls for the adherence to the principles of good 
regulation - proportionality, transparency, accountability, targeting and 
consistency. It recognises that the strong voice of small businesses is the 
heart of government and plays an important role in influencing and shaping the 
UK Government policies. 
While it is acknowledged that there would need to be a process of consultation 
to ensure that regulation and Government policies do not adversely effect the 
establishment of small business, regulation does indeed have a role to play. 
The Black Economic Empowerment Report (2001:53) identified stringent 
labour laws and legislative compliance as a burden to small business 
development in South Africa. 
Kirby and Watson (2003:191) further stated that, the unstable and unreliable 
legal framework for the development of small and medium businesses and the 
heavy bureaucracy stunts small business development and success. 
Government must provide macroeconomic conditions to enable small firms to 
flourish not just survive. 
The Government must ensure that proper standards are maintained and that 
the principle of consumer protection is upheld. The South African fuel industry 
has been regulated since 1970 in the belief that consumer has been protected 
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from high prices. In concluding this section, the possible sources of capital are 
discussed. 
3.10 SOURCES OF CAPITAL 
According to Kuehl and Lambing (1994:160-182) the sources of capital for 
small business include personal savings, retirement cash outs, loans from 
family members, bank loans, government support programmes, angel 
financing and accounts payables. While bankers have pre-determined criteria 
for lending, the small businessperson tends to focus on less observable 
characteristics. Zider (1998:132) advises that small business owners ought to 
concentrate more on the characteristics that bank manager's weight as 
important - and bank loan officials need to review their approach as to 
whether they are seeking for the right characteristics. While Cooke (2001:954-
974) is not supportative of the venture capital route, the following is an 
example of the perceptions of the venture capital industry. 
3.10.1 VENTURE CAPITAL 
According to the Zider (1998:132), the venture capital industry is envied 
throughout the world as an engine of economic growth. Venture capital fills the 
voids between the sources of funds for innovation and traditional low-cost 
sources of capital available to ongoing firms. 
The investors in venture funds are typically pension funds, financial firms and 
insurance companies that normally put out a small percentage of their funds 
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into high-risk investments expecting anything between 25% and 35% per 
annum over the life of the investments. These funds represent a tiny part of 
the institutional investor's portfolios giving venture capitalists the latitude they 
require. 
More than 80% of the venture capitalists money goes into the adolescent's 
phase of the company's life cycle. In other words, micro business owners 
would be expected to fund the enterprise to a point from their own resources 
and when the shape and form of the company becomes clearer, venture 
capitalists would invest, normally for an equity stake. 
FIGURE 3.5 
VENTURE CAPITAL INVESTMENTS 
Individual event 
Company has sufficient capital 
Management is capable and focused 
Product development goes as planned 
Production and component sourcing goes as 
Competitors behave as expected 
Customers want product 
Pricing is forecast correctly 
Patents are issued and are enforceable 
Combined probability of success 













Van Aardt, Van Aardt and Bezuidenhout (2003:199:200) stated that, cash is 
key for survival in a small business. The absolute precondition to survival of a 
small business is the availability of ready cash when it is really needed. 
Many small businesses and specifically service stations are cash operated 
businesses. A cash crunch can be symbolic of a greater problem and in many 
cases is not simply the consequence of an ailing business, but a specific case 
of poor cash management. Resnik (1998:140) also reports that, more than 
30% of the owner-managers questioned in their survey reported a case of 
under capitalisation. Hall (1995:40-41) lists out the reasons for under 
capitalization as poor estimation of capital needs, shortcomings in negotiating 
skills when dealing with the bank and the banker's perception that the 
business is a probable loser. 
Resnik (1998:140) concluded that, cash shortages are endemic to small 
businesses. Big businesses on the other hand are generally cash flush and 
can use their asset base to generate the necessary cash flow. Small business 
has limited access to capital markets. Small business owners generally sink all 
their personal savings into a small business venture. Further cash is required 
to fund growth or to absorb start-up losses. 
The unfortunate irony about small businesses is that the smaller the firm the 
more meager its resources and the greater the need to manage its scarce 
financial resources. Resnik (1998:140) further noted that, serious cash 




This chapter covers small business participation and the reasons for failure. 
Firstly, a theoretical foundation is used to explain the possible reasons that 
motivate small business owners. Maslow's hierarchy of needs is discussed 
together with Hertzberg's two-factor theory and Vroom's expectancy theory. 
These theories explain human behavior and motivation. 
The chapter also discusses the entrepreneur - the definition of an 
entrepreneur, the characteristics of one who could become an entrepreneur 
and the mentorship process. Bankers have very specific perceptions about 
small business owners and in particular, the venture capitalists views are 
recorded and discussed. 
Lastly, the chapter summarises the reasons for failure as suggested by the 
research work of others. The chapter concludes with the sources of capital for 
small business setting the scene for the next chapter where the subject small 
business - the fuel retailer is discussed. 
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CHAPTER 4 
INTRODUCTION TO THE SOUTH AFRICAN FUEL RETAIL INDUSTRY 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
The South African Retail fuel industry is unique as compared to other 
countries due to the complex regulations that govern the industry, petrol prices 
are regulated and Government adopts an interventionist approach in terms of 
price setting and industry profitability. 
The service station network, which is the case under review in this study, is an 
integral part of the small business economy. There are four thousand eight 
hundred service stations in the Republic of South Africa. While most service 
stations are franchised outlets, there are still a large number of failures in the 
industry. The failure rate is of concern since Government grants a margin to 
the dealer as a profit per liter for the sale of fuel. 
The non-fuel part of the business includes the convenience shop, quick 
service restaurant and car wash that fall outside government regulation. The 
implications of failure in this sector suggest that either government's 
intervention as a regulator has failed or that the industry is confronted with a 
serious management dilemma. The research propositions of this study hopes 
to provide some clarity. 
The Petroleum Industry is represented by major multi-national companies and 
has a small indigenous industry in the form of Sasol and Mossgas, which 
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produce fuel from coal and gas respectively. The regulatory framework has 
been derived and structured around the synfuel industry that was a strategic 
imperative of the previous government. 
The previous Government was challenged to encourage foreign investment in 
refineries while managing the price that the consumer paid for fuel. The price 
management, which is not in use currently, was a political pricing system 
implemented through the equalization fund. 
4.2 THE REGULATORY FRAMEWORK 
The current regulatory framework for the South African liquid fuels industry is a 
linkage of mechanisms and interventions that are mutually interdependent and 
constitute a number of major elements like price control, import and export 
control and marketing arrangements. This current system, including both 
detailed government regulation and loose industry arrangements, is under 
review with amendments having been proposed to the Petroleum Products Act 
and regulations that will be promulgated under it. 
The price of petrol is prescribed at the retail level (Retail Price Maintenance) in 
terms of the Petroleum Products Act 2006. The prices of diesel and 
illuminating paraffin are not prescribed but are incorporated into the regulatory 
and administrative dispensation. The price of fuel comprises an international 
component (determined by external factors) and a domestic component 
(determined by domestic factors) as illustrated in graph 4.1. The domestic 
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component can be divided into industry and transport related costs and 
Government imposts. 
GRAPH 4.1 
PETROL PRICE BUILD UP 
Composition of the Petrol Pump Price 93 Octane 
(Gauteng) in SA cent per litre 502 c/l - 06 April 2005 
Wholesale margin RttaH margin 
35.268«! ^ r- iD.SSfl 
7.8\i \ / &.1% 
Source: Department of Minerals and Energy (2005) 
The basic fuel price, which represents the international component, is 
R2.50232. In other words, in a non-regulated environment a fuel retailer could 
import a litre of petrol at the cost of the basic fuels price. The fuel tax is 
R1.5150 and includes the road accident fund, fuel levy and customs and 
excise. The compensation for the small business retailer is 40 cents or 8% of 
the pump price. 
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With reference to the international dimension, an import parity basis BFP 
(basic fuels price) is used to determine the deemed 'basic' price of fuel, with 
the price of petroleum products being directly linked to benchmark refineries at 
Singapore and Bahrain. The BFP consists of the Free-on-Board value (product 
postings) and freight, insurance, ocean leakage and wharfage. The BPF is 
converted to cents per litre by applying the applicable Rand/Dollar exchange 
rate. The calculated BFP represents the transfer price from refineries to the 
marketing divisions of oil companies and it includes the refining margin. 
With reference to the industry related and transport costs the wholesale 
(marketing) margin is based on a benchmark return of 15 per cent on 
depreciated book values of assets with allowance for additional depreciation, 
but before tax and payment of interest. The retail margin is determined on the 
basis of the actual costs incurred by the service station operator in selling 
petrol. The subject interest of this research is the small fuel retailer. 
Transport cost to the different pricing zones is determined by using the 
transport tariffs of Petronet, Spoornet and private haulers. The tariffs are 
based on the dominant or most economical transport modes namely pipeline, 
road or rail transport. The delivery cost (service differential) element 
compensates marketers for depot-related costs and distribution costs from the 
depot to service stations. A slate levy is currently applicable to reduce the 
negative cumulative slate balance. The BFP is a function of daily changing 
postings and the foreign exchange rate movements. The average of these 
changes determines the actual BFP for the month and hence the pump-price. 
Since it is not possible to change regulated pump prices on a daily basis, an 
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account is kept of these movements. The over and under recoveries multiplied 
by the volume sold for a specific month accumulate to form a positive or 
negative balance on the Slate-account. The actual price adjustments are 
determined in terms of prescribed rules and petrol prices are adjusted on a 
monthly basis. 
The small fuel retailer is at the end of these complexities and is subjected to 
the international and domestic movements. In other words, when fuel prices 
are increased the retailer would have to find extra working capital to fund that 
increase. While the opposite is also true when prices fall, the twelve-month 
averages of petrol prices show a net increase. 
The importation of petroleum products is controlled in terms of the Import and 
Export Control Act, 1963 (Act 45 of 1963) that is administered by the 
Department of Trade and Industry, with the Department of Minerals and 
Energy acting in an advisory capacity. In terms of current policy, refinery 
capacity utilisation is promoted, and only if local refiners cannot meet demand, 
is importation of refined products recommended. 
The marketing of petroleum products has in the past been largely controlled 
through industry agreement called the RATPLAN (Service Station 
Rationalisation Plan). The RATPLAN represented an understanding between 
the oil industry, the service station industry and Government that guided the 
service station network expansion. The basic objective of the Plan was to 
prevent the proliferation of petrol outlets and service stations and thus 
reducing the rate for margin increases in a price-controlled environment. The 
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Plan also became an important instrument to promote black economic 
empowerment in the industry. 
The RATPLAN has, however, not been functional since 2000 and in its place 
regulations are to be promulgated under the Petroleum Products Act (new or 
amended as the regulations deal with some matters that are not specifically 
provided for in the Act). The regulations will pursue the same objectives as the 
RATPLAN and will also give effect to specific policy elements as reflected in 
the White Paper on Energy Policy published in 1999. 
The government has now embarked on a process of liberalisation of the liquid 
fuels sector and the ultimate de-regulation of the industry is foreseen. The 
following policy challenges as set out in the Energy White Paper (1999), 
remain of paramount importance. Policy challenges for the South African retail 
fuels industry include the need to achieve, amongst others, the following: 
• An efficient and internationally competitive industry; 
• The stable and continued availability of quality product throughout the 
country at internationally competitive and fair prices; 
• An equitable balance between the interests of industry participants and 
consumers; 
• An industry supportive of government's broader social and economic 
goals; and 
• The meaningful inclusion of those interests, which have been historically 
disadvantaged. 
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Unfortunately, the Policy Paper is silent on the implications for small business. 
This is perhaps a good example of the governments conflicting approach to 
national priorities matters. While Small business is a strategic imperative for 
the Department of Trade and Industry as enunciated in the National Small 
Business Strategy document of 1995, no mention is made of it in the 
Department of Minerals and Energy Policy Paper. 
The dominant paradigm of economic thinking today is that which promotes 
less government involvement in the economic process. The thinking requires 
commercialisation and/or privatisation of state owned enterprises and 
deregulation of the workplace. According to the SADALEC study (2001:58), 
some of the key features of the current thinking are that: 
• Ownership of means of production should be in private hands; 
• Government should limit itself to the provision a legal and regulatory 
framework (when required) but should have limited economic 
involvement; 
• Prices as set by the market should co-ordinate economic activity such as 
level and timing of investments; 
• Competition if it is operating correctly should ensure maximum efficiency 
and prevent abuse of power; and 
• Fundamental economic decisions should be made by economic units, 
according to their perception of what is in their self-interest. 
The regulation of an industry is normally justified as an effort to promote 
economic efficiency in order to: 
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• Prevent unreasonable prices where "conditions" create natural 
monopolies; 
• Prevent discrimination between groups that have unequal bargaining 
power; 
• Maintain certain types of services considered to be of broad public 
interest; 
• Ensure sufficient profits for the development and expansion of an 
industry; 
• Enable government to maintain strategic control in industry; and 
• Prohibit price discrimination, undue preferences and practices of 
charging higher rates for shorter hauls than for longer hauls. 
The important question that needs to be addressed in the South African 
situation is the level of competition that exists. 
4.3 COMPETITION IN THE FUEL INDUSTRY 
Odendaal (1998:23-26) concludes that, although there is no real competition 
because of strict regulations, the petroleum industry compares well with other 
deregulated European countries. The following may be used to determine 
whether the South African Fuel industry is competitive. Using the 1996 data 
the Herfindahl index (HHI) can be used to test whether collusion takes place. 
Economic concentration is the extent to which an industry is dominated by a 
few companies, to which wealth is held by few individuals and to which oil 
reserves are located in a few countries. 
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The Herfindahl index: 
n 
H = I Si2 
1 = 1 
Si denotes the market share of company /', where /' runs from 1 to n. Squares 
are determined to accentuate the situation where there are only a few 
companies with big market shares that operate in the sector. 
TABLE 4.1 




























Source: Odendaal (1998:27) Deregulation of the Fuel Industry 
When H less than 1000 No concern with regard to market concentration 
When H >1000, but <1800 Concern with regard to market concentration 
When H >1800 Potential for collusion with regard to market 
share 
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The Index indicates that with the reading of 1 797.88 there is potential for 
collusion. The greater freedom to enter a market, the greater is the pressure 
on companies in that market to minimise cost and price their products 
efficiently. If they do not do so, it would create profit opportunities for new 
entrants to seek to exploit the opportunity. In markets where there are low 
barriers to entry and exit, even a sole producer may have little market power. 
The particular significance of this analysis is that oil companies under the 
existing dispensation can freely enter and exit the market. While the market 
shares indicated there is good potential for collusion, this is not possible in the 
current regulated environment. Should Government decide to deregulate the 
industry, the fate of the small business owner would be precarious as the oil 
companies' could merge to enhance competitor strength while leaving a 
number of the retailers to a price war in the market place. 
On the other hand, the retail sector is the one sector of the petroleum industry 
that is truly competitive and therefore lends itself to immediate deregulation. 
There is also some concern emanating from the long-term contracts between 
the retailers and oil companies that could be seen as promoting uncompetitive 
behaviour. In deregulating the retail fuel industry, government has to be 
mindful of unintended consequences for small business. 
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4.4 THE IMPACT OF DEREGULATING THE FUEL RETAIL 
BUSINESS 
The SADALEC (DME 2001:58) modelled a number of scenarios of the 
implications of deregulating the retail fuel business. Graph 4.2 presents 
changes in total economy wide employment arising from the various stages of 
liquid fuel deregulation. 
GRAPH 4.2 
CHANGES IN EMPLOYMENT DUE TO DEREGULATION OF THE RETAIL 
FUEL SECTOR 
| Changes in employment or income according to 
' stages of liquid fuel deregulation 
Source: SADALEC report to DME (2002: 5) 
• Scenario 1 refers to import control deregulation and subsequent price 
reduction at 'refinery gate' level. It is believed that the only way to 
introduce real competition into the refining part of the industry is by 
allowing product imports into the SA oil industry. Relaxation of import and 
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export control will possibly have the most impact on basic prices and 
expose the local refining sector to real global competition. The small 
business operator could choose to import product. In constructing this 
scenario the assumptions made was that a minimum of 10% of products 
would be imported. And at the retail level, new players would inject fresh 
capital into retail stations, which are likely to have much higher 
throughputs. 
• Scenario 2 - refers to the introduction of retail price competition 
combined with maximum retail prices. In this scenario, discounting is 
permitted at the retail level which results in price competition amongst 
fuel retailers. Price competition will result in right sizing of the retail sector 
and lead to closure of inefficient service stations. The assumption made 
included the net effect of new small business entrants and that 10% of 
the current retail network will close, that 10% of the jobs will be lost and 
that retail profits in urban areas will be reduced by 20%. There will also 
be some level of investments in the upgrading of service station in 
transaction automation and in additional services like convenience stores 
and car washes. 
• Scenario 3 included the abolition of full service requirements at petrol 
stations. In this scenario the impact of the removal of full service 
requirements is analysed. For this scenario, the assumptions included a 
30% reduction in number of fuel attendants resulting in a loss of about 
15 000 jobs and that some level of further investment in automation 
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equipment and other associated electronic payment systems will be 
made. 
• Scenario 4 modelled a full liquid fuels industry deregulation position. Full 
industry deregulation is for the purpose of the analysis in this report 
essentially defined as a combination of all the above three scenarios. In 
constructing this scenario, removal of the prohibition on vertical 
integration is also included. In both this scenario and scenario 2, 
licensing of retail operations will be rendered unnecessary. 
The closure of liquid fuel stations and the abolition of the full service 
requirement have a direct negative effect on employment. However, growth in 
output induced via increased demand, and investment has a positive impact 
on employment. It is for this reason that the impact on small business should 
be considered, as they are potentially the biggest job creators. 
In all scenarios the impact on national employment of highly skilled labour 
exceeds that of medium and low skilled labour. In scenario 2 (retail price 
competition) and 3 (abolition of full service requirements) this is partly the 
result of the reduction in employment of service attendants, which negatively 
affects employment of medium and low skilled labour. 
However, even in scenario 1 (import control deregulation) where employment 
of service attendants is not affected, high skilled labour benefits more. There is 
a positive correlation between the skill intensity of production and the 
percentage change in output. Output of skill intensive sector in general rise 
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more than less skill intensive sectors. The impact on total employment differs 
enormously across sectors. 
• In scenario 1 total economy wide employment of low skilled, medium 
skilled and high skilled labour increase by 0.2% (6 760 jobs), 0.3% (8 279 
jobs) and 0.35% (3 947 jobs), respectively. 
• In scenario 2 total employment of high skilled, medium skilled and low 
skilled labour increase by 0.07% (2 534 jobs), 0.13% (3 582 jobs) and 
0.16% (1 774 jobs), respectively. 
• In scenario 3, total employment of medium and high skilled increases by 
0.03% (782 jobs) and 0.07% (750 jobs), respectively, but employment of 
low skilled labour decreases by 0.09% (-3 017 jobs). 
The reduction in employment in scenario 3 reflects the decline in employment 
of fuel attendants. However, the growth in output arising from increased 
domestic and foreign demand combined with improved investment alleviates 
some of the initial decline in employment. Given the fact the Government's 
small business strategy is targeted towards job creation, the implication for 
employment as enunciated above needs careful scrutiny. Singh, (1999:50), 
suggested similar consequences of deregulation. 
4.5 THE RETAIL MARGIN 
The retail margin is controlled by the Department of Minerals and Energy and 
is determined by the actual costs incurred by the retailer. This cost takes into 
account all proportionate driveway costs such as rental, forecourt wages, 
overheads and retailer drawings. The Department conducts a Retail Margin 
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Study on an annual basis to determine the margin by using a sample of 100 
service stations across the country using an average basket of volumes. 
The methodology used in the study of the costs creates an incentive to 
retailers to become more efficient and in that way increase their profits 
proportionate to their efficiency. The non-fuel margin is generally determined 
by the oil company through their franchised operations. The following graph 
illustrates the retail margin increases from January 2001 to January 2002. 
GRAPH 4.3 
RETAIL MARGIN HISTORY 2001-2002 
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Source: Central Energy Fund Website (2001) 
South Africa has about 4900 service stations countrywide as illustrated on 
Map 4.1. The service station is an integral part of the micro- business sector 
128 
and an important node for business development. It is estimated that 50 000 
pump attendants are employed at fuel outlets supporting at least three 
dependants each, thus the industry is providing social security to some 
150 000 South Africans. 
The RATPLAN (Rationalisation Plan) seeks to protect the small business 
owner and the job creating ability of such businesses. Oil companies are 
prohibited from owning service stations and are only permitted to own and 
operate one site per province for training purposes. Self-service is also 
prohibited to ensure that the attendant's jobs are protected. 
The building of service stations is carefully controlled through a quota system 
to prevent an over proliferation of sites. General dealer outlets are also 
positioned to ensure that fuel is available in the rural areas. The Government 
in executing its regulatory functions conducts an independent review of the 
profitability of fuel sites. The study covers all aspects of cost management and 
tries to ensure that the dealer - owner receives an adequate return for his 
capital investment. 
Government conducts an annual study of this small business by carefully 
analysing the cost structure of 100 service stations nationally. The actual costs 
of operations are analysed and a retail margin is calculated. At the time of this 
study, the dealer margin was 25.2 cents per liter. The margin is effectively a 
reward for efficiency. 
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The price of petrol is regulated to ensure that urban and rural prices are not 
distorted and that the price build-up accommodates all aspects of the 
regulatory mechanism. The prices are adjusted on the first Wednesday of 
each month to reflect the movements in foreign exchange and the crude oil 
price. The price has an international and domestic component. Diesel is not a 
regulated product. The basic price is the BFP transfer price and represents the 
international component of the pricing system. 
While the margin methodology has been criticised by retailer bodies, in the 
absence of free market operations, the findings are accepted. This research 
would test the cost build-up using the case study information as a basis for 
comparison. Monthly increases in the fuel price places an additional working 
capital burden on small business retailers as they would need additional 
capital to fund both the price increase and debtor purchases as deposits held 
cannot be increased and decreased on a monthly basis. 
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Source: Central Energy Fund website (Internet 12: www.cef.org.za) 
The graph 4.4 illustrates the price movement over five years. All products 
reflect a gradual increase suggesting that the regulation in place does indeed 
bring some "order" to the South African economy. There are no wide swings in 
the pricing history. The impact of this for the small fuel retailer is discussed in 
the presentation of the case evidence in Chapter six. The number of service 
stations and their geographical spread is included in the map that follows: 
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MAP 4.1 
SERVICE STATIONS IN SOUTH AFRICA 
329 f Durban 
USUTPoft Elizabeth 
Source: Service Station locations in South Africa (2000), Department of 
Minerals and Energy 
The Map shows the intensity of investments in the major provinces. The inland 
area constitutes more than 50% of the economic activity in SA and has about 
50% of the service stations in SA. The preset profitability has supported the 
employment levels in the industry. The oil industry would have been 
substantially downsised had the regulatory mechanisms been removed. The 
question that needs to be addressed is whether the right sizing of the small 
business retailers enhances efficiency. It must also be pointed out the retail 
margin study recommends the same increase across all provinces while the 
labour costs, which constitute about 50% of the gross profit is different in 
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different areas. The Retail margin study does not factor in the spectrum of the 
retail offer or benefit that oil companies invest in to increase their return from 
the petrol sites. 
4.6 OIL COMPANY INVESTMENTS INTO RETAIL SITES 
The regulatory regime has ensured that stability prevails in the oil industry. 
Stability and clear Government policies are key considerations for foreign 
direct investments. It is accepted that the regulations in terms of returns on 
investment, price stability and market access has indeed encouraged and 
increased foreign direct investment. The introduction of unleaded petrol from 
the beginning of 2006 cost the oil industry R12billion as a cost of doing 
business - this further illustrates the size of capital invested. 
The following graph 4.3 summarises the size of total investments made over a 
ten-year period. The investment as measured across the value chain equals 
R1.5billion per annum. This is the largest sectoral investment into the 
economy on a continuous basis. The regulatory regime continues to remain 
the catalyst for such investments. 
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GRAPH 4.5 
INVESTMENTS BY RSA OIL INDUSTRY 
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Source: SAPIA Annual Report 2004 
It would appear that oil company investments into the retail network are 
influenced by competitive positioning. Oil companies own 40% of the retail 
sites in the country and dispense 60% of the fuel sales through these outlets. 
Privately owned sites are therefore not as attractive as Oil Company sites due 
to the inability of private owners to make the kind of investments required. Oil 
companies also obtain a marketing return on all investments made as per the 




No. of Service Stations Percentage Ownership 
1993* 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 1993 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
l Company controlled D Dealer controlled 1 Company controlled O Dealer controlled 
Source: Department of Minerals and Energy (2005) 
Government policy in terms of incentives does not accommodate the majority 
of the small fuel retailers or the dealer owned sites. Oil companies tend to 
invest heavily into company owned sites to gain market power and to increase 
non-fuel income as a strategic intervention in advance of deregulation. This 
effectively means that government's policy approach disadvantages a section 
of the small business fuel retailers. Oil Company controlled and owned sites 
have been steadily increasing from 1994 to 2004 compared to 1983. 
There is a perception by government, and this is supported by the graphical 
information provided that that there has been an explosion of retail service 
station numbers and that companies are over-investing in their service stations 
This perception seems largely based upon the number of large '1st world' 
service stations that have been built in South Africa which provide a fully 
developed non-fuel offer. 
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All companies base their investment decisions upon a discounted cash flow 
analysis, an evaluation of the future revenue income resulting from a service 
station project versus the capital investment and costs incurred. According to 
the Mackenzie report (2005:5), a range of views exist among the oil 
companies about the future level of margins but generally it appears that 
margins are assumed to fall in the long term (i.e. the assumed impact of 
eventual market deregulation). If a project does not meet the company's 
investment criteria (e.g. payback period or IRR) it is not supported and will not 
proceed. 
The consistent clear message is that oil companies will only invest in South 
Africa where they can justify the decision - either to local head office or within 
a global organisation. This investment behaviour in South Africa is rational and 
can be observed in most markets where the international oil companies 
operate. If a company makes poor investments or over-invests in ways which 
earn a lower return than the 15% allowed under regulation, they are only partly 
compensated through while any competitors who invest more wisely stand to 
benefit. 
But the result of such investment behaviour remains that the retailer owned 
sites would continue to diminish due to the lack of investment in upgrade and 
expansion. It is this aspect that would marginalise some small business 














Capital investment per litre has also risen 
over the period - but broadly in line with 
CPI apart from 2001 
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The graph 4.7 illustrates the capital investment programme of oil companies 
over the 2000-2004 year. With the exception of 2001, the capital investment 
per litre has increased in line with the consumer price index. Franchisees 
operating company owned and controlled sites would continue to have 
stronger competitive strength in the market place in terms of customer offer 
like quick service restaurants, shops and car washes at a cost. 
It is clear that the oil major's control of the retail network has increased 
significantly over recent years as over 70-80% of all new to industry sites are 
company controlled sites. The percentage of company controlled sites in the 
retailer network has risen from 41% in 1993 to 57% in 2004 while about 70-
80% of site closures are dealer controlled sites. 
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It is important to point out there are a number of possible factors which may 
have influenced these trends - they may not arise purely because of a 
structural weakness in regulation. 
Oil majors may seek greater control over their network to ensure high levels of 
customer service. This is especially relevant in South Africa where retail 
gasoline price competition does not exist and so companies have to compete 
on non-price elements - location, customer service, fuel differentiation and 
non-fuel offering. 
The growth in non-fuels convenience retailing is important. The oil company 
ownership gives them control and access to the profit potential from this fast 
growing business. Therefore, in themselves, it can be argued that these trends 
do not provide evidence of independent investors being disadvantaged. The 
independent small business owner is disadvantaged primarily as a result of 
the exclusion from the return on investment approach that oil companies are 
awarded. 
This research would attempt to examine the franchise and real estate 
recoveries in the fuel retail business. Given the fact that most oil companies 
are multi national corporations and operate in international deregulated 
markets, a comparison of South African average volumes and geographical 
dispersion to European countries would be useful. 
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GRAPH 4.8 
AVERAGE FUEL SALES (RSA AND EUROPE) 
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Source: Department of Minerals and Energy (2005) 
The average volume in South Africa is about 2.5 million litres per annum, 
which is much higher than Switzerland, Italy, Belgium and Norway. However, 
when comparing the market size, South Africa is about the size of Netherlands 
where the average volume is much higher. 
The conclusions that can be drawn, is that the small retail business, although 
operating in different regulatory environments with varying volumetric sales 
survive through non-fuel income. Graph 4.9 shows that, service stations in 
South Africa are the furthest to each other at more than 100km radius 
compared to a country like Belgium where the sites are 8 km apart. Close 
proximity implies greater competition. In South Africa, there is no competition 
as prices are regulated. Is customer service or is the location of the business a 
differentiation? What influences the retail small business competitive 
advantage in the South African context? 
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GRAPH 4.9 
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South Africa has the least number of sites per 100 square kilometers, in 
comparison to most European countries but pumps a higher average annual 
volume. The current regulatory format will continue to divide the market on 
lines of capital strength. Oil companies would become more dominant and 
private owners more marginalised in their ability to compete should the market 
become liberalised. The number of new small business retail sites being 
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Graph 4.10 shows that within a four-year period (2000-2004) 367 service 
stations were built in South Africa. This is in spite of the overtrade that exists 
suggesting that oil companies are divesting from non-performing sites and 
investing in new sites with higher volume and non-fuel income. This is evident 
from graph 4.11, which shows that in tandem with the general trend of 
closures over 180 dealer-owned sites closed in 2001. This also illustrates that 
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It is apparent that oil company investments at service stations includes non 
fuel businesses and that the general strategy appears to be high investment in 
company owned sites which would result in high volume and non fuel income 
sites being completely dominated by the oil majors. 
Lastly, the size of the non-fuel investment is supported by the data on 
graph 4.12. The rationale for the change in market emphasis is the same 
abroad as in South Africa. According to the Mckenzie report (2005:4), growth 
in non-fuel retailing from service stations is a global trend. It has also become 
apparent during the research that there is a paucity of statistical information 
regarding service station numbers in South Africa. 
There are two key factors behind this trend. Firstly, it is opportunity driven. The 
regulatory or consumer trends, such as convenience shopping or 'eating on 
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the go', have created demand for non-fuel services from petrol stations. Oil 
majors have spotted the opportunity and developed new retailing formats to 
meet the demand. Secondly, Low fuel margins in competitive markets means 
that service station operators must find alternate income streams to survive. 
This has forced the oil majors into becoming major players in the convenience 
retailing sector in markets such as the US, UK and Germany. 
They have the skills which can then be applied in other markets where they 
also operate. This does, however, present a different challenge for small fuel 
retailers. They have moved from selling one homogenous product at fixed 
prices to retailing over two thousand line items. Retailing requires specialist 
skills like merchandising, stock management and gross profit targeting. 
GRAPH 4.12 
GROWTH IN NON-FUEL SALES 
BP global store sales 
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Source: McKenzie presentation to Department of Minerals and Energy, 2005 
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BP has reported that their growth of their total store sales since 2000 has 
grown by nearly 16% compared to a market growth of 6%. The trend line 
shows a constant increase from 2000 to 2004 with average sales per square 
meter of USD 800. 
As in many markets, over recent years there has been a significant trend 
towards the development of non-fuel retailing in South Africa (C-Stores, 
restaurants, cafe's etc.). This non-fuel income can materially improve the 
service station economics and the international oil companies will be able to 
lever off their expertise developed in other countries. It is under these expert 
franchise conditions that small business should thrive and the question about 
their failure under such conditions becomes even more important. 
4.7 CONCLUSION 
This chapter provided insights into the regulatory conditions that prevail in the 
retail fuel industry. Small business retailers receive a margin on petrol sales 
calculated on an industry benchmark basis. Retailers functioning below the 
efficiency line are penalised and those operating above would generate 
increased cash flows. 
The retail fuel industry is regulated and there is price setting effectively 
preventing price competition in the market place amongst fuel retailers. 
Retailers can only compete on service, location and non-fuel merchandise. 
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The oil industry is allowed a return on marketing investments made and there 
is a perception that the regulatory regime has led to this unintended 
consequence. Notwithstanding government's perception, the number of new 
retail sites increased over a number years matched by a number of closures. 
In both instances, the small fuel retailer owning sites were disadvantaged. The 
fuel retail business provides a significant number of jobs and the impacts of 
potential deregulation of the industry were discussed. 
While the capital investments increased on a continuous basis, the capital 
seems to be directed at increasing non-fuel income from shops and car 
washes. The last four chapters had set the scene for the case study analysis 
and the following chapter presents the research methodology. 
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CHAPTER 5 
THE RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
This qualitative investigation focuses on small business failure within the fuel 
retail industry in South Africa. The study aims to formulate strategies to 
address the reasons for failure and in that way contribute to greater 
effectiveness. Consequentially, this would better prepare small business 
entrepreneurs and thus contribute to small business development, which has 
been identified as a major intervention to address unemployment and 
economic development within the new South Africa. Against this background, 
there is a need to clearly identify and address the reasons for failure within this 
franchised and highly regulated industry. 
The previous chapters reviewed the extant literature on small business and 
small business failure setting the scene for conducting the case study 
analysis. The main aims of this chapter are to present the methodology 
approach by addressing the research problem, the various sub-problems, the 
dilemma when confronted with the methodology question and the rationale for 
adopting the said approach. The generalisation issue is also addressed 
together with the research design, data collection, pilot study and case 
selection criteria. 
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5.2 THE RESEARCH PROBLEM 
The problem that formed the basis for this research work was first outlined in 
the introduction to this research work. While other research studies (Pillay 
2000; Johnson 1999) have focused on small business failure and success in 
general, no research has been done in the fuel retail sector. The intention is to 
focus on a contemporary phenomenon in a real life context by using the case 
study approach while adopting great care in the design and approach to 
overcome the traditional criticisms of the case study method. 
Previous studies investigating small firm performance focused on small 
business failure or success. A review of the literature on "failure" by Berryman 
(1983:47-59) showed that there were many factors associated with failure. The 
majority of the apparent causes, like the lack of sufficient cash and inventory 
control, were considered to be symptoms of managerial inabilities. Berryman 
(1983:47-59) then grouped another set of apparent causes as "behavioral", 
including excessive optimism and a reluctance to seek professional help. A 
third set of factors was termed "exogenous". This referred to ill health, 
personal problems, economic and seasonal conditions. 
Other researchers undertook studies on "going concerns" or successful small 
business units. As indicated in the literature review section, there are many 
reasons for success. Financial performance data has been used as a measure 
of success. According to Cooper, Woo and Dunkelberg (1998), new business 
owners generally have a high optimist in the beginning. Their goals are often 
immodest and almost one third express a desire to grow their businesses into 
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larger firms. According to Kirchhoff (1994) few would ever become growth 
firms. William and Lloyd (2001:75) state that research in new business 
profitability is often constrained because virtually all of them are privately held. 
Homaday and Wheatley (1986) emphasised goal setting rather than planning 
activities. 
The fuel retail industry often represents the dream and aspirations of small 
business entrepreneurs due to its being the most accessible part of the value 
chain in the oil industry. Indeed, government has annexed the voluntary Liquid 
Fuels Charter as part of the Petroleum Products Amendments Act in 2005. 
There is a need to understand the critical success and failure factors. What 
are the reasons for failure in the retail fuel industry? 
Cooper and Schindler (2001:62) suggested that, a useful way to approach the 
research process is to state the basic dilemma that prompts the research and 
to then try to develop other questions by progressively breaking down the 
original question into more specific ones. 
Emory and Cooper (1991:675) concur with Schindler by stating that, the 
problem statement contains the need for undertaking the research project. The 
problem is usually represented by a management question. It is followed by a 
more detailed set of objectives. Both approaches are adopted in this research 
work. There are about four thousand nine hundred five service stations in the 
Republic of South Africa. The Fuel Retailers Association and the Department 
of Minerals and Energy both concur that the failure rate amongst fuel retailers 
is unacceptably high. 
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It is in the assessment of the factors that contribute to both failure and success 
that small business failure can be minimised. Micro-businesses are the 
foundational contributors to the economy. The intensity and size of the failure 
rate warrants careful scrutiny. Why is the failure rate so high? What are the 
key contributing factors? What are the critical success factors? What are the 
controllable factors? Is it at all possible to reduce the failure rate? What are the 
reasons underlying failure? A detailed understanding of the contributing 
factors to failure and success will form the foundational basis for the creation 
of future entrepreneurs. It is hoped that this study would contribute to the world 
of knowledge of small business success and failure and in that way instill 
greater confidence in potential entrepreneurs contemplating small business 
ventures that is the backbone of the economy. 
The high failure rate has a major inhibiting influence on risk taking. The fear of 
failure and financial ruin could shrink the size of the small business sector. 
Entrepreneurial flare is dampened thus reducing the chances of new 
inventions and the generation of new ideas. It is not the intention of this 
research work to generate a model that would guarantee success, nor is it the 
intention to isolate all factors that contribute to failure. If such a model, can be 
constructed, and it is hoped that future researchers would attempt to 
investigate this, using the results of this study as a starting point. 
The study seeks to examine a number of sub problems without inhibiting the 
findings of the study. The breaking down of the research problem into discrete 
sub-problems, each researchable by the testing of dedicated hypothesis, was 
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proposed by Leedy (1993:70). The research hypothesis should initially be 
presented in a scientific format, and be subsequently converted into testable, 
statistical hypothesis. 
While, Cooper and Schindler (2001:49J, suggest that in research, hypothesis 
serve several important functions by guiding the direction of the study and 
identifying the facts that are relevant and those that are not thus suggesting 
which form of research design is likely to be most appropriate - this study 
does not adopt any hypothesis as a basis for testing the reasons for failure 
and success. 
A theoretical proposition, as is the tradition in case study analysis is presented 
together with a rival theory. The theoretical proposition is that other factors 
such as education, skills and training, management factors and occupational 
experience are the main reasons for success and failure amongst fuel retail 
outlets in the Republic of South Africa. The rival theory is that the main criteria 
for success or failure are the size of fuel volumes and non-fuel turnovers. In 
other words, service stations with high volumes of fuel sales and high turnover 
from non-fuel income streams will succeed and by implication sites with lower 
volumes and turnover are deemed to fail. 
5.3 OBJECTIVES OF THE STUDY 
The reasons supporting the choice of the fuel retail business, as a sector of 
the small business environment in South Africa was as follows: 
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The country is on a national drive to develop and encourage small 
business development. The fuel retail business is an integral component 
of the small business sector. It employs 50 000 attendants at four 
thousand nine hundred service stations. The industry is highly regulated 
and government allows a margin on fuel sales as a profit incentive. The 
margin is a function of costs - and these costs are independently verified 
on an annual basis. The paradox lies in the fact that there is a perception 
that many of the fuel retail outlets are marginal. In spite of this, low-
pumping sites, lower than the average volume used in the margin study, 
continues to operate. Banks have traditionally viewed the service station 
business as high-risk businesses and are generally reluctant to loan 
funds or provide working capital facilities. These considerations coupled 
with the researchers keen interest in the service station business, was 
sufficient to ignite interest and led to this research work; 
Oil companies normally operate as a franchisor and provide expensive 
training courses to the prospective fuel retailers. Notwithstanding this, 
many service station operators exit after disillusionment and failure. Their 
reasons are not clearly understood nor has it ever been academically 
studied as far as the researcher is aware; 
There are many interested parties attempting to get an independent 
assessment of the fuel retailer sector. Government believes that the 
industry is over traded and hence it's "marginal" performance. The Fuel 
Retailers Association alleges that the major oil companies are in a way 
responsible for small business failure. Their reasoning lies in the 
excessive franchise fees, high real estate fees and rigid terms of 
agreement that oil companies force small retailers to endure. These 
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divergent views made it easy to obtain information and the researcher 
had access to quality information from the EFG case study; 
• Government is contemplating the gradual liberalization of the industry by 
2010. This would introduce free market competition amongst retailers 
and will eventually lead to self-service and vertical integration. The 
implication for small business and employment is of serious concern. 
Clearly, any policy shift by Government must be investigated thoroughly. 
This research would provide valuable information to be considered 
amongst other research studies for the development of the new policies; 
• Lastly, the researcher has worked for a major oil company and is 
currently in Government tasked with the policy development for the fuel 
retail industry. The researcher has witnessed fuel retailers going 
bankrupt and losing all their personal capital and in two cases - even 
committing suicide. Conversely, there were other fuel retailers who 
enjoyed great success and became wealthy as fuel retailers. What 
distinguishes the two classes of fuel retailers? 
Most service stations have standardised offerings and generally retailed one 
homogenous product in the form of fuel as the main income stream. Yet, some 
failed and some succeeded. 
The main objectives of the study are: 
• To examine why many emerging small fuel retailers fail although they 
operate within a franchised structure within a highly regulated industry. 
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• To conduct qualitative testing using the case study approach for the 
purposes of conducting an in depth analysis of the issues under 
investigation. 
• To establish and compile a comprehensive databank of information 
through interviews, observations, documentation survey, legislative 
analysis and review of case study information. 
• To propose business management strategies and approaches that is 
capable of overcoming the challenges of fuel retailers. 
• To examine the quality of franchise support and support mechanisms in 
place. 
• To review current government policies and procedures to formulate 
alternative and effective strategies for the industry. 
5.4 THE RESEARCH STRATEGY 
The intention was to find out the reasons for failure and success. In order to do 
this the sample data had to be extracted from a population that had the same 
chances of success and failure or else any conclusions from a finding that was 
predicated on different circumstances could have different reasons for success 
and failure. It was also important to interview both failed and successful 
retailers to establish the reasons for either phenomenon. In other words, the 
reasons for failure, if applied positively would be the reasons for success. If 
poor management was a cause for failure then was good management a 
cause for success? The sample would have to include a representative 
number of failures and successes within a specific time frame. 
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This presented a serious challenge. Any statistical testing on a randomly 
selected sample could provide generalised results. The random sample would 
have to be selected from the whole population of four thousand nine hundred 
service stations - the number of fuel sites that currently exists in South Africa. 
The sample size had to be significantly large. To be truly randomly drawn, the 
sample could include retailers across the nine provinces. The cost of travel 
and time constraints made this impossible. It was also difficult to extract such 
a list from the oil companies and indeed, although the industry is regulated a 
comprehensive list of sites does not exist within the government library. 
Another important consideration was the availability of information, especially 
for failed sites. An extraction of a random sample from the oil company credit 
records would have been acceptable but the sample bias could distort the 
data. The other restriction is that there are six major oil companies operating in 
South Africa, each with its own brand and operating conditions and this would 
make the scientific and random selection sample permutations complex and 
beyond the scope of this work. 
Leady and Ormrod (2005:208-209) stated, that data is delicate and sensitive 
to unintended influence. Bias attacks the integrity of the facts and is 
particularly vicious when it enters surreptitiously into the research and goes 
undetected. It can render suspect even the most carefully planned research 
effort. 
Qualitative studies are concerned with quality or qualities. Leady (2005:205) 
states that a "qualitative research has two things in common. Firstly, they 
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focus on phenomena that occur in natural settings - that is in the real world. 
Secondly, they involve studying those phenomena in all their complexity." 
Quality researchers do not simplify what they observe but recognise that the 
issue being studied has many dimensions and layers. Gillham (2000:12) 
states that qualitative study enables the researcher to achieve the following: 
• To carry out an investigation where other methods such as experiments 
are not practical; 
• To investigate situations where little is known about what is there or what 
is going on; 
• To explore complexities that are beyond the scope of more "controlled 
approaches"; 
• To "get under the skin" of a group or organization to find out what really 
happens - the informal reality which can only be perceived from the 
inside; 
• To view the case from inside out - to see it from the perspective of those 
involved. 
Strauss and Corbin (1990:17) defined qualitative research, as "any kind of 
research that produces findings not arrived at by means of statistical 
procedures or other means of quantification." Another definition offered by 
Yin (2003:13) is that, "a case study is an empirical enquiry that investigates a 
contemporary phenomenon within a real life context, especially when the 
boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident." 
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Patton (1990:65) notes that, in quantitative studies researchers seek casual 
determination, prediction and generalization of findings while qualitative 
researchers seek illumination, understanding and extrapolation to similar 
situations. 
Yin (2003:13-17), also points out that the case study approach should not be 
confused with "qualitative research". Some qualitative research follows 
ethnographic methods and seeks to satisfy two conditions: (a) the use of 
close-up detailed observation of the natural world by the investigator and (b) 
the attempt to avoid prior commitment to any theoretical model. However, 
ethnographic research does not always produce case studies nor are case 
studies limited to these two conditions. 
Gillham (2000:13) also states that, in adopting the case study method, 
different sub methods are used like interviews, observations, documents and 
work samples etc. Data can be accumulated by different methods and when 
these methods converge then the researcher can be reasonably confident that 
a true picture is being created. Triangulation is the approach adopted from 
different methodological standpoints. 
While discussing the methodological challenges with the sponsor and various 
other researchers it was accepted that, the case study approach would best 
meet the methodology challenges at hand. 
In the decision to adopt a qualitative research approach, several 
considerations were taken in to account. Although Gillham (2000:12) had 
156 
stated that qualitative methods can be used to better understand issues about 
which little is known, the main reason for adopting this approach lies in the 
need for an in-depth understanding about small business failure amongst fuel 
retail business. 
The intention in this research work was to "get under the skin" and to get a 
better grip on the complexity of the reasons for success and failure. The 
research purpose was to get an "insider" view of what the issues were and to 
actually see it from the perspective of those involved - the fuel retailers. It was 
important to interact with those that risked their capital and lost and those that 
risked their capital and succeeded. This makes research real - asking in an 
informal way for the sharing of experiences of those that are the subject of 
study. 
However, there are limitations with qualitative research work in that the results 
cannot be generalised due to the small sample sizes that are normally drawn. 
It is also situation and time bound, often requiring a lot of time for appropriate 
data collection and can be an intrusion into the lives of others. 
Another consideration is the challenge of bias - is the researcher attempting to 
replace a quantitative method with a reduced sample set and then drawing 
conclusions from the analysis? This "background" noise was a constant 
reminder about the importance of ensuring that a number of sources of 
evidence were gathered that embellished the interview findings and made for 
a truly in-depth analysis of the case history. This involved follow- up interviews 
using email correspondence and telephonic discussions. Audited financial 
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statements were obtained, augmented by attendance to fuel retail conferences 
hosted by government. The researcher had attended parts of an oil company 
training course and went back into the field, in some cases three or four times 
to observe a particular phenomenon like the taking of dips for wet stock 
reconciliation. 
Yin (2003:13) notes that a case study enquiry copes with the technically 
distinctive situation in which there will be many more variables of interest than 
data points. It relies on multiple sources of evidence, with data needing to 
converge in a triangulation fashion and benefits from the prior development of 
theoretical propositions to guide data collection and analysis. 
There are many advantages to the case study approach. Firstly, Cooper and 
Schindler (2001:137) contend that, "case study approach place emphasis on a 
full contextual analysis of fewer events or conditions and their interrelations". 
It is adopted when the researcher does not have any control over the events 
and when the focus is on contemporary phenomenon within a real life context. 
This is precisely what this research is focused on. The phenomena being 
investigated are the reasons for success and failure amongst fuel retailers. 
These reasons were outside the researcher's control. It is currently a point of 
discussion and debate in both the private and government circles. 
Government at the time of this research is presenting new legislation in 
parliament about the fuel retail business. It is expected that this research 
would be completed by the time the regulations are published for public 
comment and this could add to the debate around the new policy formulation 
158 
in this small business sector. It is most interesting to observe how persons 
who were most successful in their previous occupations would fail abysmally 
in operating a fuel retail business. Yet, on the other hand, it would seem that a 
person with limited expertise and education makes a tremendous success of 
the venture. 
Secondly, case study approach provides the researcher with a detailed set of 
information from which specific theoretical nuances can be examined and 
explored. Thirdly, the method is useful as it allows for multiple theoretical 
approaches to be tested against the same set of events using multiple data 
sets of the same phenomena and is therefore valuable in the evaluation and 
comparison of competing theories. 
The research sought to examine the complex phenomena around the reasons 
for failure and success. Case studies allow an investigation to retain the 
holistic and meaningful characteristics of real life events. The EFG (Energy 
Finance Group) case history as described in APPENDIX 1 is a real life event 
where a niche funder loaned capital to entrepreneurs to purchase their own 
fuel stations. 
The overall results of the twenty - one entrepreneurs placed in these 
businesses, are that almost half of them had failed. This failure report was 
extracted from the loan records of the finance company. It is for this reason, 
that the case study approach was adopted, in order to "get under the skin" and 
to conduct in-depth tests to identify the reasons for failure and success. The 
total case population shared the same uniform procedures as a condition 
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before the loan was approved and all received the same professional support 
for the duration of the loan. The EFG case study was an ideal opportunity to 
address the research question. 
5.5 THE SCOPE OF THE STUDY 
The study was conducted in the period 2000 - 2005 and focused on those 
emerging entrepreneurs that had received funding from the EFG. The case 
study respondents used in this research were also selected from the afore-
mentioned group where the researcher explored reasons that constituted 
failure or success of the retail fuel Industry sample. 
5.6 THE GENERALISATION ISSUE 
Newbold (1991:782-783) asks, "What is the relevant population and is a listing 
of it available?" He concludes that dubious conclusions have often been 
reached following an otherwise perfectly respectable analysis of survey data. 
There are four specific threats to external validity: the interaction of testing and 
experimental treatment; the interaction of selection and treatment; reactive 
arrangements and interferences of multiple treatments with one another. This 
diagnosis could be possible due to the fact that because of the advances in 
sampling theory in survey research, it is possible to draw samples from very 
large and heterogeneous populations and then to generalise using the logic 
probability statistics. 
160 
Denzin (1983:133-134) rejects generalisation as a goal in research and notes 
that, "the interpretivist rejects generalisation as a goal and never aims to draw 
randomly selected samples of human experience. For the interpretivist, every 
instance of social interaction, if thickly described represents a slice from the 
life world that is the proper subject matter for interpretive inquiry ...every 
topic... must be seen as carrying its own logic, sense or order, structure, and 
meaning". 
This strong rejection of generalisation is perhaps due to the historical tendency 
to regard the issue of external validity as irrelevant and hence to disregard it 
as qualitative research tradition has been closely linked to cultural 
anthropology with its emphasis on the study of exotic cultures. 
Finally, Gomm, Hammersley and Foster (2000:74) notes that, many qualitative 
researchers have began to recognise the importance of dealing with the issue 
of generalization. It is clear that the classical view of external validity is of little 
help to qualitative researchers interested in finding ways of enhancing the 
likelihood that their work will speak to situations beyond the one immediately 
studied - that is, that it will be to some extent generalisable. The idea of 
sampling from a population of sites in order to generalise to the larger 
population is simply and obviously unworkable in all but the rarest situations 
for qualitative researchers, who often take several years to produce an 
intensive case study of one or a very small number of sites. 
Whilst the findings of this research work may not in the conventional sense be 
generalised, case studies like experiments are generalisable to theoretical 
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propositions and not to populations or universes. In this sense the case study, 
like the experiment does not represent a "sample" - and in doing a case study 
the goal is to expand and generalise theories (analytic generalisation) and not 
to enumerate frequencies (statistical generalisation). 
5.7 THE CASE STUDY DESIGN 
Yin (2003:19) describes a case study design as, "case study design is the 
logic that links the data to be collected and the conclusions to be drawn to the 
initial questions of the study. Every empirical study has an implicit, if not 
explicit research design. Articulating "theory" about what is being studied helps 
to operationalise case study designs and make them more explicit" 
The data collected in the EFG case study (see case history in APPENDIX 1) 
was drawn from multiple sources. The various sources of data sought to 
address the research question raised: What are the causes of success and 
failure of small fuel retailers in the Republic of South Africa? 
Nachmias and Nachmias (1992:77-78) describes a research design as a plan 
that, "guides the investigator in the process of collecting, analysing and 
interpreting observations. It is a logical model of proof that allows the 
researcher to draw inferences concerning casual relations among the 
variables under investigation". 
The research design is therefore a logical plan of action detailing how the 
researcher would make progress from dealing with the research question, then 
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collection of the relevant data and then describing how the data will be 
analysed. Due to its limited use by researchers as a methodology, a fair 
amount of doubt exists about the design of case studies. Careful care has 
been taken to deal with this apprehension at the outset. 
The importance of developing a research plan is that its development will help 
avoid the situation where the evidence does not address the research 
questions being investigated. The reasons for failure and success will be 
provided by the case evidence that will emerge from the cross case analysis, 
observations, interviewing and re-interviewing, review of selected parts of the 
retailer-training course and the quantitative analysis from the financials and 
other reports. 
The research questions in this study deals with the reasons for small business 
failure and success. The methodology adopted is a multiple case study 
approach comprising twenty-one fuel retailers. By adopting the multiple case 
approaches, a cross sectional analysis was possible. This allowed the 
researcher to draw meaningful conclusions about the reasons for failure and 
success. 
5.7.1 COMPONENTS OF THE RESEARCH DESIGN 
Yin (2003:21) further states that five components are important in case study 
research design. They include the study questions, its propositions, the unit of 
analysis, the logic linking the data to the propositions and the criteria for 
interpreting the findings. 
163 
It is in the assessment of the research findings into the study questions that 
insight can be obtained into the reasons for both failure and success in the fuel 
retail sector. Micro-businesses are the foundational contributors to the 
economy. The reason for the failure and success amongst fuel retailers 
warrants careful scrutiny. Why is the failure rate so high? What are the key 
contributing factors? What are the critical success factors? What are the 
controllable factors? Is it at all possible to reduce the failure rate? What are the 
reasons underlying failure and success? A detailed understanding of 
contributing factors to failure and success will form the foundational basis for 
the creation of future entrepreneurs. 
The research will specifically provide answers to the raging debate that 
currently pervades the retail fuel industry. Firstly, Government determines the 
margins for the fuel retailer and is therefore perceived as unsympathetic by 
fuel retailers, then the oil industry operating as franchisors are accused of not 
fully performing their function as franchisors, bankers have red-lined the retail 
fuel sector as high risk sector thus limiting the flow of capital and lastly, the 
fuel retailers themselves see the oil industry as exploiters seeking to improve 
their bottom line without due regard to themselves. All of these issues are 
eclipsed by the absence of an independent research. 
Secondly, the study propositions for the reasons of success and failure are 
considered. Although this research is a qualitative case study intended to 
extract by in-depth analysis of individual cases, the reasons for failure and 
success, on the basis of the literature review, industry experience and 
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intuition, the researchers study propositions is that failure is primarily the result 
of poor management and training, entrepreneurial factors, occupational factors 
and exogenous factors. 
The third component of the research design is the unit of analysis. This 
component is related to the problem of defining what the case is. 
Yin (2003:12) states that, "In each situation, an individual person is the case 
being studied and the individual is the primary unit of analysis" 
This is a case study of fuel retailers financed by EFG and hence they are the 
unit of analysis in this research. The successful and failed fuel retailers were 
appointed in 2000 and 2001. Only those successful or failed fuel retailers that 
EFG loans were granted to in 2000 and 2001 was part of the unit of analysis. 
Specific time boundaries have been defined to determine the limits of the data 
collection and analysis. Only the original set of fuel retailers that were funded 
by EFG was considered - the first twenty-one loans. 
Attempts were made to link the data to the propositions. This was done by 
providing a financial analysis on the audited financial statements and then 
comparing the financial results to the findings from the detailed interviews. The 
financial and interview results was further augmented by observing and 
reviewing selected sections of the oil company training course, conducting 
expert third party interviews, attending the government sponsored workshop 
on fuel retailers, returning to the field for further observing activities on the fuel 
retail sites and re-interviewing, to obtain clarity on working capital issues. 
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The criteria used for interpreting the findings included a comparative analysis 
of key operational and financial variables between the successful and failed 
retailers and an integration of the interview results with the documentary 
evidence to find support for case respondent views. The purpose was to strike 
a pattern or match. If for example, it was found that retailers failed due to 
insufficient education and training, then the chances of failure may be reduced 
by improving education and training. In other words, failure is a function of 
education and training. 
5.7.2 THEORETICAL DEVELOPMENT 
The role of theory development, prior to the collection of data, is a significant 
point of difference between case studies and other related methods of 
research. Many research methods such as experiments and surveys 
deliberately avoid specifying any theoretical propositions, although such 
exploratory studies have a stated purpose at the outset. In a quantitative 
study, a hypothesis is formulated and is later tested in the research findings. 
Lord (1993:198) notes that, as stated by Scapens (1990), "That the 
appropriateness of a research methodology, as opposed to competing 
methods, depended upon the methodological and epistemological position of 
the researcher". 
The social sciences and the theoretical presuppositions of the researcher 
influence the observation, the perceived phenomena and the interpretations 
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thereof. It is therefore appropriate to review the epistemological stances that 
might have been appropriate for this research work and to explain the 
approach adopted. 
The definition of epistemology was given by Emory and Cooper, (1991:37) as: 
"...The philosophy of science or, more specifically, epistemology is the body of 
knowledge that provides the classifications that help us discriminate amongst 
the styles of thinking." 
Lord further notes that, Otley and Berry (1994:45-46) distinguished between 
three epistemological stances of positivism, functionalism and insight. 
Positivism suggests that research aims to develop the explanations of 
phenomena. Researchers continue to modify theory as new evidence 
emerges. Theories can be abandoned by researchers should superior theories 
emerge. 
Lord (1993:199) also states that, functionalism aims to explain phenomena in 
relation to their functions in support of the purposes of an organization. This 
approach was criticised by Otley and Berry (1994:50) as it tended to produce 
interpretations of phenomena and control systems, rather than working 
towards the building or developing of theories. 
Lord (1993:199) also states that insight stances, also referred to as 
"Verstehen", include phenomenology, ethno methodology and interpretative 
methods. These methods are not utilised for formal theory-testing purposes, 
but address the pivotal issues of purpose, power and values that are ignored 
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by positivist approaches. Otley and Berry (1994:50) stated that, researchers 
often adopted insight stances when they were interested in rationales or 
theories in use by subjects within a case study situation. They noted that such 
researchers often relied on predetermined theory through which observations 
were interpreted. 
Otley and Berry (1994:48) criticised the functional and insight approaches, as 
they did not primarily aim at building, developing or the testing of theory. 
Anderson, Sweeney and Williams (2002:359) stated that, hypothesis testing 
could be used to test the validity of a claim and for decision making. 
This research work is undertaken as a multiple case study analysis, examining 
the reasons for failure and success amongst individual fuel retailers within the 
EFG group. Otley and Berry (1994:48) supported that a positivist approach 
could be applied as the study of a particular organization could be viewed as 
part of a wider set of similar studies, provided that adequate scientific control 
was demonstrated. This would ensure that subsequent researchers could 
follow the design in a reliable manner. This research work can best be 
classified as a positivist approach. 
Otley and Berry (1994:48) further acknowledges that the main difficulty with 
this approach was the potential inability to control the boundary of the 
research study effectively, thus failing to ensure that the values of the 
endogenous variables were held constant. They also noted that the full range 
of the exogenous variables might not be fully observed, and comparative 
analysis may then not be possible. 
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Yin (2003:28) states that, "For case studies, theory development as part of the 
design phase is essential, whether the ensuing case study's purpose is to 
develop or test theory". The goal is to have sufficient blue print for the study, 
and this requires theoretical propositions, as noted by Sutton and Staw 
(1995:378), as "a hypothetical story about why acts, events, structure and 
thoughts occur". 
While theory is not primary and evidence is - this research seeks to test the 
assumptions that underlie this study and hopes to find evidence that either 
strengthens the initial understanding or challenges the assumptions made. It is 
accepted that contradictory evidence could emerge or even evidence that 
qualifies the emerging understanding but both remain basic to research 
integrity. 
The theory being presented in this research is four - fold. Firstly, the 
researcher has theorised that entrepreneurial factors may play an important 
role in success and failure. The variables to be considered include the 
entrepreneurial factors such as age, gender, professional affiliations, 
education, training and motivation. The retailer as the unit of analysis is the 
subject that needs to be studied under close scrutiny. Understanding the 
human ability and influence is important in extracting the reasons for failure 
and success. 
Secondly, management Factors are a key component of success and failure. 
This is perhaps the most significant variable to be considered in explaining the 
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phenomenon of failure and success. It is intended to qualify the entrepreneur's 
decision to buy the business. The spectrum of questions would include 
consideration of pre-business purchase issues and a due diligence study with 
a series of probing sub -sections covering financial and general management. 
Thirdly, it is theorised that occupational factors play a role in small business 
success and failure. It is suggested that business success is enhanced by 
previous experience. Previous experience is not restricted to previous retail 
convenience experience but any small business experience, as the 
fundamentals are essentially the same. The test of previous experience 
attempts to clarify whether the move from the position of employee to 
entrepreneur is any different than moving from one small business to another. 
Lastly, exogenous factors have an influencing role for success and failure. 
This refers to factors directly outside the influence of the small business 
influence like economic shocks in terms of high interest rates or other 
externalities like road closure, as was the case with one of the cases originally 
considered for inclusion in the multi case study. 
The rival theory is that none of the above is relevant but that success and 
failure is a function of volume and turnover. In other words, the volume of fuel 
pumped or turnover generated from non-fuel income streams determines the 
retailer's success or failure. This subsection has suggested that a complete 
research design, covering the five components of research design is 




The research design is intended to represent a logical set of statements. The 
quality of the research design was also determined by certain logical tests. 
These tests include trustworthiness, credibility, conformability and data 
dependability. In essence, the tests are reliability and validity. 
Reliability ensures that if a consequent researcher adopted the same 
procedures as described in this research work and conducted the same study 
again, then the researcher will arrive at the same conclusions and findings. 
This simple test for reliability was followed. The "footprint" of the research 
process was recorded to enable another researcher to take the same journey. 
An inventory of all the documentary evidence was kept and has been indexed 
for easy reference. 
Reliability seeks to reduce the errors and bias in the study. The case study 
protocol was adopted to deal with the issue of reliability and thus allowed a 
second researcher to retrace the steps adopted. 
Yin (2003:69) recommends that a case study protocol should include an 
overview of the case study, field procedures adopted, case study questions 
and outline of the case study report. 
The reason for adopting the case study approach was that all fuel retailers 
funded under the EFG relationship went through the same qualifying 
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processes and had the same chance of succeeding. In spite of this, about fifty 
- percent of the fuel retailers had failed. Failure was defined in chapter two 
sections 2.3 as the inability to trade or a structural change in the business. In 
other words, any change to the original structure of the working capital or 
ownership was treated as a failure. The study is intended to research the 
reasons for such failure. 
This makes for an interesting academic study in the context of the research 
question. The case history is attached as APPENDIX 1. 
The only asset that the small business entrepreneur owns is the share in the 
"goodwill" or brand. All other assets on site, from pumps and tanks, to shop 
equipment are owned by the oil company. When purchasing a service station, 
the retailer has simply prepaid for the future cash flows. In most cases, the 
small business fuel reseller owns the property but these are generally smaller 
sites that offer limited convenience to the motorist. Price is not a differentiating 
factor as the fuel retail business is price regulated with service and 
convenience being the main driving considerations. 
The reasons for failure and success would be the same for either an oil 
company owned site or for a fuel retailer owned and operated site. This is due 
to the regulated nature of service stations in South Africa. Profit margins are 
set by Government and are the same for both types of service stations. 
The EFG funding model used the future cash flows as security and lent funds 
against the future earnings. All loans were paid into a proprietary limited 
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company and the shares were ceded to EFG as security. This ensured that, in 
the case of inability by the fuel retailer to make loan repayments, EFG would 
then exercise its option to take cession of the lease and then appoint a new 
retailer. 
EFG also provided insurance and financial support services to its clients. 
According to the loan register twenty one (21) loans were issued between 
2000 and 2002 and of this total there were eight successes (08) successes 
and seven (07) failures. The remaining six retailers could not be included in 
the analysis. 
The substantive issues to be investigated include training and skills, previous 
occupational experience, general management ability and exogenous 
variables. The last option has been included to isolate factors that do not 
require research to identify. These include factors such as death and 
economic shocks like exceptionally high interest rates. 
The rationale for using the EFG fuel retailer is two- fold. The candidate 
businesses have strong uniformity in their funding, training and support. Now, 
under such similar circumstances how is it possible that some would succeed 
and some would fail? Are there perhaps other reasons that define success 
and failure? If poor training is the reason for failure then good training must be 
a reason for success. Does such a linear relationship exist? The rival theory 
presented is that, fuel volume turnover and non- fuel sales are the most 
substantial reasons for failure and success. Is this really true? If it is then what 
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is the volumetric threshold that reflects such a point? The theoretical 
development also factors in externalities or exogenous variables. 
One particular service station, funded by EFG was FFR10 in Newlands. This 
site pumped in excess of 400 000 litres - this was an exceptional volume 
compared to the South African industry average of 170 000 liters. However, a 
new road detour stranded the service station and the volumes were reduced, 
forcing the retailer out of business. This externality is not considered in this 
case report, as the reason for failure is unfortunate - but known. In answering 
the research questions, we are attempting to isolate factors that differentiate 
failure and success in the same range of turnovers challenged by the same 
circumstances. We would then arrive at a set of controllable factors capable of 
management control. 
Another of the retail sites that would have been a classic inclusion was FFR10. 
This site pumped in excess of 300 000 litres per month and the non-fuel 
income was R250 000. The fuel retailer at this site failed - and could not be 
included in the analysis due to the retailer's reluctance to participate. 
Previous studies by Johnson (1999) suggest that government regulation and 
franchising enhance the chances of success. Service station retailers operate 
within a regulated industry and within a franchised environment. Government 
regulates the profitability of service stations by allowing a retail margin on the 
sale of fuel. This margin is calculated from a survey study done by the 
Potchefstroom Small Business Unit. The margin is a reward for efficiency - the 
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reasons for efficiency and inefficiency amongst the EFG case group will be 
determined in this research. 
The field procedures adopted is detailed under section 5.11 and was primarily 
constituted of informal interviews. The case study question is the last aspect of 
the case protocol used for establishing increased reliability and reflects the 
heart of the research enquiry. Yin (2003:74) states that, "the protocols 
questions are in essence your reminders regarding the information that needs 
to be collected and why." 
The protocol is for the data collection from a single case, or one fuel retailer 
and was not intended to serve the entire project. Miles and Huberman 
(1994:75) recommended that, the protocol questions should include, "table 
shells" which are outlines of a table clearly defining the rows and columns of a 
data array - but without actual data. 
This technique was applied to further increase the validity of the research by 
allowing another researcher to use a similar tabulated approach. A table shell 
facilitated the collection of parallel information from different fuel retailers in the 
multiple case studies and is attached as APPENDIX 2. 
APPENDIX 2 outlines the open- ended questions posed to each of the 
selected EFG fuel retailers. The final section on increasing reliability 
considered the format of reporting the case study. A multiple case study 
approach within both a qualitative and quantitative style was adopted. This 
was done to increase acceptability of the findings or to seek greater 
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convergence or triangulation in the research findings. The quantitative 
techniques simply adopted financial analysis and ratios to seek support for the 
qualitative findings. 
No separate chapters or section was dedicated to specific fuel retailers but the 
entire report will consist of cross case analysis both descriptive and 
explanatory. Each of the issues will be covered in separate sections and the 
findings of individual cases will thus be dispersed throughout each section. 
Clearly, the documentation collected and used in the case study analysis 
forms an integral part of the data- base. The research, as recommended by 
Yin (2003:77) included in the case study report an annotated documentation 
list in which each of the available documents was itemised. This is included in 
APPENDIX 9. 
The annotations will help increase the validity, as future researchers will know 
which documents might be relevant for further enquiries. In this way, the key 
findings across the cases will be clearly captured and compared to other 
sources of evidence. 
5.7.4 VALIDATION 
Internal validity is only a concern for casual or explanatory case studies in 
which a research is attempting to establish whether event x led to event y. If 
the causation is incorrectly established - without knowing that some third 
factor - z, may have actually caused y - then the research has failed to deal 
with the threat of internal validity. This approach does not apply to exploratory 
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case studies such as the one being undertaken. The objective is to draw out 
the reasons for success and failure and not to seek a basis for correlation in 
advance. 
External validity deals with the issue of generalization - knowing whether the 
studies findings are generalisable beyond the immediate EFG case study. 
Critics often state that a single case will offer poor basis for generalization. 
However, such critics are implicitly contrasting the situation to survey research 
where a sample, if correctly stated, readily generalises to a larger universe. 
Survey research relies on statistical generalization while case study research 
relies on analytical generalisation. In analytical generalization, the researcher 
is striving to generalise a particular set of results to some broader category. 
Replication logic - not generalization is claimed in case study approaches. 
Replicating the findings in a second or even third study will test a theory. Once 
such direct replications have been made, the results might be accepted as 
providing strong support for the theory. If poor training is identified as a failure 
factor in the in the first case study and this is repeated in the second and third 
and so forth - then we can state with confidence that poor training provided by 
the oil company is a possible cause of failure within the EFG case group. 
Another researcher can then adopt quantitative approaches and use this as a 
starting point for obtaining a more generalised view on a wider sample. 
Yin (2003:35) notes that, "people who have been critical of case studies often 
point to the fact that a case study investigator fails to develop a sufficiently 
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operational set of measures and that subjective judgments are used to collect 
the data." 
In view of Yin's concerns, multiple sources of evidence were used in a manner 
encouraging convergent lines of enquiry in the data collection phase. This 
involved both unstructured but in-depth interviews with each of the fuel 
retailers chosen, third party interviews with industry experts, returning to the 
field for further clarification and analysis of audited financial statements 
together with other documentary evidence. 
The analysis could further be divided into failed retail operators and successful 
retail operators- thus enhancing the quality of the research findings. The other 
data collection procedures were developed as the research unfolded. This 
resulted in further interviews, field trips for observation of management control, 
expert third party discussions, critical review of the loan valuation model and 
due diligence information and other data collection methods. 
Various tactics were available to increase construct validity when doing case 
studies. Firstly, there is the collection of data from multiple sources in a 
manner that encourages convergent lines of enquiry. This was done -
although it was more expensive, time consuming and required the researcher 
to be trained on how to successfully conduct interviews. 
Other documentary evidence and observation results were also used to test 
the case study responses to remove individual bias or inaccuracy. An example 
was the question in the informal interview schedule about the size of retailer 
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drawings- the responses were measured against the drawings amount 
reflected in the audited financial statements. 
The data used in the research work was both primary and secondary in 
nature. Primary information was defined by Cooper and Schindler (2001:81) 
as: "...Proximity to the truth", while secondary data was defined as: "have at 
least one level of interpretation between the event and its recording." The core 
of the primary information collected constituted individual interviews and 
documentary review. The secondary data came from third party interviews. 
Secondly, the establishment of a chain of evidence in the data collection 
phase also increases construct validity. This was established to improve the 
quality of the validity. Lastly, the researcher emailed the draft case report to 
the key informants to be reviewed for accuracy and content. Comments were 
further analysed and inputted into the main body of the findings. The validity of 
one source of information, was compared and contrasted to other sources and 
in cases where discrepancies resulted, such discrepancies were noted. 
The use of theory also becomes the main vehicle for generalising the results 
of the finding or seeking external validity. While statistical generalization 
cannot be claimed, as the individual service station cases were not sampling 
units, the multiple cases in this study were treated as multiple experiments. 
The research will make an "analytic generalization" in which the previously 
developed theory is used as a template with which to compare the empirical 
results of the case study, as suggested by Yin (2003: 32-33). 
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If two or more cases from amongst the EFG fuel retailer support the same 
theory then replication logic will be claimed. The empirical results would be 
more potent if two or more cases support the same theory but do not support 
the plausible rival theory. 
5.7.5 SCREENING OF CASE STUDY NOMINATIONS 
Lord (1991:209,) refers to the "accidental access" as a reason for undertaking 
research. This refers to cases where the researcher or his associates have 
prior personal contacts with senior managers in an organization. Such a pre-
existing relationship can aid the process of "selling" the research proposal to 
management. 
This research work in the small business area and specifically within the fuel 
retail sector was no accident. The researcher had an express interest in the 
small business sector and more particularly the service station industry having 
previously owned and operated a number of service stations. The target 
population is all the loans from the EFG loan book and the selected cases met 
the following criteria: 
Retailers had to be from the class of the 2000 72001 loans - when EFG 
was first formed to finance fuel retailers. The rationale here was that, 
those existing at the time of this study would have an extensive financial 
and document base year on year. Documents for those that have failed 
were available from EFG. This criterion was important to prevent double 
counting as many of the failed retailers businesses were re-financed and 
then operated by "new entrepreneurs." The researchers primary interest 
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was to identify the reasons for success and failure amongst the group 
that "were given the same chance" under the same conditions in 2000. 
Criteria like cost of capital, interest rates, support structure and sweat 
equity contributed were the same. This was important as it created 
uniformity in the data set to be examined. 
• To seek convergence in the findings the research has adopted a 
triangulation approach where both quantitative and qualitative techniques 
would be applied. The basis was to test whether a variable like financial 
training had a bearing on the retailer's success and failure. In the 
ordinary world, one would expect that well trained retailers were 
successful and untrained ones failed. Access to audited financial 
information was important. 
• It was also important to have the full support and co-operation of the 
respondent to maximise the provision of information. 
Each of the nominees was contacted by telephone and through personal visits 
where appropriate. Information on twenty-one fuel retailers was obtained and 
six had to be excluded. There were eight successes and seven failures. 
Table 5.1 provides a list of the cases that were considered based on the 
accessibility to the fuel retailer and thoroughness of the documentation. 
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TABLE 5.1 






















Six of the nominations had to be excluded. Firstly, FFR09 in Cape Town could 
not be traced and was therefore excluded. Then FFR10 had to be excluded as 
the site was stranded due to new road developments. This resulted in the 
volumes being reduced by more than half and ultimately causing the fuel 
retailer to exit the site. The reason for failure - uncontrolled in this case was 
not due to the dealer's activities and was thus not considered. The reason for 
failure in this case was obvious. Although, contact was made with SFR08 and 
the retailer agreed to participate, there were significant gaps in the 
documentation required and it was decided to exclude this case from the final 
list. 
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The fuel retailer at SFR09 was deceased. The FFR11 could not be traced and 
was also was excluded from the case study. The SFR10 was reluctant to 
participate and after some consultation with other fuel retailers was excluded. 
Although the screening process resulted in a large number of exemplary 
cases, multiple case studies are best suited when a large number of cases are 
included. While the exemplary cases chosen were mainly from Kwa Zulu 
Natal, this had little bearing in the case results due to the regulated nature of 
the industry. The case samples had a fair mix of huge volume and average 
volume sites setting the scene for interesting analysis. 
Yin (2003:13) notes, "The specific cases to be studied may be selected by 
following several different rationales, one of which is to select "exemplary" 
cases. The use of this rationale means that all the cases will reflect strong, 
positive examples of the phenomena of interest. The rationale fits the 
replication logic well, because your overall investigation may then try to 
determine whether similar casual events within each case produced these 
positive outcomes." 
Yin (2003:78) notes that, "... Sometimes the selection is straight forward 
because you have chosen to study a unique case whose identity has been 
known from the outset of your enquiry. Or you may already know the case you 
will study because of some special arrangement or access that you have." 
This was indeed the situation in this study. The researcher had access to the 
historic information in the form of individual administrative and financial 
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information and full access to the fuel retailers - many of whom were known 
on a first name basis. 
This familiarity did present the risk of choosing the wrong "cases" and to guard 
against this, a screening procedure was applied in advance of the formal data 
collection. However, a notable constraint was that only a small number of 
cases could be the subject of the study. This was based on "getting under the 
skin" of each case and into the research questions for the reasons of failure 
and success in the fuel retail sector. 
Another limitation was that the study needed to be able to inform policy 
decisions on the future of the fuel retail business and to create a platform for 
dialogue between the different stakeholders. Although no statistical 
representative sample could be drawn from such a small number of cases, 
some distributive factors needed attention. 
Multiple cases were required but only a small number could be subjected to 
greater study, thus leading to the use of replication logic to select the final 
cases. Ginsburg (1989:597-679), noted that an exemplary case design is 
important. 
In applying replication logic three criteria was necessary. Firstly, every case 
had to demonstrate, prior to final case selection, the occurrence of exemplary 
outcomes. The considerations were whether similar events in the case of each 
fuel retailer could result in similar outcomes. Secondly, the criterion must 
reflect the researcher's quest to provide answers to the research questions. 
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Lastly, the cases were to cover different fuel retailers across the different fuel 
outlets emphasising different styles and approach of the different retailers, with 
the uniformity in support and operations that the EFG retailers had 
experienced. 
As a result of these considerations, the researcher firstly considered all the 
fuel retailers that EFG had funded. The total number of fuel retailers funded by 
EFG was twenty-one. This was across the Engen, Caltex, Exel and Shell 
brands. Due to the diversity and operational requirements of each brand, it 
was decided to consider all brands to enhance the integrity of the case study 
when choosing the sample cases. While individual brands, like Engen did 
have unique operational and training requirements, they were operating under 
similar circumstances. Thus, the fuel retailers were chosen from across the 
different brands. All the cases chosen had documented and exemplary 
outcomes that survived the researchers screening procedures. The selection 
included failures and successes covering some distribution across the 
geographic and economic conditions. 
It is important to qualify this reasoning and choice of "cases" as supported by 
Yin (2003:78), who advised that although there may be many qualified "cases" 
one has to choose a multiple of cases from amongst them. 
A set of operational criteria was also used to help select the "cases." Senior 
management knowledgeable about each candidate case from EFG and the 
respective oil companies were consulted about each case. Documentation, 
including annual financial statements and due diligence reports, on the 
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selected cases were collected to further qualify the selected cases. The 
researcher also wanted to avoid an extensive screening procedure that 
effectively became a "mini" case study. 
The multiple cases selected showed good potential for the analysis to provide 
answers to the research questions. 
5.8 DESIGN OF THE QUESTIONNAIRE 
Two open-ended questionnaire was used to obtain primary information. The 
first questionnaire contained the major thrust of the research data and the 
second questionnaire, which was administered telephonically, covered only 
the working capital considerations. According to Tull and Hawkins (1984:252), 
"a questionnaire is a formalised set of questions for eliciting information." The 
design and construction of the interview questionnaires, based on the 
literature review, went through many drafts and was constantly refined until the 
final research instrument was formulated. Melville and Goddard (1996:43) 
noted that a good questionnaire design should satisfy the following conditions: 
• It is complete and elicits all the data required 
• It asks only relevant questions 
• It gives clear instructions 
• It starts with general questions 
• It has objective questions with sensitive questions spread at the end 
These elements were considered in the drafting of the questionnaire to ensure 
active respondent participation. The instrument used in this research consisted 
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of a series of questions intended to solicit maximum response and comprised 
the following sections: 
A Biographical information 
B Service station operations 
C Financial information 
D Occupational experience 
E Management factors 
F General management information 
G Human resource management 
H Exogenous variables 
I General 
The first questionnaire comprised one hundred and forty three structured 
questions, which elicited detailed information from the case study respondents 
as shown in ANNEXURE 4. A covering letter to the respondent outlined the 
importance of the study, the aim of the research and the importance of 
participation. An incentive in the form of sending through the final study results 
was used to bolster co-operation. The covering letter was formalised using the 
institutional letterhead and was either faxed or shown to the respondents to 
validate the authenticity of the study. The questionnaire was directed to the 
fuel retailer and the researcher conducted all fifteen case interviews and third 
party interviews personally. 
The second questionnaire, the working capital questionnaire, was 
administered telephonically and covered five questions as follows: 
• Calculation of the working capital amount 
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• Inclusion of capital and non capital items 
• Consideration for stock turns 
• Consideration for fuel price adjustments 
• Consideration for no margin increases 
The working capital questionnaire resulted from the analysis of the first 
questionnaire and was therefore not conceived of at the beginning of the 
research. To complete the cross case analysis, it was necessary to return to 
the field and obtain further information on the working capital structures for 
each of the cases. 
5-9 PRE-TESTING 
Pre-testing is important to establish research credibility and it facilitates quality 
data collection.Martins (1996:232) states that, "the researcher who avoids a 
questionnaire pretest and tabulation of replies is either naive or a fool." Pre-
testing refers to initial testing of the questionnaire by friends or associates to 
ascertain the following: 
• Are the question prompts clear enough to stimulate discussion? 
• Is the choice of words in the questionnaire clear enough? 
• Is the structure of the questionnaire logical and easy to follow? 
• Are the questions not leading the respondent in a particular direction? 
The questionnaire was given to a research methodology lecturer at the 
University of South Africa and to a fuel retailer in Kwa-Zulu Natal for 
constructive critique with a view to further amendments and fine-tuning. Both 
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individuals were familiar with the objectives of the study and the following is 
noted: 
• It took too long to administer the interview questionnaire but the 
researcher was reluctant to reduce the number of questions asked in the 
unstructured interview questionnaire, as it would have necessitated the 
removal of entire variables from the research work and could be 
subjected to criticism, as this was a qualitative effort. It was better to 
continue the interview over a number of sessions than reduce the 
number of questions. 
• The questionnaires were administered to the respondents in the English 
language and this presented no problems. The researcher was 
concerned that English was not the first language of most of the 
respondents. 
• The pre-test did reveal some minor ambiguity and the questionnaire was 
refined to ensure clarity and simplicity of expression. Some questions 
were unclear and resulted in yes or no answers only. This was reworded 
to generate detailed responses. It also found that some questions were 
repeated and they were deleted. This related to Mark ups and GP's in 
sections E, F and I. 
• The format of the original questionnaire was also a problem. The 
question type approach restricted the respondents to the question being 
asked. The question format resulted in many "yes" or "no" answers with 
not much conversation. Clearly, this was not suitable and was changed 
to using prompts. 
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The continuity and flow of the unstructured interview questionnaire, the 
sequence of the items, and the open - ended responses sought within the 
preambles were all successfully pre - tested. The recording devices worked 
well and the recording of responses in abbreviated form for later compilation 
was also successfully done. No significant changes were necessary on the 
interview questionnaires and it presented no validity problems. 
5.10 PILOT STUDY 
Cooper and Schindler (2001:81) noted that, a pilot test is conducted to detect 
weaknesses in design and instrumentation and to provide proxy data for 
selection of a probability sample. While the study adopts a mix of qualitative 
and quantitative approaches, a pilot study was still considered relevant. The 
qualitative aspects required that only exemplary cases be considered for 
inclusion. 
Yin (2003:78-79) notes that, "a final preparation for data collection is the 
conduct of a pilot case study. The pilot case may be chosen for several 
reasons unrelated to the criteria for selecting the final cases in the case study 
design. For example, the informants at the pilot site may be unusually 
congenial and accessible, or the site may be geographically convenient or 
may have an unusual amount of documentation and data. One other 
possibility is that the pilot case represents a more complicated case, 
compared to likely real cases, so that nearly all the relevant collection issues 
will be encountered in the pilot case". 
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Convenience, access and geographic proximity were considered in selecting 
the pilot cases. This allowed for a less structured and more prolonged 
relationship between the respondents and the researcher. This approach was 
useful as the pilot case was used as a "labouratory" for the testing of the 
informal discussions. 
The enquiry was very broad based and served as a trial run. The objective 
was to determine the validity and reliability of the questionnaires with a view to 
making final changes in advance of the actual survey. As a precautionary 
measure, the two pilot sites were representative of the EFG case respondents 
in that they were EFG retailers and had gone through the same processes as 
the actual case respondents. 
The pilot retailers are also long time friends. Besides the proximity and 
convenience, they did not mind the fact that the research was at its initial 
stages. One was a Caltex branded site, situated in Gauteng and was owned 
by FFR10, who had undergone financial difficulties and was forced out of the 
site by Caltex and EFG. This fell within the category of failed retailers. The 
other retailer, SFR10 had operated an EFG funded site at Johannesburg 
International Airport and was considered a successful fuel retailer at the time 
of the interview. The geographical location of the pilot cases was close to the 
researcher's residence and this helped to refine the process through many 
visits. The following were the main lessons from the pilot test: 
• An important finding was that although a single protocol could be used to 
understand the reasons for success and failure, the questionnaire had to 
be refined to enable its use for both a failed and a successful site. Other 
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specially designed questionnaires would have been needed for each 
success and failed category resulting in two questionnaires and will be 
cumbersome. Questionnaire prompts were used to stimulate a 
meaningful discussion. This also removed the need for different 
questionnaires being developed for failed and successful sites and 
highlighted researcher weakness as a research interviewer. Formal 
interview training was taken from Mr. C Coetzee, a research 
methodology lecturer at the University of South Africa. 
It was not easy to obtain copies of the audited financial statements and 
due diligence reports. The audited financial statements were obtained 
from EFG and special consent was necessary. In the sample case, the 
financials for FFR10 could not be obtained. This became an important 
consideration when making the final case selection, as the audited 
financial statements were key for the cross case analysis to be done. 
It was clear that telephone interviews or email discussions could not 
replace the actual interviews, as was the original intention. 
Retailers had a certain passion for reporting their success and especially 
their failures. It was almost impossible to allocate a time for the informal 
interview due to the number of issues and personal views that the fuel 
retailers held. This was another consideration for the data collection. 
Therefore, no time limit was proposed for the real case interviews and 
the respondents were informed about this in advance. A valuable lesson 
learnt was the need to inform the retailer that the entire interview could 
be completed in different stages - in other words on different days, if the 
discussions could not be concluded in one sitting. 
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It was noted that while testing the data collection plan that the retailer 
often had relapses or forgot about specific details but wanted to report it 
and therefore tried to get a copy of some document or correspondence to 
make a point. This involved the retailer calling the office staff and on both 
occasions, the office staff could not find the specific documentation. On 
site interviews was therefore the logical choice for the actual interviews. 
The pilot test also revealed the importance of referencing each report. At 
the end of the second pilot interview, the researcher had often forgotten 
who made specific remarks due to the quantity of information being 
collected. If this were the case with the two pilot cases, then the 
responses from the selected cases would represent a significant data -
base of information. Each response was therefore coded by using SFR01 
for the first successful retailer and SFR02 for the second and so on. The 
same was adopted for failed retailers and FFR01 denoted the first failed 
retailer and FFR07 for the seventh failed retailer. 
Some mild resistance was noted from the pilot respondents who were 
apprehensive, about their comments being referenced to themselves. 
This was a particular problem and the researcher noted the importance 
of communicating that the final case report would be structured across 
different subject matters and that the financials would be coded so as to 
keep the financial data confidential. Thankfully, the covering letter from 
the business school and the confidentiality disclosure placated most of 
their fears. It is still not clear why this would have created the 
apprehension it did. 
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Further refinement of the questionnaire was not deemed necessary and the 
pilot study revealed some important pointers for the actual data collection 
process. 
5.11 DATA COLLECTION 
According to Varkevisser, Pathmanathan and Brownlee (1991:142), "data 
collection techniques enable researchers to systematically collect information 
in order to answer questions in a conclusive way." Yin (2003:97) also notes 
that a "major strength of case study data collection is the opportunity to use 
many different sources of evidence. Further more, the use of multiple sources 
of evidence far exceeds that in other research strategies..." 
Two main data sources were used in this research. Firstly, informal interviews 
were conducted with specific fuel retailers, stakeholders and experts and 
secondly a number of documents were collected, workshops attended and 
publications scrutinised. 
5.12 DATA COLLECTION USING INTERVIEW 
QUESTIONNAIRES 
5.12.1 CASE RESPONDENT INTERVIEWS 
Each of the selected fuel retailers was telephonically contacted and the 
purpose of the study was explained. An appointment was secured and upon 
arrival, the purpose of the study was again explained. Permission was 
obtained to use the interview notes and the financials for academic purposes. 
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A formal letter of introduction, as attached in APPENDIX 3, was faxed in 
advance of the interview, and in some cases read before the interview. On a 
number of occasions the schedule of dates were changed due to the 
respondents busy work schedule. The questionnaire covered different 
questions and the case respondents were encouraged to provide much detail 
as possible. 
The importance of recording the interview was highlighted and the basic 
functioning of the Olympus digital voice recorder VN-240 PC was also 
explained. This was useful as the recorded interviews were saved as sound 
files on the laptop. The recorder had a very useful pause button - allowing us 
to break when a staff member interrupted or something urgent had to be 
attended to. The master response sheet on the laptop was used for 
abbreviated notes as the respondent spoke to the different prompts raised. As 
far as possible, the respondent's comments were recorded verbatim. 
The interviews were conducted over five months starting May 2005 to 
November 2005. This totaled 17 visits across the country - including the pilot 
interviews. In the cases of failed retailers, the interviews were conducted at 
their new businesses or homes and in some cases at their sites. 
The interviews generally lasted for about two hours. The following prompts 
were used to guide and stimulate the discussions: (Details in APPENDIX 2) 
• Biographical information 
• Service station operations 
• Financial information 
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• Occupational experience 
• Management factors 
• Financial management 
• Wet stock management 
• Dry stock management 
• Cash management 
• Controls and administration 
• General management 
• Human resource management 
• Exogenous variables 
• General information 
To the extent that the retailer felt comfortable with the researchers typing on 
the laptop, this was done. At times when the typing of notes seemed to create 
a break in the conversation, only headline details was recorded for completion 
after the interview. 
When failed fuel retailers were interviewed, the atmosphere was initially tense. 
The retailer initially felt uneasy and was generally very critical of the Oil 
Company and EFG. In such cases, the researcher allowed the retailer to vent 
their emotions and paid complete attention to the retailer's views and relied 
completely on the tape recordings for later analysis. This was done to ensure 
that the retailer did not feel that the researcher was unsympathetic or 
disinterested in the views being expressed. 
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The case study report was then completed from the notes and was emailed to 
the respondents to ensure accuracy of facts with a request that track changes 
on Microsoft word be used. This was possible as all retailers had access to 
email. A short instruction on how to use the track change facility was also 
included. Only one report with tracked changes was received back. On receipt 
of the track-changed report, the response was filed for later analysis. 
A digital recording device was used to record all interviews and the voice 
recordings were transferred as sound clips onto the electronic database. This 
again enhanced the reliability that was being established. In cases where 
further clarity was required - a telephone call was made. In cases where 
significant clarity was required, email follow- ups were used and allowed the 
researcher to gather additional information with the flexibility of moving back 
and forth between data collection and data analysis. 
5.12.2 SECOND CASE RESPONDENT INTERVIEWS 
The researcher had to return to the field to seek further elucidations and clarity 
on responses received and on a number of new questions raised about the 
working capital situation. The second questionnaire included questions as 
reflected in APPENDIX 5. This was necessary as the comment around 
working capital was varied and it comprised a major variable in the analysis. 
These discussions were telephonically done and focused on margin 
adjustments and fuel price increases. 
197 
5.12.3 EXPERT THIRD PARTY INTERVIEWS 
Expert third party interviews were conducted with hand picked individuals who 
were considered fuel retail experts and who had extensive experience in the 
fuel retail business. This extensive experience qualified them as experts. Each 
was requested to share their views on what constituted the reasons for failure 
and success of fuel retailers. The question was not limited to the EFG cases 
but fuel retailers in general. These discussions were held with: 
• Mr. Abel Malinga from the Industrial Development Corporation; 
• Mr. David Chiat, the previous Engen retail manager who oversaw the 
EFG roll out process from 2000 to 2003; 
• Mr. Lenny Chetty, the incumbent Engen retail manager; 
• Mr. Peter Morgan, Chief executive officer of the Fuel Retailers 
Association; 
• Mr. Theuns Burger, Director for Petroleum and Gas Regulation at the 
Department of Minerals and Energy; 
• Mr. Andrew Watson and Mr. Grant Fincham, the ex-director and present 
financial director of EFG; 
• Mr. Monison Sookay - a long time friend and seasoned successful fuel 
retailer. 
The discussions and conversations were recorded on field notes and later 
transcribed. Expert third parties interviews are attached in APPENDIX 7. This 
was done in an informal way. Experts were notified about the nature of the 
research and only one question was posed as follows: The retail fuel industry 
appears to be under the spotlight - what are your views? A recording device 
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was not used and the researcher relied on hand written notes to complete the 
reports that would form part of the greater analysis. No structured interview 
schedules were used as only expert opinions were being sought by using 
rigorous discussions as a medium. 
5.12.4 DATA COLLECTION FROM SECONDARY SOURCES 
DOCUMENTATION REVIEW 
Official records and documentation were another valuable source of 
information and were collected both during and after the interview process. 
The annual financial statements formed the bulk of the documentary evidence. 
The financial information from the income statement and balance sheet was 
aggregated into one spreadsheet and is attached as APPENDIX 6. Hard 
copies of the actual financials as submitted to the South African Revenue 
Services for the 2001-year end were used. 
Other documentary evidence included the complete EFG loan valuation 
model, the five year budget forecast schedule, the oil company training 
curriculum, government and industry publications, working capital analysis 
worksheets, turnover reports, wage books, staff rosters, franchise agreements 
and the original due diligence reports. Where possible, documentation was not 
taken off site. 
The study of documentation involved many visits to the head office of EFG. 
Again, the laptop was used to record notes from each site file. Electronic 
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POS report detailing sales, cost of sales, gross profit and VAT 
Debtors report with age analysis, debtor invoicing, debtor journals, credit 
notes and receipts 
Credit reports with age analysis, credit invoices, creditor journals, creditor 
credit notes and creditor payments 
Stock reports 
Weekly wage schedules 
Monthly salary schedules 
Schedule of staff loans 
Rental and oil statements 
Details of general expense data 
Copies of fixed assets invoices purchased 
Copies of installment sale agreements and leases entered into 
Copies of call account statements and bank accounts 
Daily fuel readings, sales, lotto and banking 
Daily cash payouts and safe drop payouts 
Daily cheque payments 
Daily internet payments or direct debit on bank accounts 
Daily receipts 
Time was also spent on site on the back office system - this was the 
technological support provided by the franchisor. While this was not done for 
all cases respondents (as it would have been a futile exercise given that all 
case respondents operate the same system) many days were spent on the 
processes for wet cash and stock control , the dry stock control facilities, 
daily shift analysis information and on line banking system in place. These 
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observations were recorded on flash disk 2 as, "notes and observations from 
supplementary readings - operations". 
OBSERVATIONS 
As part of the field work the researcher spent time on site observing the 
different trading activities, stock control measures, staff movements, customer 
buying patterns, time spent by the retailer on site and general operating 
procedures. The observations are recorded as "researcher notes". On 
average, about half a day was spent on some sites usually during the morning 
or evening rush hour. 
• ATTENDANCE OF CONFERENCES AND WORKSHOPS 
The research work necessitated attendance of fuel retail conferences and 
workshops. This included participation at the Department of Minerals and 
Energy workshop on opportunities for women in the oil industry in 2003. This 
also included attendance to the oil company-training course held in Durban in 
2002. 
On completing the first batch of interviews, it became apparent that training 
was raised by the fuel retailers as a critical issue. While divergent views were 
noted on the training benefits - the issue of financial training surfaced as a 
burning issue. The researcher then approached Mr. Keith Pin, the general 
manager of Engen, explained the research work to him, and promised to share 
the research findings once concluded. Mr. Pinn arranged for the company's 
training manager to forward the latest training programme (Attached as 
APPENDIX 10) which was admitted as case study evidence and recorded the 
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findings and perceptions on flash disk number two as "Notes from Engen 
training course - financial fundamentals." 
PUBLICATIONS AND STUDIES 
The research work necessitated an in-depth review of the annual "retail margin 
study" conducted by the Small Business Section of the Potchefstroom 
University. Other publications included a number of Government policy 
documents and research reports. All these documents were studied to 
facilitate a greater understanding of the dynamics in the retail fuel business. 
An inventory register of all documents, both electronic and hard copies, for the 
purposes of reference and increasing the reliability was kept throughout the 
research. The electronic database eventually included the following 
information: (Detailed listing in APPENDIX 9) 
• Open ended case respondents interviews 
• Working capital questionnaire 
• Notes from expert third party discussions 
• Respondents tracked changes to draft case study report - one copy 
• Consolidated audited financial statements on Exel for financial year 
ended 2000 with categories split into failed and success retailers 
• Researcher observation notes from retail site visits and attendance to 
training course and workshops 
• Other documentary information such as the Potchefstroom study, the 
SADA-LEC deregulation study, notes from Government workshop on fuel 
retailers and FRA consultants report on fuel retail franchises in South 
Africa. 
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5.12.5 PRINCIPLES OF DATA COLLECTION ADOPTED 
To ensure the validity and reliability of the case study evidence the following 
three principles were adopted: 
5.12.5.1 USE OF MULTIPLE SOURCES OF EVIDENCE 
The most important advantage of using multiple sources of evidence is the 
development of converging lines of enquiry or triangulation. Firstly, an 
unstructured interview schedule was used to collect information from fifteen 
individual retailers. The questions were open ended and resulted in an 
extensive collection of information. Together with the quantitative information 
and documentary evidence in the form of financial statements, a convergence 
was sought in the findings. The intention was to corroborate the same facts or 
phenomenon, and thus deal with the problem of construct validity. This 
triangulation can be schematically illustrated as follows: 
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FIGURE 5.1 
CONVERGENCE OF ENQUIRY 
MULTIPLE SOURCES OF EVIDENCE 
Open interview questionnaire 
V 
Documentation Telephonic interviews 
> FACT < ; 
A 
Expert third party views 
Both the quantitative and qualitative approaches were adopted in the data 
collection process. The first interviews (that is the first round interviews) were 
unstructured open - ended interviews. The researcher had to return to the field 
in spite of the lengthy discussions held in the first round as critical questions 
around the issue of working capital was not adequately covered in the first 
round. The second round interviews were conducted telephonically. In spite of 
the researches thoroughness, the pilot study did not highlight this weakness in 
the questionnaire. 
5.12.5.2 CREATION OF CASE STUDY DATABASE 
Yin (2001:101), notes that".... too often, the case study data are synonymous 
with narrative presented in the case study report, and a critical reader has no 
recourse if he or she wants to inspect the raw data that led to the case study's 
conclusions". 
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In keeping with case study protocol and to increase the reliability of the case 
study, different databases were created on both Microsoft word and excel 
packages. In this way, the raw data collected from the various sources were 
referenced and available. 
Taped recordings were also referenced to each retailer. In this way, any new 
researcher could access the data at any time. All documentary evidence, with 
the exception of the audited financial statements was captured in electronic 
format. Flash disk 1 has all the interview results, flash disk two has all the loan 
models and due diligence reports and flash disk 3, the other data as detailed 
in APPENDIX 9. A cross - reference was made to each interview and the 
taped recording by citing a code number on the reports. Lastly, an annotated 
bibliography of all the documents collected was done. 
5.12.5.3 MAINTAINING A CHAIN OF EVIDENCE 
This approach was adopted to further increase the reliability of the information 
in the case study by providing a chain of evidence. The intention was to allow 
an external observer, the reader of the research work, to follow the derivation 
of the evidence, ranging from the initial research questions posed to the 
ultimate case study conclusions. 
The report will include citations from the database by citing specific 
documents, interviews and observations. Each of the reports and taped 
recordings indicate the date and time of the discussions. This was all done in 
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accordance with the case study protocol to illustrate that the data collection 
followed the procedures stipulated by the protocol. 
This was in keeping with Yin's (2003:105) recommendation that "...you have 
therefore to move from one part of the case study process to another, with 
clear cross referencing to methodological procedures and to the resulting 
evidence". This is the ultimate "chain of evidence" that is desired. The 
following diagram illustrates the chain of evidence presented in this research. 
FIGURE 5.2 
CHAIN OF EVIDENCE OF WHY FUEL RETAILERS SUCCEED OR FAIL 
Case Study report on the reasons for success and failure of EFG fuel 
retailers 
Z 
Fuel retailer database 
5 
Citations to evidentiary sources in the case study database 
H 
Case Study Protocol 
D 
Case study questions - What are the reasons for success/failure? 
Figure 5.2 illustrates the chain of evidence beginning from the case study 
questions to the case study report and vice versa. The case study protocol as 
applied to the EFG case study followed the case protocol and the safekeeping 
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of all the evidence in both an electronic and manual format. Lastly, the case 
study report summarised all the findings. 
The interviews were deliberately conducted first, before examining any 
documents to ensure that there would be limited influence by the details of the 
reports and notes in the interviewing process. The documents presented a 
kind of "hard evidence" and its review at the end of the process was both 
prudent and necessary. 
Whilst conducting the interviews, the researcher was aware of personal 
suspicions and reasons for failure and success amongst fuel retailers and 
made every effort to manage the interview process in a way that did not 
influence the responses being received. This was of such great concern and 
the short lesson in the art of interviewing, from the research methodology tutor 
from the University of South Africa in Pretoria, came into great use. 
An open mind was kept and the researcher allowed himself to be educated 
and briefed on what informant views were for the reasons of failure and 
success. There was a good mix of failed fuel retailers, successful retailers, 
expert third party views, observations from on site visits, due diligence reports 
and audited financial statements. This increased the confidence in the study 
as the data spread was wide, reinforced with hard evidence type information. 
The researcher gradually left the field when it was becoming evident that less 
and less was being learnt. There was little benefit in interrogating the findings 
any more, as clear patterns were emerging. Some of these patterns were 
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tested using quantitative methodology to further confirm the findings of the 
qualitative work. 
The researcher eased his way out of the field as recommended by Bogdan 
and Biklen (1992:104-105) and only stayed in touch in with the key informants 
close to his work offices in Pretoria and sent thank you notes to each of the 
fuel retailers and promised to share the final results of the findings with them 
once the study was complete. All the data collected from the different sources 
was then processed. 
5.13 EDITING 
Editing involves a thorough and critical examination of each completed 
questionnaire to ensure that all questions have been answered and that the 
criteria for collecting data have been complied with. The editing was done by 
the researcher and the criteria of completeness were adhered to. This was 
done for all primary and secondary information. 
5.14 CODING 
The construction of the questionnaire had the advantage of being coded in the 
different categories to make for easy analysis. Coding involves assigning 
numeric codes to each response, which falls in a particular category. The 
coding facilitated data capturing and analysis. For the successful retailers 
codes SFR01 to SFR08 was used. This was a code for successful retail 
number 1 to successful retailer number eight. The same was applicable to 
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failed retailers i.e. FFR01 to FFR07 - failed fuel retailer number one to failed 
retailer number seven. All the question prompts were precoded to facilitate 
cross case analysis. 
Data was collected and analysed from interviews and discussions, documents 
obtained from site files, on site visits and from the Engen training course 
curriculum. The constant comparative method of analysis was used to collect 
the data, group relevant themes within the categories already identified in the 
research and this resulted in the further reevaluation and categorisation of 
issues. 
The general management themes originally presented in the pilot survey 
expanded in depth and breadth and generated more reasons for failure and 
success in the development of the study. Data submitted as case study 
evidence was coded. 
5.15 RESEARCH ETHICS 
Due cognisance was paid to the retailers right to privacy or reason for non-
participation. This was applicable to all the case participants. Some of the 
other fuel retailers, in particular SFR3, requested that, his financial statements 
be consolidated with others and not be isolated and commented upon. These 
sensitivities were considered. 
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5.16 THE RESEARCH ENVIRONMENT 
All the interviews were conducted personally by the researcher at the 
respective service station sites mentioned as the sample group. Open-ended 
questions and observations were recorded as outlined in the research 
methodology process. 
5.17 THE RIVAL THEORY 
The rival theory was that fuel retailer success or failure was a function of 
volume and turnover. In other words, high volume and high shop turnovers 
were the reasons for success and the opposite were true for failure. Section 
6.2.2 provides a test for the acceptance or rejection of the rival theory. 
5.18 DATA PREPARATION AND ANALYSIS OF DATA 
In conducting the analysis of the data, the researcher was mindful of Yin's 
(2003:19) recommendation that, "regardless of the choice of strategies or 
techniques, a persistent challenge is to produce high-quality analysis, which 
require investigators to attend to all the evidence, display and present the 
evidence separate from any interpretation, and show adequate concern for 
exploring alternative interpretations". 
The researcher proceeded to do this by providing an overall analytical strategy 
intended to address the original research problem: What are the reasons for 
success and failure amongst the EFG fuel retailers? The initial point of 
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departure was to follow the theoretical propositions that led to this case study. 
The researcher originally theorised that, by examining management, 
entrepreneurial, occupational and exogenous factors we would arrive at the 
possible answers to the research questions. The strategy in the analysis of the 
data was to seek consensus for this. This theoretical orientation guided the 
case study analysis. 
The researcher then examined the data in light of the rival explanation 
presented and the strategy was extended to include the testing of the rival 
explanation for the causes of success and failure amongst fuel retailers. The 
rival theory presented was that failure or success in the fuel retail business 
was a function of individual site fuel sales and turnover. In other words, high 
volume and high turnover retail businesses would always be successful. Does 
size really matter? 
The researcher pursued the data collection to collect evidence about the direct 
rival theory vigorously, as addressing and rejecting the rival proposition would 
enhance the confidence in the findings. The following data analysis techniques 
were considered: 
ANALYTICAL TECHNIQUES 
In choosing the technique for the data analysis, consideration was given to the 
pattern matching technique, the explanation building technique, time series 
analysis, logic models and cross case analysis. 
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The pattern matching logic did initially seem to be appropriate for the data 
analysis on hand. Such logic compares an empirically based pattern with a 
predicted one and when the patterns coincided, internal validity is 
strengthened. Explanatory building was more suited to explanatory case 
studies while times series analysis involved single cases examined over time. 
Neither was suitable for the multiple cases of fuel retailers on hand. The logic 
model technique involves the matching of empirically observed events to 
theoretically predicted events. This also presented a possible option but was 
disregarded in favour of the cross case analysis. 
The cross case analysis was used due to its special applicability to multiple 
case studies. Generally, the technique is used for analysis of two cases but 
the fifteen cases of fuel retailer data served to further strengthen the findings. 
Another reason for using this technique was its simplicity - it aggregated the 
findings across a series of individual fuel retail cases. The synthesis, due to 
the number of cases under scrutiny, also incorporated a quantitative 
technique. This was ideal in all circumstances for the purposes of this work. In 
presenting the data, the individual financial information could be contrasted 
and compared with the other fuel retailers at a glance. 
5.19 PREPARING THE CASE STUDY REPORT 
This final aspect of the methodology section will present the format and 
structure of the EFG case study report and bring the results and findings to a 
close. This provides a summary of the key evidence to these audiences. This 
is not the first time that some of these stakeholder interest groups had sight of 
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the findings - a draft report was circulated in advance of this final report for 
consideration and critique. For ease of reading, a specific report format was 
adopted together with a corresponding structure as follows: 
CASE STUDY AUDIENCE 
Yin (2003:142) recommended that the case report be drafted before the data 
collection and analysis phase had been completed. There was a very diverse 
set of possible audiences and while no single report could serve all audiences, 
the report format made for targeted reading. 
Firstly, other researchers would be interested in the methodological issues as 
well the research conduct that was adopted in the case study. The 
presentation of the findings without interpretation is the corner stone of a good 
case study. The findings were presented and the analysis of the evidence 
followed. 
The South African banks would be interested from the perspective of risk 
analysis of the fuel retailer sector. The Industrial Development Corporation as 
the providers of capital to EFG would be interested in finding out the reasons 
for the failure and success amongst the fuel retailers they helped fund. The 
guarantor to the loans was the German Re-insurance company, Hanover Re. 
The company wrote off in access of R20 million in bad debts. The researcher 
hopes that the research findings would be of interest to them. It is also hoped 
that the oil company's and their training divisions would note the findings and 
recommendations and thus commission further evaluations on their training 
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courses to achieve maximum value for the new retailers who enter the 
industry. 
The individual retailers would also use the findings to compare and contrast 
their individual experiences against that of their colleagues, as the multiple 
case studies will aggregate the findings - providing a benchmark measure. 
Failed fuel retailers could also reflect on the reasons for success amongst their 
successful colleagues, while those that have recorded success will be 
cautioned about reasons for failure. The fuel retail organizations, like individual 
oil company dealer councils may want to use the results to inform their retailer 
members about the findings and perhaps seek to conduct further tests and 
research. 
The Department of Minerals and Energy funded the research work in the last 
two years and would be interested in the findings to seek support or to 
commission further research while finalising the regulations for the Petroleum 
Products Amendments Bill that is being debated in Parliament. 
Some findings of the case study, contradicts the Retail Margin Study of the 
Business Advisory Bureau, which may seek to defend some of their findings. 
Lastly, and most importantly the report is intended to provide future 
entrepreneurs an invaluable preview about the fuel retail industry and in this 
way create the basis for making a well-informed decision and for better 
preparation. 
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FORMAT OF PRESENTATION 
The specific needs of the audience as indicated above, were the main reason 
for the choice of the format of the case study report. Firstly, the single case 
study was not viable as the research dealt with 15 different cases. The 
researcher then considered the multiple case report of the single case study 
and the question and answer type presentation where multiple narratives are 
presented, but this was eventually rejected in favour of a cross case analysis 
where the information from individual cases were dispersed through each 
section covering a particular issue. In this way, topics or areas of interest 
amongst the audience could easily be traced to a section where exhaustive 
summarised data from all fifteen fuel retailers are concentrated. This approach 
of providing an account on an issue-by-issue basis was most suited to both 
hurried readers and those pursuing specific areas of interest, like training. 
STRUCTURE OF THE REPORT 
Different structures were considered. It was important to arrange the sections, 
subtopics and other components in an organised way to create a compelling 
case. The unsequenced structure was clearly not suitable where sections of 
reporting would have no particular importance. Chronological structures 
dealing with events over time was also looked at. While the case study 
examined a group of fifteen fuel retailers from the year 2000 and their 
economic journey of their businesses to date, concerns about giving 
disproportionate time to events in the early days and less to the latter days 
could be a pitfall. Comparative structures were then tested for suitability. The 
case study is repeated two or more times comparing alternative descriptions 
or explanations of the same case. The repetitions are intended to illustrate a 
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pattern matching technique. While this was an option, it was not suitable due 
to the large number of cases in the study. 
The linear-analytic structure was also considered, as it was a standard 
approach for composing case study reports but this approach seemed most 
suited for an audience comprised of other researchers and given the wide 
audience that the report was being addressed to, a more general format was 
sought. The theory building structure was eventually chosen as the most 
suitable format for reporting the findings of the previous chapter. Each section 
of the report progressively illustrated the reasons for failure and success -
thus revealing a new part of the theoretical arguments presented. 
COMPILATION OF CASE REPORT 
The approach recommended by Becker (1986:43-47) was adopted, on how to 
compile the case report. Becker recommended writing and rewriting, 
especially in response to other comments received. Attention was focused on 
the general composition, the problem of whether to leave the case identities 
anonymous and the review procedure to increase the construct validity of the 
case study. 
Firstly, the researcher started compiling the case study report early in the 
analytic process as recommend by Wolcott (1990:200) who noted that, "You 
cannot begin writing early enough." On completion of the literature review 
section, the methodology and bibliography sections were worked on and 
sections of the report was completed. 
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Secondly, the anonymity of the case respondents did not present a challenge 
as is generally the case in case study approaches. All respondents granted 
permission to disclose their participation and this resulted in two important 
outcomes. Firstly, readers had the opportunity to link the findings to other case 
studies where the same respondents participated. Secondly, the case 
evidence was more easily available for review and criticism. The report 
presented cross case analysis and only the aggregate evidence was 
presented. 
Lastly, the researcher focused on the overall quality of the study. In order to 
validate the procedure, the first draft of the report was circulated to a mix of 
respondents and third party participants. In some cases, the comments 
received were exceptional. This review of the report was more than just a 
matter of professional courtesy as it helped corroborate the facts and evidence 
collected and analysed from the case respondents and secondary sources. 
5.20 CONCLUSION 
This chapter described the research methodology, the objectives of the study, 
covered a description of the case history and explains how the case studies 
were drawn. It also covered a description of the questionnaire used and how it 
was administered. Despite financial and time constraints, the method of data 
collection used required the researcher to conduct all fifteen case interviews 
together with third party interviews personally. This ensured proper 
administration and collection of information and justified the imperatives of 
accuracy, speed and completeness of data, to facilitate cross case analysis. 
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The chapter also included pre-testing, the pilot study and the data collection 
method used. Lastly, the format of the report was covered. The next chapter 
presents the case study evidence and the analysis thereof. 
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CHAPTER 6 
PRESENTATION AND ANALYSIS OF CASE STUDY FINDINGS 
6.1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter provides a summary of all the case evidence collected. Data 
analysis consists of examining, categorising, tabulating and testing both 
qualitative and quantitative evidence to address the initial propositions or the 
reasons for failure and success. Specific techniques were used to analyse the 
qualitative data and this included pattern matching and cross case synthesis of 
the fifteen cases studied. Thereafter, an analysis of the quantitative data is 
presented and the results of the two processes are converged to increase the 
reliability of the findings. Documentary evidence, observations and expert third 
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01; M1: Married with 1; Sex/Age M34 = Male 34 years old 
AGE AND FAMILY SUPPORT 
The average age in the failed category was 37 years compared to 38 years in 
the successful category. There was no evidence to suggest that age is a 
critical factor for success and failure and the oil company target range of 25-40 
years, appears to be an exaggeration of the importance that age plays. The 
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range in the successful category was from 28 to 44 years while the range in 
the failed category was 28 to 52 years. 
This finding collabourates the results of Hall's (1995:48-62) research, 
referenced in section 3.5.2 of the UK construction industry where the owners 
of surviving companies were younger than those of failures. While these finds 
reinforce each other, it is somewhat surprising - if people gain knowledge, skill 
and experience as they become older, then they should more capable of 
running winning businesses. 
The perception that younger people are more vibrant and motivated than older 
people is supported from the findings. This seems logical given the franchised 
nature of these businesses. Gender was also not found to be a differentiation 
factor for failure and success. 
Zimmerer and Scorborough's (1998:12) views, recorded in section 3.8.3, that 
entrepreneurs start their businesses between the ages of 30-40 years has 
found support from the case findings. 
Three of the failed retailers operated as husband and wife teams while two 
such teams were in the successful category. Given the nature of the retail 
business and the demand for time, family teams should in theory enhance the 
ability to control the detail in the fuel retail business but there is certainly no 
evidence from the case to suggest that such combinations have a bearing on 
success and failure, as suggested by the oil company expert view. 
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Case respondents in almost all cases operated the businesses themselves 
with the exception of SFR2 whose workday was managed around looking after 
her three-month-old baby. The retailer secured the services of a retired police 
captain to oversee the security aspects of the business and paid him a retainer 
of R3000 per month. 
In the case of SFR3, the retailer trained his brother to operate the site allowing 
him the time to develop the business. SFR5 regrets that the long hours are "an 
imposition on family time." In the cases of SFR6 and SFR7, the spouses are 
actively involved and this worked well. It was observed, in almost all cases that 
family and spouses actively assisted in the business by purchasing dry stocks 
and doing general administration. 
Even amongst the failed retailers, spouses were often involved. In the cases of 
FFR1, FFR5, FFR6 and FFR7, the spouses assisted the retailers. There is 
certainly no evidence to suggest that spouse managed business had a higher 
success rate or vice versa. The following table illustrates the number of hours 
spent at the business and the living distance from the retailer's home. 
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TIME SPENT AT BUSINESS 
TABLE 6.2 
































Averagel 0.71 hours/8.5KM 
The evidence reflects that both groups spent an average of 10 hours plus a 
day on site excluding weekends. This is more than a standard working day of 
eight hours. The trading hours as required by the franchise agreement is 24 
hours. The EFG retailers have in all instances adjusted their lifestyles to be 
closer to the business and to spend more time on site. This illustrates the 
quality of commitment made to ensure that their businesses succeeded. In 
many cases, they purchased homes in the vicinity of the business and 
transferred their children to nearby schools. While FFR7 was being 
interviewed, his 7-year old daughter had just arrived directly from school and 
came straight to the business to have lunch and to do her homework. The idea 
proposed by to Frese (2000:25) in section 3.5.2, that children of entrepreneurs 
will get a positive role model of entrepreneurship at an early age appeared 
possible in the case of FFR7. 
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The retailer's personal lives are interwoven with their businesses and the need 
for success is that much greater. In many cases, the respondents agreed that, 
"the business owns them and that they do not own the business." Kuehl and 
Lambing (1994:18) noted in section 2.4 that a business can close down for 
non-financial reasons as described by FFR7. When the business is too much 
of an intrusion in the entrepreneur's life - they may decide to move on. 
The view from the oil company expert that retailers failed due to a lack of 
commitment is refuted. This was further evidenced from comments received 
when asked: what would happen to the business if you took an extended 
holiday? 
SFR1 commented that the business would still function, as there would be a 
manager on site. SFR2 noted that "it will run for two weeks with no problem." 
SFR3 responded that "the business will collapse - although my brother is 
here." SFR4 commented that he couldn't leave the site for a peaceful holiday 
without worrying. He noted that, "I run the site by phone- and that too I am on 
the phone for 6 hours when away from the site." 
SFR5 explained that, "The only time I left the site was when I attended the oil 
company conference." SFR6 also commented that, "I cannot go away for more 
than one week" while SFR7 responded that "I will never do it - I cannot trust 
anyone - although I do have a cousin who stands in for me when I take a 
weekend off." SFR8 felt that she could take a break although she did not trust 
anyone because of the good controls in place. Argenti (1984:14) in theoretical 
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section 3.8 attributes failure to the lack of proper control - in the case of SFR8 
proper control provide a sense of comfort. 
FFR1 commented that she has never taken a day off - "it is impossible to do 
so"; while FFR2 responded that, she often went away on weekend trips as her 
brother was on site. FFR3 acknowledged that there could be difficulties 
although he had a partner but further commented that, "my partner lacked the 
passion." FFR4 responded that "the business will collapse if I took a break". 
FFR5 had a single response, "the business will die." FFR6 also shared this 
view and noted that, "the business will collapse and that it was not possible to 
take a break for an extended period." Lastly, FFR7 acknowledged that he has 
not been away on leave for more than two weeks in the last four years. 
The case respondents were probed further and asked in section E1.5 to 
describe a typical day at their business. In all instances, the case respondents 
indicated that they arrive at their business early in the morning and that they 
check the stock levels, bank account balances, housekeeping matters and 
dealt with staff issues. This was verified by the observations made by the 
researcher. 
In the case of SFR1, sufficient time was spent on the forecourt and "I get 
involved in my customers lives - I have infiltrated the community well and was 
therefore able to increase the volumes from 260k liters to 450k liters. This is 
most certainly a criterion for success." During the observation, the researcher 
causally approached a fueling motorist who noted the only reason for fueling 
at the site is that "I am on first name basis with the owner." This "pervasive 
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influence" of the entrepreneur was identified by Rajagopolan, Rasheed and 
Datta (1993:349-384), in section 3.5.2, as a winning attribute. 
SFR4 arrives at 5am each morning to check that all staff is on site and that 
they are dressed appropriately and commented that, "I am on the forecourt 
between 08h00 and 09h00 and between 15h00 to 18h00 daily." SFR5 also 
arrived at 05h00 together with the morning staff. SFR6 arrived between 07h00 
and 07h30 and checks who is on site and watches for "body language from 
staff' to get clearance on security before entering the business. The routine 
followed was typical of the other case respondents. This was confirmed during 
a morning observation visit at the site. 
SFR7 also arrived at 7am and followed the normal routine with the exception 
that, "I bank all cheques - cashiers bank their own money and are responsible 
if they go short - but the cheques take 7 days to clear and with the cash in 
transit company this is extended to 10 days." 
The Failed fuel retailers followed a similar routine. It was evident that all the 
case respondents executed similar approaches each day and that the tasks 
became a tolerance of routine. Typically, retailers arrive very early in the 
morning, balance shifts, manage the housekeeping roster, place orders and 
reconcile dry and wet stock. The morning sequences of activities were 
observed to include the preparation of the day end reports and dip readings 
before the day began. Johnson's (1999:72) view in section 2.10.4, on 
franchise uniformity in the accounting systems and controls, was found to be 
true and relevant. 
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However, this can be supervised by delegating the repetitive activities. The 
retail business is about detail and control and if all the retailers are consciously 
aware of the need to constantly balance and reconcile data, and then what are 
the factors that differentiate success and failure? Is it really beneficial to spend 
long hours performing tasks, rather than managing a control system? It is 
possible to be productive and refreshed each day by spending such long 
hours on site. 
EDUCATION AND DRAWING 
The levels of education in both the failed and successful categories were on 
par. The levels ranged from a basic matriculation to a doctoral degree in 
chemistry within the successful group. The level of education in the failed 
group ranged from matric to an honours degree in Public Administration. The 
case information indicates that a basic matriculation degree is appropriate for 
fuel retail operations. There is certainly no evidence to suggest that university 
graduates have a higher success rate although one is tempted to make such a 
conclusion. There is also no support from the case evidence for Zimmerer and 
Scarborough's (1998:12) views, as noted in section 3.5.1, that entrepreneurial 
education at colleges and universities, had any influencing role in the 
entrepreneur's decision to own and operate a service station. The case 
reflects the contrary as evidenced by SFR4, SFR6 and SFR7 who only held a 
basic matriculation. 
This is perhaps the case due to the franchised format within which fuel retail 
businesses operate. Entrepreneurial flare and innovation is muted in the 
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franchise environment. The expert oil company view that university training in 
managerial finance is an important contributor to success was not supported 
from the case evidence as SFR01 and FFR02 both held a commercial degree. 
Bates (1990:551-559) view, as recorded in the theory section 3.5.2, that 
entrepreneurs with a college education were more likely to see their firms 
survive than those less educated is also at odds with the case findings. 
However, the case evidence does show that education facilitates good 
communication and customer orientation. Lastly, Halls (1995:59) view in the 
same section 3.5.2, that the possession of a degree would not necessarily 
speed progress up the learning curve, found support in the findings and it can 
be agreed that the role of education remains an "an open question." 
The salaries drawn by the retailers - notwithstanding their education levels 
were as follows: 
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TABLE 6.3 



































SUCCESSFUL RETAILERS DRAWINGS VERSUS INDUSTRY 
BENCHMARK 
SFR1 SFR2 SFR3 SFR4 SFR5 SFR6 SFR7 SFR8 
Successful fuel retailer 
| — Drawings (total) — 2004 study 
Note: The 2004 study refers to Governments margin study conducted by North 
West University in 2004 
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GRAPH 6.2 
FAILED RETAILER DRAWINGS VERSUS INDUSTRY AVERAGE 
Fuel Retailer salary 
FFR1 FFR2 FFR3 FFR4 FFR5 FFR6 FFR7 
Failed fuel retailers 
j -^Drawings (total) - • - 2004 study 
Note: The 2004 study refers to Governments margin study conducted by North 
West University in 2004 
The 2004 Retail Margin Study uses R153 000 as a total salary allocation in 
keeping with the stipulation that the retailer's salary should be at a level of a 
deputy director in the public service. This is deemed compensation for fuel 
related activities and includes salary, pension and medical aid. 
The graphs 6.1 and 6.2 illustrate two distinct situations. The average drawings 
as reported by the successful retailers were R180 000 per annum as a total 
salary i.e. for the operation of both the fuel and non-fuel business. The 
average salaries drawn by failed dealers were R147 000 for both the fuel and 
non-fuel business. However, when comparing the interview responses to the 
director's drawings to the 2002 audited financial statements the average for 
failed category was R165 090 and the successful category was R106 018 per 
annum. 
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During the observations and documentation review, specifically the goods 
received vouchers, it was noted that retailers often purchased stock for own 
use while replenishing trade stock. An examination of the debtor's age 
analysis also shows that each retailer maintained an account for personal fuel 
consumption. 
While the deputy director in the public service does not take the 
entrepreneurial risk and is therefore a poor benchmark for a compensation 
measure, this criterion was used for budgeting purposes by EFG and any 
excesses influenced the cash flows. The failed category exceeded the 
threshold by R12 090 (R165 090 - R153 000) and the successful category 
was under by R46 982. 
This optimism and lack of prudence was referred to by Wright (1995:52-53) in 
section 3.8, who concluded that amongst the reasons for cash flow problems 
is that too much money is spent on the owners salary - this is the case with 
most of the failed retailers. 
Notwithstanding the market salaries that both cases of retailers would 
command, particularly SFR02 with a doctoral degree in chemistry, the EFG 
funding model assumed a drawings on average of R10 000 per month and 
because the cost budgets were drawn from the retail margin study the upper 
end of the retailer drawings was allowed. The conclusion that can be drawn is 
that failed retailers exceeded the drawing levels while the successful retailers 
under - drew directors emoluments. This finding is supported by the oil 
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company experts view that, "most retailer fail because of excessive drawings -
beyond the ability of the business". 
Lastly, case respondents were asked about professional affiliations. The Fuel 
Retailers Association (FRA) is a professional body that serves the needs of its 
members - the fuel retailers. They only represent some 30% of the fuel 
retailers in South Africa. Their mandate is, in exchange for a monthly 
subscription to serve as an industry representative and to support the fuel 
retail fraternity. As evidenced by the failed and successful affiliation, 
membership to the FRA does not in any way influence success or failure 
contrary to the comments made by its executive during the expert interviews. 
All failed retailers with the exception of FFR6 were paying members. 
6.2.2 OPERATIONS. EMPLOYMENT AND TURNOVER 
The following table summarises information from the questionnaire on retailer 


















Volumes (kl pm) 
Budgeted (kl pm) 
Shop sales (Rk pm) 
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Budget volumes(kl pm) 
Shop sales (Rk pm) 
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CBD = central Business district; 
Trans = transient or highway sites; 
Res+T = Residential transient site; 
Shop = shopping Center site; 
Ind = Industrial site; 
L = low; 
H = high 
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6.2.2.1 TRADING HOURS 
As table 6.4 reveals, the trading hours for both categories were in all instances 
24 hours. SFR1 responded that there was no need for a 24-hour operation as 
his was a residential site. The cost of doing business from midnight to early 
morning represented sunk costs with no proportionate benefit. Staff wages, 
electricity and additional security had to be paid for while little benefit was 
gained in terms of turnover generation. The security risk to the business and 
its staff on duty is at its greatest during this time. The wage cost, calculated for 
SFR08, as calculated from the wage book was about 10% of the annual wage 
bill. With the exception of SFR3 and SFR8, all the successful sites have a 
transient market and had to operate 24 hours. 
This is not the case for the failed retailers as only FFR6 served a transient 
market - the trading hours could be reduced as the hours of trading is a 
function of the service offer. In the case of farm and industrial sites, there is 
absolutely no reason for oil companies to impose on the fuel retailer the 24-
hour trading requirement. This should be a matter of mutual economic benefit 
- in the interest of the business. 
Each fuel outlet is unique. In the case of SFR6, where the retailer competes 
with nine other sites within a one-kilometer radius, a 24/7 operation is a 
competitive advantage, especially as most of the food sales are recorded 
between 10pm and 3am and the site is located within two kilometers from a 
casino. In the case of SFR8, the site location is industrial and does not justify 
the additional operating cost. The fuel retailer reported that, "it was a waste of 
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money - but I have no choice but to conform." The franchise agreement did 
indeed stipulate that a standard condition of the franchise is 24-hour trading. 
During the observation rounds, it was noted that the staff at SFR3 and SFR8 
were asleep on duty as the forecourt was deserted at 12pm. 
Notwithstanding the fact that fuel outlets are selling convenience and that 
almost all of the failed case respondents preferred to operate restricted hours, 
the 24-hour operation requirement by the oil company is an unnecessary 
operational imposition on the small business owner. Based on the 10% 
extrapolation using the annual financial statements, the saving for the failed 
sites would have amounted to R45 629 per annum or a reduction of 16.29% of 
the average annual trading loss. In spite of the expert oil company view that 
24-hour operation enhances the brand and is intrinsic to convenience selling, 
the cost exceeds the benefit in all cases, and is a contributory factor to failure. 
6.2.2.2 CUSTOMER OFFER 
The customer offer in all cases included a fuel retail outlet and convenience 
shop. Bakeries and quick service restaurants were a profit center for both 
categories and the oil company expert views that they "supplement profit 
levels" is correct. There is, however, no evidence to suggest that a wider offer 
differentiated failed and successful sites as suggested by the oil company 
expert. The oil company expert also confirmed that the oil company reserved 
the right at company owned sites to extend or limit the offer. 
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6.2.2.3 WAGE COSTS 
It is estimated that the fuel retail business in South Africa employs some 
50 000 people. Personnel expenses are estimated to be 50% of the gross 
operating profit or 20 cents of the value of the fuel margin, according to official 
government studies carried out by the Small Business Advisory Bureau of 
North West University in 2004 (Retail margin study 2004). The average weekly 
wage, including cash benefits and overtime was reported as R358.11 per 
attendant. The 2002 average was R350.73 and the wage cost factor was 
0.072 cents. The wage cost factor per liter pumped is a reflection of pump 
attendant efficiency and productivity. The average wage cost per liter pumped 
increased from 0.071 cents in 2001 to 0.099 cents in 2004. The average wage 
per pump attendant increased from R324.87 in 2001 to R436.03 in 2004. The 
2002 average was R350.73. 
The wage cost factor amongst the failed retailers was R476.37 while the same 
average for the successful retailer was R344.78 per week. This was calculated 
by dividing the annual wage cost, as per the audited financial statements in 
Appendix 6 by the number of attendants and then converted to a weekly cost. 
The weekly wage book and staff roster was analysed and compared and the 
wage payouts were confirmed as recorded in the financials. Successful 
retailers managed the wage costs below the industry average while failed 
retailers were above the industry average. This finding is consistent with views 
of Business Date (1996:7), Kuehl and Lambing (1994:222) and Hall (1995:20) 
views, as reflected in section 3.8.3, showing that poor financial management 
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can lead to business failure. However, the case finding contradicts the findings 
of Argenti (1984:14), noted in 3.8.3 where it was found that larger businesses 
did indeed have a history of losses. The inability to manage the cost 
component is a contributory factor for failure. Following the wage cost 
analysis, the staff efficiency was then scrutinised. 
6.2.2.4 ATTENDANT EFFICIENCY MEASURE 
The successful retailers reflected the following averages in terms of liters sold 
per pump attendant. This is a good measure to test efficiency. 
SFR1 SFR2 SFR3 SFR4 SFR5 SFR6 SFR7 SFR8 AVG 
Ltrs per att. (Lk) 22 21 17 38 17 16 17 18 211 
FFR1 FFR2 FFR3 FFR4 FFR5 FFR6 FFR7 AVG 
Ltrs per att. (Lk) 13 23 22 18 14 18 20 181 
The average liters pumped amongst the successful retailers were 21 000 liters 
per attendant while the average amongst the failed retailers was 18 000I per 
month. This was calculated by dividing the volumes by the number of 
attendants employed. The 2004 industry average as calculated by the North 
West University study was 21 000 liters per attendant. The successful fuel 
retailer's efficiency was equal to the country average while the failed retailers 
had a lower average. The case analysis shows that the most productive 
attendants were from the successful category while the least productive 
attendants came from the failed category. 
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The average number of attendants employed per site according to the North 
West study (Retail margin study 2004) was 13 attendants in 2004. The case 
average for failed retailers was 18.4 and that of successful retailers was 16.6. 
Using the 2004 average wage cost this means that failed retailers were 
overstaffed by 5 attendants at a cost of R113 360 per annum (5 x 52 weeks x 
436.03) and successful retailers were overstaffed by 3 attendants per site at a 
cost of R68 020 per annum (3 x 52 weeks x 436.03). 
The head count on duty corresponded with the staff roster in the attendants 
change rooms verifying the persons on duty. The expert retailer view was 
supported by the FRA viewpoint that additional staff had to be employed to 
ensure constant quality service due to the oil company's mystery shopper 
programme. The expert oil company view disagreed that there was a need for 
additional staff to render the standard service expected. 
The average number of attendants and the cost allocation were important 
determinants for the calculation of the current retail fuel margin by 
government. This means that both failed and successful retailers are above 
the industry average. The failed group is, however, twice as inefficient as the 
successful category. 
As per the annual financial statements, the average trading loss in the failed 
group was - R279 866 and the extra wage cost comprised about 40.5% 
(R113 360/R279 866) of this loss. This inefficiency, while not a clear 
differentiating factor between success and failure is a contributory factor for 
failure. 
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This finding collapses Halls (1995:8) argument presented in section 3.8.1 
where he concludes that a company's survival increases positively with its 
size. A number of the failed retailers had higher turnover numbers than the 
successful retailers. 
6.2.2.5 TURNOVER PERFORMANCE MEASURES 
GRAPH 6.3 
FUEL AND NON-FUEL TURNOVERS - ACTUAL VERSUS BUDGET 
SUCCESSFUL FUEL RETAILERS 








SFR1 SFR2 SFR3 SFR4 SFR5 SFR6 SFR7 SFR8 
Successful fuel retailers 
[• Fuel - Act • Fuel - Budget D Non-fuel Act D Non-fuel Budget 
With the exception of SFR6 and SFR8, all cases in the successful category 
have constantly achieved volume performances above the original budget. 
The non- fuel performance of fuel retailer SFR6 and SFR8 did not compromise 
its successful classification. This also weakens the rival theory argument that 
volume is a critical success factor. 
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The average volumetric throughput in the successful category was 350 000 
litres against a non-fuel average of R373 000 per month. This equates to 
R1.06 spend on non-fuel income for every one liter of fuel sold. The volume 
range was 246 000 liters to 700 000 liters while the shop range was R260 000 
to R542 000 non-fuel turnover per month. EFG only used 80% of the free cash 
flow in the business valuation model. 
GRAPH 6.4 
FUEL AND NON-FUEL PERFORMANCE - ACTUAL VERSUS BUDGETED 
FAILED FUEL RETAILERS 
Actual versus budgeted performance 
FFR1 FFR2 FFR3 FFR4 FFR5 FFR6 FFR7 
Failed fuel retailers 
[• Fuel -Act _• Fuel - j3udget^D Non-fue[Act rj Non-fuel Budget] 
Failed fuel retailers FFR5, FFR6 and FFR7 did not achieve their volumetric 
budgets for fuel. FFR5 and FFR6 also failed to achieve the non-fuel budget. 
While FFR7 exceeded the non-fuel budget, the aggregate performance was 
still below the threshold required to support the loan payments. FFR1 
exceeded the fuel budgets set but stumbled on the non-fuel targets resulting in 
an overall failure. While FFR2 exceeded both the volumetric and non-fuel 
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targets, the retailer still failed. This is also the case with FFR3. The 
performances of FFR2 and FFR3 exceed the national average - which has 
been calculated at 17 000 litres for fuel sales as per the 2004 Retail Margin 
Study. The documentary evidence examined correlated the case respondent's 
views and was further supported by the graphical information from the back 
office system. 
The average volumetric throughput in the failed category was 345 000 litres as 
apposed to the successful category of 350 000 litres against a non-fuel 
average of R238 000 per month. This equates to R0.68 spend on non-fuel 
income for every one litre of fuel sold. The volume range was 170 000 litres to 
700 000 litres while the shop range was R160 000 to R340 000 non-fuel 
turnover per month. The case study evidence clearly shows that successful 
retailers did indeed have higher shop sales in relation to fuel volumes than 
failed retailers. 
Statistical analysis from the graphical data from graph 6.3 and graph 6.4 was 
done to determine whether a strong correlation and equality of means 













































































** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
Due to small sample sizes, the actual size of the correlations was examined. 
Table 6.5 indicates that the correlation is large and positive between the Shop 
Actual and Shop Budget. While the correlation between Fuel Actual and Fuel 
Budget is lower (r= 0.455) and positive, the larger the Shop Budget the larger 
the Shop Actual tends to be. This correlation is significant in spite of the small 
sample size. 
(Internet 8: www.davidmlane.com/hyperstat/A34739.html); 
(Internet 9: www.statsoft.com/textbook/stbasic.html) 
TABLE 6.6 










































































Table 6.6 shows a small but negative correlation between Shop Actual and 
Shop Budget for the failure group. This means that the larger the shop budget 
the smaller Shop actual tends to be. This correlation is not significantly small 
(r=-0.384). This also suggests that the budget for the failed category was not 
achieved resulting in reduced cash flows. 
Table 6.5 indicates that the correlation between shop actual and shop budget 
of successful retailers are 0.879 - showing a strong positive correlation and 
achievement of the budgeted numbers. 
The correlation between Fuel Actual and Fuel Budget is (r=0.749) and 
positive. It is interesting to note the high correlation between Shop Actual and 
Fuel Actual (r=0.508). This suggests that a relationship exists between fuel 
sales and shop sales. Higher fuel sales will yield higher shop sales. 
There is a stronger correlation between shop actual and fuel actual in the 
failed category as compared to the successful category (r = 0.508 versus r = 
0.423). In all instances, a positive correlation exists between fuel sales and 
shop sales justifying the oil company's approach of introducing convenience 
shops in anticipation of a deregulated market structure. Notwithstanding this, 
the success group generated a higher ratio of shop sales (R1.06 shop income 
per litre of fuel sold) than the failed retailer (R0.68 shop income per litre of fuel 
sold). 
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Given the correlations found, a statistical analysis of the variances between 
the actual and budget follows to identify further trends that may emerge 
between the success and failure groups. The following calculations were made 
using the SPSS programme. 
TABLE 6.7 
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS FOR SUCCESS GROUP 
Fuel volumes (kl pm) 
Budgeted (kl pm) 
Act Shop sales (Rk 
pm) 
Bud shopsales (Rk pm) 





























DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS FOR FAILURE GROUP 
Volumes (kl pm) 
Budgeted_(kl pm) 
Shop sales (Rk pm) 
Bud shop sale (Rk pm) 






























DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS ACTUAL VERSUS BUDGET 
Group Statistics 
DIFF fuel volume 
Act-Budget 





























The actual volumes exceeded the budget in both categories. The successful 
category had a larger positive difference than the failed category. The shop 
variance is worthy of special note. The success group exceeded the shop 
budget by about R150 000 while the failure group did not achieve the targeted 
amount. This is significant given that the success group also achieved a higher 
gross profit percentage than the failed group. Hall (1995:20), quoted in section 
3.8.4, made a similar finding where failures had a lower gross profit margin 
than successful enterprises. 
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TABLE 6.10 
T - TESTS FOR INDEPENDENT GROUPS BETWEEN THE SUCCESS AND 
FAILURE GROUPS ON THE MEAN DIFFERENCE 
Independent Sample Test 
Diff act 
Volume 
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Based on the data analysis and assuming equality of variances for the 
volumes, it cannot be concluded that the means of the differences for the 
success and failure group differ - in other words volumes does not appear to 
be a differentiator of success and failure. From this table it is clear that the two 
groups do not differ with regard to the difference between actual Volume and 
Budgeted volume (sig. = .801). 
The opposite is true for shop sales. The two groups do differ significantly with 
regard to the difference between Shop sales and Budgeted Shop sales 
(Sig. = .007). It appears that in the case of the success group that the shop 
sales mean was much higher than budgeted mean, while in the case of the 
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failure group the mean was lower than budgeted mean. Failure to achieve the 
shop budgets has contributed to failure. 
The case evidence also shows that high volume sites like FFR2 and low 
volumes sites like SFR3 have other drivers for success and failure. 
Matshamba (2000:1) found similar results. 
GRAPH 6.5 
SITE CLOSURES 1997-2000 
120 , 
Site Closure by Volume 
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Category 
Source: Matshamba (2000): Department of Minerals and Energy 
Government investigated the Impact of site size on closures. In order to help 
with the decisions on the optimal size for the service stations, a relationship of 
service stations closures correlated with size of the service station was 
investigated. From the graph 6.5, it is clear that the reasons for closures of 
sites are more than just the size of the service station. There are clearly more 
closures in the lower volume brackets but closures of sites that are pumping 
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more than 200kl_ per month are significant. It is possible that the primary 
reasons for these closures are other than financial viability. The graph 6.6 
further illustrates this phenomenon. Total Oil closed about 50 service stations 
from 1997-2000. These were sites located in the rural areas. 
GRAPH 6.6 
SITE CLOSURE BY OIL COMPANY 
60 
Site closures per company 
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Source: Gumede (2002: Department of Minerals and Energy) 
The graph 6.6 indicates that Caltex Oil had the least number of closures while 
Total Oil had the most. Total Oil also had the most number of service stations 
in the rural areas. The graph 6.6 also illustrates that a greater number of sites 
were closed in under 100 000 litres category and that Governments regulation 
of the industry may have artificially led to an over supply of service stations. 
The expert government respondent interviewed supported this view. 
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It also appears that other countries, most of which do not have any 
government regulation in terms of pricing, have a lot more service stations 
than South Africa. Notwithstanding the fact that the car population in each of 
the countries, must be factored in, for valid conclusions to be made, the 
number of service stations does not, in itself, seem to be a problem. 
GRAPH 6.7 
NUMBER OF SERVICE STATIONS WORLDWIDE 
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Graph 6.7 shows the number of service stations in the various countries while 
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One part of the rival theory that suggests that volumes are the main reasons 
for success and failure comes under question from the graph data. The 
average volume in the failed category was 345 000 litres compared to the 
industry average of 235 000 litres. This illustrates that sites pumping a higher 
volume than the country average have failed for reasons other than volumes. 
Graph 6.8 also shows that, notwithstanding the fact that the regulatory regime 
may be different in other countries, low volume sites in countries like Belgium 
do survive. The country results support the EFG case study information in that 
volumes is not the key driver for profitability. 
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The data on graph 6.3 and graph 6.4 illustrates the non-fuel turnovers. While 
the successful category had a higher average than the failed category, a 
number of failed retailers like FFR3 had higher non-fuel sales compared to 
SFR1, SFR2, SFR3, SFR4 and SFR5. This further illustrates that higher 
turnovers does not result in success as suggested by the rival theory. 
This finding also contradicts Hall's (1995:8) view that the probability of a 
company's survival increased positively with its age and size. The effect of 
size, in terms of fuel sales has no relevance to success and failure. 
6.2.3 DUE DILIGENCE AND VALUATIONS 
This section summarises the respondents view on the amount paid for their 
businesses, the due diligence study, basis of the valuation done and whether it 
constituted a fair price. This section will also report on the sweat equity 
contribution. Sweat equity refers to personal unencumbered contribution. 
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TABLE 6.11 
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6.2.3.1 BUSINESS VALUATION 
Only SFR1 and SFR6 responded that price for the business was not a fair 
price while FFR2 and FFR4 thought it was a fair price. SFR1 felt that the price 
should have been a little lower but could not indicate what that price should 
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be. SFR6 operated a new to industry site and the projected volumes of the oil 
company did not materialise and he felt that the price paid was too much. Five 
out of seven retailers within the failed category believed that their failure was 
partly due to the "over pricing" in relation to the purchase price. 
With the exception of SFR4, all other retailers contributed in excess of 10% 
sweat equity as per their agreement with EFG. EFG funded the purchase 
prices using a multiple formula. The range targeted was between 20 and 24 
multiplied by the FCF (free cash flow) or the pre-tax net profit. Only 80% of the 
free cash flow was used in calculating the repayment allowing for a 20% 
contingency. 
Gumede (2002:5) noted that, "it is an open secret that the biggest problem in 
the retail business is the current gross overvaluing of retail sites. It is not 
uncommon, in this industry to get a service station that has been running at a 
loss for a period being sold at premium, therefore commanding a serious 
goodwill. The same goes for new sites, where the unsophisticated fuel retailer 
pays upfront key money, the amount of which is based on some projected 
volumes (which they have no way of confirming) and are also expected to pay 
significantly high rentals, on overly capitalised property, values of which they 
had no part in deciding". 
Gumede (2002:5-6) poses the question that needs to be asked with respect to 
the purchasing of a service station: "what in actual fact is the dealer buying 
when they buy a fuel retail outlet, especially the oil-company-owned service 
stations. It could be argued that all they are buying are future cash flows and 
254 
therefore the value of their transactions should be linked to such cash flows 
and not to some book value of retailing assets or any other such value". 
Gumede (2002:6) further states that, "Compounding the problem is that the 
contract terms are largely one-sided and do not protect the fuel retailer from 
unscrupulous sellers and from the oil companies themselves. Clearly, these 
would be expected to be one sided because the balance of power during the 
negotiations is largely tilted towards the oil majors, as they hold all the cards, 
as they have all the information, they own the property, they are the single 
biggest supplier to the service station, etc., etc." The findings in the EFG case 
study and the views of Kirby and Watson (2003:189), noted in section 3.9, that 
the inability to access information is one of the key reasons for failure, largely 
support these observations made. 
The expert oil company view is that due diligence and business valuation are 
matters for negotiation between a willing buyer and a willing seller. It is 
perhaps this view that leads to the overpaying by uninformed buyers. 
Although, the oil company central database contains accurate day-to-day 
trading data, such information is not made available to the incoming retailer. 
The FRA concurs that an industry methodology must be developed to prevent 
the chaos that currently prevails. Government's intention of issuing licenses is 
a call for such a valuation. 
The following illustration indicates the methodology that EFG applied for the 
valuation of the retail business. 
255 
ILLUSTRATION 6.1 
EFG BUSINESS VALUATION 
Forecourt 400 000I 
Margin 39.8 cents per liter (using October 2004 margins) 
Shop R300 000 per month 
Margin 28% (using industry target gross profit percentage) 
Gross income R159 200 Forecourt + R84 000 Shop = R243 200 
Expenses 80% of Gross profit = R194 560 
FCF R48 640 
Valuation R972 800 to R1 167 360 (using multiple 20-24 times FCF) 
80% x FCF R38 944 was the maximum repayment budgeted over 5 
years 
Multiple 20 x FCF was a discount rate while 24 x FCF was a 
premium rate 
The key assumptions used in the model were: 
• That the retailer would constantly over the five years loan achieve the 
shop and fuel turnovers; 
• The retail fuel margin was fixed and did not allow for government 
increases thus leaving the retailer in a net benefit situation when margins 
did increase. There is no record of the retail margins ever decreasing; 
• The shop turnover was inclusive of value added tax and exclusive of lotto 
sales; 
• The shrinkage provision was 2% of turnover not gross profit; 
• The expenses was benchmarked at 80% of the free cash flow in line with 
government's approach to retail margin calculation; 
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• Only 80% of the free cash flow was used as repayment of the loan; and 
• The business value was a factor of the free cash flow. 
Based on this illustration, the following case valuations were done. 
TABLE 6.12 
REFRESHED VALUATIONS 
Budgeted Gross Profit (Rk) 
Budgeted Expenses (Rk) 
Free cash flow 
Multiple factor 
Business Purchase Price (Rk) 
Actual Gross Profit (Rk) 
Actual Expenses (Rk) 
Variance (Rk) 
Revaluation (@given multiple (Rk)) 
Working capital (Rk) 
Stock (Rk) 
Equity contribution (Rk) 
Loan amount (Rk) 
Budgeted Gross Profit (Rk) 
Budgeted Expenses (Rk) 
Free cash flow 
Multiple factor 
Business Purchase Price (Rk) 
Actual Gross Profit (Rk) 
Actual Expenses (Rk) 
Variance (Rk) 
Revaluation (@given multiple (Rk)) 
Working capital (Rk) 
Stock (Rk) 
Equity contribution (Rk) 
Loan amount (Rk) 
The following observations 
table 6.12: 
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can be drawn from the refreshed valuation 
• It was found that the multiple used for the valuation ranged from 18 to 26 
and not 20 to 24 as was reported by EFG. 
With the exception of SFR3, SFR6 and SFR7 all other successful 
retailers exceeded the budgeted expense amount and with the exception 
of SFR4 all had failed to achieve the targeted gross profit levels. 
• In the failed category, all retailers had exceeded the expense budget 
while only FFR2 and FFR3 had achieved the gross profit targets. Many 
researchers like Jaggard (2001:14), Cooper and Chew (1996:88-97) and 
Timmonds (1994:10) referenced in section 3.8.4, concurred that the 
inability to put a ceiling on cost management will lead to runaway costs 
and eventual failure. 
• The table also indicated that the failed retailers had proportionally larger 
deficits in terms of decreased gross profits and increased expenses. In 
the case of FFR7 the shortfall of R45 000 per month was clearly the 
cause of failure. This finding is similiar to Timmon's (1994:10) results as 
mentioned in section 3.8 where it was found that the majority of failures 
resulted from extremely high operating expenses. 
• The re-valuation done on the basis of EFG formula supports the expert 
government view that sites running at a loss still command serious 
premiums in the market place. Table 6.12 confirms that none of the sites 
in the failed category has any "goodwill" value as they all have negative 
cash flows. Only SFR4 and SFR5 have a "goodwill" value. 
It can be concluded that the financial retardation would continue to a point of 
bankruptcy and the Oil Company and EFG would again sell the site to a new 
retailer using the same valuation methodology - which is indeed, what 
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happened. Should the new retailer function under the same conditions of debt 
and gearing then it would be reasonable to assume a similar fate. If the new 
person purchases the business with little or no gearing then the business 
outcome could be different. 
This highlights the critical reason for failure. The fact that the loans are highly 
geared, slippages in financial control will lead to failure. Kuehl and Lambing 
(1994:222), referenced in section 3.8.4, also found that financial slippages, is 
the primary cause of failure. 
Table 6.12 also brings into question the 2004 Retail Margin Study - as the 
expense budgets are modeled against the study. The benchmark expenses 
from the Retail Margin Study 2004 do not correlate with the case study 
findings. 
In spite of this, some of the successful sites continue to exist. This was 
primarily due to the unplanned retail margin increase that retailers received as 
evidenced from graph 6.11. It would appear that the failed sites - in spite of 
the bonus margin increases could not meet monthly expenses. The other 
reason for this is the inadequate working capital provision and sweat equity 
contribution. 
In summary, the valuation model and its assumption were flawed for the 
following reasons: 
• The retail margin study and the retail margins that result from it did not 
provide for any level of gearing. The EFG model did not adequately 
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accommodate this in terms of expense trade offs in other areas to ensure 
that the cash flows were sufficient to service the debt; 
In many instances, the multiple factor differed from the standard ceiling 
set by EFG of 24 times free cash flow. This resulted in sellers of the retail 
sites commanding higher prices; 
It seems that EFG was attempting to grow its loan book as quickly as 
possible. This resulted in poor quality due diligence studies and risk 
management as was confirmed by the EFG expert third party interview; 
The electronic system developed by EFG as a risk management tool was 
being developed during the loan rollout phase. This resulted in many 
versions being tried and tested without a proper system of risk 
management at inception of the loan; 
The ability to react to the risk management findings seemed limited. The 
budget over runs could not be contained due to the non-performance of 
the loans in the first instance; 
Most of the failed retailers did not generate the correct mark up 
percentages - this should have been a relatively easier slippage to 
correct. This was the most notable failure of the retailer, Oil Company 
and EFG; 
The model assumptions were very reliant on the fuel retail margin study 
by government for its input cost targets - the margin study did not 
provide for cost of gearing; 
The retailers were not fully apprised of the cost constraints and in many 
instances exceeded their budgets. 
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6.2.3.2 CONTRIBUTION TO SWEAT EQUITY 
Table 6.11 reflects the various sources of equity contribution. With the 
exception of FFR2, FFR3 and FFR4, the other failed retailers contributed in 
excess of 10% sweat equity as per their agreement with EFG. The total loans 
for both FFR2 and FFR3 were inclusive of the working capital provision of 
R300 000 and R204 000 respectively. These were in fact term loans and not 
an overdraft facility, which would have been cheaper. Both these loans were in 
fact geared 100%. This is an aspect of small business reality, which has not 
been accommodated in the Retail Margin Study - as the study does not 
include an expense line item for interest on debt. 
In the case of FFR4, FFR6 and FFR7 the business was under capitalised 
forcing the failure. FFR4 did not contribute the R400 000 sweat equity required 
and neither did EFG have any corrective mechanism to remedy the situation. 
FFR6 and FFR7 were also undercapitalised by R300 000 and R250 000 and 
this laid the foundation for failure from inception. 
The findings of Atkin, Chell and Mason (1993:62), referenced in section 3.8.4, 
was similar. There is a high concentration of failure amongst businesses that 
are not sufficiently capitalised. Under capitalization in the case of FFR6 and 
FFR7 was due to initial shortfalls when the business first started 
All retailers within the successful category deposited the sweat equity 
required. The sources of the sweat equity within the failed category were 
reflected as interest bearing loans. SFR3 and SFR5 were soft loans with no 
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fixed period of payment. The following section looks at the working capital 
provision and the impact of the sweat equity contribution. While all case study 
respondents received loans from EFG, each retailer was required to make a 
10% equity contribution. The equity contribution was factored in the loan 
valuation in calculating the business ability to pay. 
Three of the successful fuel retailers used personal savings to fund the equity 
requirement compared to four of the failed retailers. FFR2 and FFR6 used the 
proceeds of their pension funds as equity for their new venture. FFR6 took six 
months to receive the pension payout and this placed a burden on the cash 
flows. EFG attributed the retailer's failure to this non-compliance although their 
approach to equity payments in advance of moving into the business was 
relaxed and variable. 
It was interesting to note that SFR3, SFR4 and SFR5 funded their equity 
investments from other loans - effectively resulting in a 100% geared 
business, with the junior loan sourced from other institutions at different costs. 
The loan model made no provision for the servicing of this capital and interest 
repayment 
In the case of the successful fuel retailers, the additional loans had favourable 
repayment terms. SFR3 obtained an access bond on his father's home 
(payable over twenty years) and serviced the loan repayments from his 
drawings not affecting the business cash flows. SFR4 and SFR5 used 
overdraft facilities from their banks to bridge the equity shortfall. In both these 
cases, the site performance far exceeded the budget provision and the loans 
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were serviced easily. Burn's (2001:336) view, in section 3.8. 4, that banks are 
all too aware of the failure statistics for business start-ups, explain why none of 
the retailers could obtain a direct bank loan. 
FFR4 operated as a taxi site and the loan was made through the taxi co-
operative - and not budgeted for in the EFG loan process. This contributed to 
the sites failure. In the case of FFR6 who used multiple sources of the equity 
financing (savings, pension (that took six months to be received) and loan) -
the business was on shaky grounds from inception. The interviews confirm 
that this retailer had the most traumatic time managing the finances of the 
business and the most significant contributor to the situation was the retailer's 
inability to make the equity contribution as was required, exacerbated by 
EFG's failure to ensure compliance. 
Only SFR1 used proceeds from the previous business to fund the equity 
requirement. The EFG loan agreement had no stipulation for the 10% sweat 
equity contribution, explaining the company's inability to act against defaulting 
retailers. The FRA expert view was that, according to information held at the 
Association, there were very few cases of successes in highly geared 
businesses. 
This confirms that the failed retailers used more multiple sources of equity 
financing (suggesting a measure of desperation with the hope that the equity 
debt would be funded through the business) to secure the business loan from 
EFG. This was not investigated in the due diligence process and was found to 
be a contributing factor to failure. 
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While Hall (1996:56), in section 3.7, questioned the value of investigating this 
complex relationship of banks and funding as it "provides no valuable insight". 
The case evidence points to the contrary 
6.2.3.3 WORKING CAPITAL 
Working capital is an intrinsic part of any business, particularly the fuel retail 
business as fuel products are cash on delivery products and the current 
regulation prohibits the sale of fuel products for credit. The following sections 
review the component of the working capital equation: 
WORKING CAPITAL PROVISION 
The EFG loan did make provision for a business purchase price and a working 
capital provision. Table 6.6 reflects the details of the working capital as 
obtained in the second interview process and from the due diligence records. 
All successful retailers were adequately provided for. In the case of FFR4, 
FFR6 and FFR7 the business was under capitalised forcing the failure. 
This finding is consistent with the report of Business Date (1996:7) in section 
3.8, where it was noted that, "inadequate initial capital will lead to failure". The 
entrepreneur's efforts are limited to a sole purpose - that is to raise additional 
funds. This was the experience of all the failed retailers. 
EFG had a blanket overdraft facility with ABSA bank, which was secured 
against a guarantee issued by the Re-insurance company. This facility 
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covered all the sites, compromising control on a site-by-site basis. The due 
diligence reports did project the working capital requirements going forward 
but all the individual case bank accounts reflected slippages. 
FUEL PRICE INCREASES 
The aggregate effect of the price adjustments for successful retailers on an 
annual basis was that an additional R9 574 of additional working capital was 
required. Failed retailers required an additional R8 574. While the EFG model 
did not provide for the increase and decrease in available cash flows due to 
monthly fuel price adjustments, the omission had no material effect on 
success and failure contrary to the FRA view that such impact was great. Price 
adjustments did cause stock losses and gains. 
OVERDRAFT LEVELS 
EFG held a view that price adjustments necessitated additional capital and 
hence a blanket overdraft facility was provided. Table 6.13 details the 




ORIGINAL LIMIT VERSUS CURRENT LEVELS 
SFR1 R160 000toR400 000 
SFR2 R 50 000 to R300 000 
SFR3 R100 000toR200 000 
SFR4 R000 000 to R700 000+ 
SFR5 R100 000toR150 000 
SFR6 R200 000 to R270 000 








R150 000toR300 000 
R200 000 to R700 000 
R150 000toR300 000 
R000 000 to R300 000 
R250 000 to R500 000 
R350 000 to R500 000 
R150 000toR700 000 
SFR8 R50 000 to R250 000 
Graph 6.9 shows that with the exception of SFR4, all the case respondents 
had a growing overdraft within a twelve-month trading period with no 
proportionate increase in sales indicating constant and accumulating losses. 
266 
GRAPH 6.9 
OVERDRAFT LEVELS FOR SUCCESSFUL RETAILERS 
Overdraft Analysis 
Successful Fuel Retailers 
B Original U Current \ 
With the exception of SFR4, all other successful retailers showed a gradual 
increase in the overdraft levels. The respective bank accounts moved 
backwards from the loan inception implying that the business is incurring costs 
that it cannot service and it has accumulated cost over runs and overspends in 
the overdraft. An overdraft is generally used in other sectors as a tax tool as 
the interest can be written of to tax. 
The average overdraft facility amongst the successful retailers was R94k when 
the loan was issued and this retarded to an average of R158k or R64k more 
than the base year resulting in a 68% increase in the overdraft amount. This 
corresponds with the findings from table 6.12 showing actual expenses 
exceeding the budgeted expenses. 
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GRAPH 6.10 
OVERDRAFT LEVELS FOR FAILED RETAILERS 
Overdraft Analysis 
FFR1 FFR2 FFR3 FFR4 FFR5 FFR6 FFR7 
Failed fuel retailers 
| • Original • Current 
Failed retailers have all increased their overdraft facilities where the most 
significant retardation was experienced by FFR2 where the levels 
disintegrated from R250 000 overdrawn to R700 000 overdrawn against no 
corresponding growth patterns. The original average amongst the failed 
dealers was R178 000 increasing to R471 000 - a net increase in overdraft of 
R293 000or164%. 
The inability to service the overdraft led to the failure of FFR2, FFR4, FFR5 
and FFR6. FFR1 admitted a 50% equity partner in August 2004 and FFR7 
restructured the overdraft facilities with a different financial institution. For the 
purposes of this research both FFR1 and FFR7 have been classified as 
failures, which are defined in this research as "inability to continue trading". 
The case study respondents were also asked to suggest reasons for the state 
of their bank accounts and whether they had a plan to reduce the overdraft 
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size to a more manageable level. While EFG provided a blanket facility of R10 
million for all sites and individual levels, they did allow the overdraft levels to 
float according to the expert EFG view, further highlighting the poor control 
measures in place. 
SFR1 responded that, "I do know that the overdraft has increased due to the 
growth of the business and I do not have an immediate plan to reduce it." The 
case information confirms this. SFR2 commented that the loan should be a 
"term loan not an overdraft facility - the overdraft has increased due to the 
high cost of servicing the loan repayment". SFR3 noted there was no problem 
with the level of the overdraft facility and while it is his intention to reduce it -
there is no immediate plan. SFR4 never had a facility but "took no salary and 
doubled up on the loan payments." 
SFR5 acknowledged that the "overdraft does not bother him - it is only there 
as an emergency - because of the fuel delivery and I prefer not to have the 
facility". SFR6 also acknowledges that the overdraft has increased but has no 
plan to restore it to the original level. SFR7 suggested that, "petrol price 
increases are hugely responsible for the increased limits". Finally, SFR8 
responded that the increase in the overdraft was expected, "I knew that 
something was happening - most of the cash is used to service the debt - in 
fact it came to a point where some operational expenses could not be paid -
and the site was not growing as expected". 
FFR1 noted that the "overdraft grows on you - I have lost all sense of why." 
FFR2 responded that she received almost daily drops of fuel and the bank 
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facility was inadequate. FFR3 and FFR4 responded that they had no clear 
plan to reduce the overdraft nor did they have a clear idea as to the reasons 
for the increase in the levels. FFR5 responded that he was not able to isolate 
the reasons for the increase in the overdraft - even with EFG assistance and 
that, "I had no plan to reduce the level - how do you do that?" 
All indications are that the failed retailers were under capitalised and did not 
manage their debt with any level of prudence. This phenomenon of insufficient 
capital and mismanagement of debt, was identified as the primary reasons for 
failure by Chell and Mason (1993:62), in section 3.8.4 
FFR6 also had no clear idea as to the reasons for the increase in the level of 
overdraft and noted that, "The overdraft nearly killed me. I really felt the 
pressure of the 500k facility and there was one day when the overdraft nearly 
killed me. I could not understand how it got to that level and my whole world 
caved in. I wrote a message to say that I was going to quit -commit suicide. I 
drove around town and could not find any comfort anywhere and felt 
overwhelmed by the fact that I gave my life, time and career for this business 
and felt destroyed". 
The experience of FFR6 has been described by Kuehl and Lambing 
(1994:552), in section 3.8, as a classic symptom of failure. Many small 
business owners are shocked to learn that a very profitable company may 
consistently be short of cash. The failure to fully grasp this concept leads to 
the loss of confidence. Frese (2000:91) in section 3.8 also noted that 
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emotional coping is necessary. There is no evidence from the case to show 
that the oil company offered any support for the exiting retailer. 
Although the franchise support mechanism comes into serious question in 
instances such as these, the expert oil company view was that they have 
dedicated business managers for each site. 
Overdraft is an efficient and legitimate tax tool when companies make profit. 
All cases in the EFG case profile incurred cumulative losses. The researcher's 
perception when interviewing the different retailers, especially those that failed 
was that the overdraft was like a mystical phenomenon that could not be 
understood. When the limits were exceeded, the bank would return the fuel 
debits resulting in a stressful situation for the retailer. 
The immediate result of the unpaid debit is that the oil company would place 
the retailer on hard cash - an absolute certainty that the retailer will fail, as he 
would not be able to pay for product in advance. This is done in spite of the 
fact that the oil company holds a guarantee for two drops of fuel. 
Notwithstanding the oil company's credit position and its legal rights to secure 
payment, the general approach to such situations is one of little tolerance in 
spite of the fact the potential for bad debt is low, so long as the outstanding 
amount does not exceed the guarantee value being held. The oil company 
also has to approve the incoming retailer on condition that all monies to the oil 
company must first be paid. 
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This is another practice that disadvantages small fuel retailers. The idea of 
prepayments for fuel drops against a guarantee being held is a double security 
measure. In other words, the small fuel retailer has to put up a R200 000 
guarantee as security in cases of default. This could be used as working 
capital. The wet stock issue is a significant component of the working capital 
equation and is discussed in the following section. 
WET STOCK MANAGEMENT 
FFR7 had during the discussion produced a "load size sheet" from the local 
depot. The sheet provides a number of permutations of petrol and diesel that 
the fuel retailer can order. These are the minimum orders and would generally 
place a cash flow strain on the retailer as he is forced to buy product that he 
would only sell over a number of days. There is a direct correlation between 
stock holding and the bank facility. 
The lower levels of stock would result in the bank overdraft being within limit. 
An imposition on the small fuel retailer is the oil company managing its 
transport economics at the cost of the small business. This imposition is one 
definite cause of failure in the fuel retail industry. Oil companies receive a 
service differential fee of 5 cents on every liter to manage the costs of 
transport. 
Government needs to audit this cost, as the perception is that oil companies 
are profiting from this at the expense of the small fuel retailer. The researcher 
obtained a delivery schedule sheet from the Engen Wentworth depot as most 
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of the EFG retailers drew product from this depot. The delivery instruction had 
a note that read as follows: 
"These are the only depot sizes that can be accommodated. All orders not 
conforming to these quantities will be cut! Please note that the super and 
unleaded petrol can be swapped with each other but not the diesel". 
This is a very restrictive ordering system for product that the retailer is paying 
for and is indeed an onerous requirement. In any ordinary retailing 
environment, the wholesaler should supply the product ordered for by the 
retailer. After all, the retailer is paying cash on delivery for the product against 
a guarantee held by the oil company, which according to the franchise 
agreement is the only source of supply. 
TABLE 6.14 





















Super = is high octane petrol, ULP is unleaded petrol and ADO is diesel 
Source: Wentworth depot delivery schedule, January 2005 
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The above table 6.14 confirms the size of the imposition. Retailers wanting to 
order 30 000I, perhaps due to their working capital constraints, would have to 
take a permutation of products that corresponds with the depots delivery 
instruction. The table does not accommodate site-specific needs but rather 
provides a general offer. This restriction would result in the retailer carrying 
extra product, at additional cost to the business simply to comply with the 
delivery imposition. 
If a retailer turns over 20 000 liters of super, 10 000 liters of unleaded and 
5 000 liters of diesel then the above stipulations would at best result in the 
retailer receiving a reduced delivery (18 000 super, 6 000 unleaded and 5 000 
diesel). This means that the retailer would have to re-order at levels when 
there is still stock underground to avoid running dry. The cost of the "holding" 
stock is unnecessary and has to be funded by the retailer. 
TABLE 6.15 































Super = is high octane petrol, ULP is unleaded petrol and ADO is diesel 
Source: Wentworth depot delivery schedule, January 2005 
The table 6.15 again reflects the restrictions with a larger delivery vehicle. In 
considering an order of 35 000 litres, retailers have to find the balance 
between what is required to meet sale projections against what can be 
supplied by the depot. Retailers turning over higher volumes of a particular 
product would have to carry additional product, generally diesel, for a longer 
period than required. This results in cash being sunk into product underground 
instead of being in the bank - and all this at the expense of the small business 
owner. 
TABLE 6.16 
























Super = is high octane petrol, ULP is unleaded petrol and ADO is diesel 
Source: Wentworth delivery schedule, January 2005 
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The 38 000 trailer size is generally used by higher pumping sites. Higher 
pumping sites would have shorter stock turnover cycles. This means that 
product is ordered and sold quicker. The delivery imposition also places undue 
financial strain on those larger sites that have product permutations and sales 
splits that is not accommodated in the delivery regime. A retailer turning over 
product every three days and requiring product in permutations of say 30 0001 
super, 10 000I unleaded and 10 000I diesel would have to make stock holding 
adjustments in a least efficient manner. 
Government's failure to properly regulate this imposition has allowed the 
industry to perpetuate such inefficient delivery constraints on the small retail 
fuel sector. The monthly price adjustments have far reaching impacts on 
"holding stock" resulting in monetary gains and losses. 
It can be concluded that there is a strong inverted correlation between the 
stock levels and the bank account. The oil company has a limited risk for non-
payment as they hold a guarantee for the two drops of fuel, a rental deposit 
and opportunity to recover outstanding funds from the new incoming dealer as 
evidenced from the legal documents reviewed. The delivery regime gives the 
supplier power in pursuit of greater profits for the oil company and is a 
contributory reason for failure. The FRA concurred that this was a common 
cause of cash flow difficulties and eventual failure. 
Both successful and failed retailers implemented a standardised wet stock 
control procedure. Stock was ordered and received and dips were taken to 
confirm that the correct quantities were received. There was also general 
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discomfort around the receipt of product - there is no scientific method to 
confirm that the quantity received was indeed correct and that the truck meter 
reading had to be accepted as the main checking mechanism. In all cases, the 
retailers accepted the integrity of the oil company delivery process. The 
researcher had the opportunity to witness the receipt of product during one of 
the observation sessions and was confident that the delivery process was 
acceptable, based on the pump and tank reconciliation done. 
Daily sales were reconciled to the pump and tank readings and both classes of 
retailers executed this daily. It was also a significant finding that fuel 
purchases, unlike any other known retail product, was purchased from the oil 
company and paid for without the retailer having physical sight of the product. 
In many cases, the retailer did not even know the colour of leaded petrol. 
When respondents were asked, "What was the average variance you 
accepted without query?" Their responses were as follows: 
TABLE 6.17 

















It was noted that all retailers did daily stock takes, reported the wet stock 
numbers to the oil company third party management for monitoring and 
managed the stock take process. The oil company adopted hands- on 
approach to wet stock management. With the exception of SFR2, all other 
retailers in both categories had no mechanism in place to verify that the 
dispensed quantity of fuel was indeed correct. SFR2, a trained chemical 
engineer used a calibrated container, developed by the University of Natal 
Engineering Division (where she was previously a student) to test the 
quantities dispensed on the pump to the rand value of the sale. 
SFR2 also commented that, "When I buy a box of chocolates you can see it. 
Fuel is not the same. I have a print out as everything is computerised- but 
cannot say for sure that it is correct". All respondents confirmed that some 
variances were expected when stock was received but the levels self adjusted 
over a few days. Generally, product was received in "sealed parcels" - a 
predetermined truck size adjusted for temperature. The oil company also 
controlled the deliveries from their head office in Cape Town and retailers 
were required to submit daily information on the extranet. 
This allowed the oil company to optimise their transport economics at the 
expense of the small fuel retailer. Fuel distribution depots received a "transport 
differential" included in the petrol price to fund their operating costs at depots. 
The delivery combinations as at November 2004 included the following from 
the Durban based refinery: 
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TABLE 6.18 
















The above also indicates the stock turnover rate. FFR1 turns the fuel stock 8 
times per month. In other words, the tanks had to be replenished eight times 
on average per month. The average purchase per week would therefore be: 
TABLE 6.19 
WEEKLY WET STOCK AVERAGES 
FFR1 37 500I 
FFR2 44 000I 
FFR3 40 000I 
FFR4 27 000I 
FFR5 42 500I 
FFR6 34 000I 
FFR7 36 000I 
SFR1 38 000 
SFR2 37 000 
SFR3 50 000 
SFR4 54 000 
SFR5 37 000 
SFR6 41 000 
SFR7 41 000 
SFR8 35 000 
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According to the 2004 Retail Margin study, the average stock turn per annum 
in 2004 was 76.88 versus 82.02 in 2003. This means that the average delivery 
size has increased to optimise the oil company transport costs. Depot 
optimization would mean fewer deliveries of increased quantities. The average 
of failed retailers per annum was 111 deliveries and the average of the 
successful retailers is 100 deliveries per annum. The average volume of the 
successful retailers was 350k while the failed sites averaged 345k liters. While 
the average throughput for both failed and successful sites are almost 
identical, the successful retailers received on average 11 drops lesser. An 
increased frequency of deliveries at the combinations not suitable for the 
retailer is an imposition that would lead to failure. 
SFR5 commented that the oil company should really become your partner in 
the area that matters - like providing affordable deliveries. This is a normal 
condition in other retail industries - "oil companies should not dictate and 
become your partners". 
In the case of SFR8 who sold more unleaded fuel than leaded fuel, the 
delivery combinations placed a constant cash flow burden, as "I have to get 
leaded petrol due to the order requirements". It is this kind of imposition that 
contributes to failure in the fuel retail business. 
The treatment of stock as consignment stock would resolve the depot 
economics challenges and simultaneously ease the cash flow burden on the 
small fuel retailer. The oil companies hold in all cases a "guarantee" for at 
least two drops of fuel. It appears that the retailer has no ability to control this 
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key function of the business. The retailer cannot order what is required and 
has to pay in advance although the oil company holds security for the 
equivalent of one drop of fuel. This appears one sided and has no commercial 
basis but is the dictate of the oil company that has resulted in the failure of 
many a fuel retailer in the past - a viewpoint shared by both the FRA and 
government expert views. 
SFR1 noted that fuel was occasionally delivered by meter-less vehicles and by 
routers (private transport companies). Oil companies are only required to 
calibrate these vehicles or to call for certificates annually - and felt that, "such 
calibrations should be done more than once a year". 
SFR1 also indicated that the oil company included in the rental recovery a 
compulsory third party wet stock management cost at a cost of R226.00 per 
month. The company conducted variance analysis from electronic information. 
This is only for the areas that the oil company could potential incur an 
environmental risk due to leaking tanks that in all cases belong to them. In 
cases of leaking tanks, as was the case with SFR3, the oil company 
compensates the retailer on condition that proper records have been 
maintained (in spite of the fact that daily wet stock control information is sent 
to the oil company appointed monitoring company). There was no provision for 
this cost in any of the budgeted cash flows and nor was it identified in the due 
diligence process. 
This requirement does not exist for the dispensing equipment or the pumps 
and if the pump under or over throws, the implications are significant for both 
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the motorist and the retailer. There is no regular testing of the dispensing 
equipment. SFR2 further commented that the training course would have been 
useful if retailers received a calibrated container to routinely verify that the 
quantities dispensed from the pumps corresponded with the rand value 
reading on the pump. FFR6 responded that "the only time I had proof is when 
the motorists comes in to complain. I can also say that I do not know how the 
overdraft got bigger and bigger". 
FFR7 recalled an incident when a customer queried, "How can you pump 70 
litres into a sixty five litre tank?" The retailers first response was that the 
attendant had manipulated the pump by starting to pump from say R20.00 
dispensed from the immediate previous motorist. This was not the case. The 
pump recording showed that it dispensed 70 litres but the physical quantity 
dispensed was only 65 litres - at the expense of the motorist. 
Could this be the answer to the mystical growing overdrafts? Being intrigued 
by this finding and phenomena, the researcher arranged to randomly test four 
retail sites and obtained an assised container and physically tested the 
unleaded fuel dispensation - the actual litres dispensed corresponded to the 
reading from the assised container. 
The fuel retailer operates from a very disadvantaged position. Orders can only 
reflect the transport economics of the oil industry, in spite of the transport 
delivery cost allowed for in the price build up of petrol. Government has a 
responsibility to investigate the size of the delivery costs and its adequacy to 
cover the transport. According to expert oil company view, deliveries to city 
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areas can only be done at night and early hours of the morning due to the fire 
safety regulation. It is highly improbable that the retailer would be physically 
present when such deliveries are made. There is no legislative testing of tanks 
and dispensing equipment - this is only required to be as sized once annually. 
The retailer cannot influence the stock loss or stock gain situation when prices 
are adjusted on a monthly basis. The monetary cost of this is not included in 
the margin study. 
Clearly, the whole system needs to be reviewed as the retailer is at a 
disadvantage to the oil company in terms of delivery sizes, delivery frequency, 
payment methodology and source of supply. This further illustrates the 
uniqueness of the fuel retail business. 
DRY STOCK MANAGEMENT 
Convenience shops are a recent addition to the fuel retail business in South 
Africa. The convenience industry is not as developed as compared to the 
United States but has been strategically developed in response to 
Governments recorded intention to deregulate the industry. The retail 
convenience business requires specialist retail skills as the product offer has 
increased from the marketing of one product - fuels at fixed prices - to the 
sales of over 2000 line items at varying prices. The convenience shops are in 
direct competition with the corner shops. Kolshorn and Tomecko's (1992:53-
56) views as noted in section 3.8.3, that skills must be complemented by other 
skills such as learning how to be pro-active is relevant here. 
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The franchisor support in this area is generally limited to increasing turnover 
and ability to service franchise fee charges. All case respondents reported that 
a percentage of turnover is charged as franchise fees. In all cases, the number 
is between 7%-10%. This means that a convenience shop turning over 
R100 000 would pay between R7 000 to R10 000 per month as franchise 
support fees. The management of dry stock is important in the fuel retail 
business - the 24-hour operation is again unique as compared to other retail 
sectors. When questioned about the frequency of stock takes, case study 
participants responded as follows: 
TABLE 6.20 
FREQUENCY OF DRY STOCK TAKES 
FFR1 Monthly 
FFR2 Monthly 





SFR1 Rotational/2 weeks 
SFR2 Rolling/1 week 
SFR3 Rolling/1 week 
SFR4 Rolling/1 week 
SFR5 Rolling/1 weekly 
SFR6 Rolling/1 weekly 
SFR7 Monthly 
SFR8 Rolling/2 weeks 
An analysis of the responses indicates a clear pattern. Failed retailers 
conducted stock takes less frequently than successful retailers. FFR1, FFR2, 
FFR4 and FFR5 only conducted stock takes on a monthly basis. FFR6 
conducted stock takes on a weekly basis and only FFR3 conducted rolling 
stock takes and was able to determine the shrinkage value every third day. 
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This is in stark contrast with the successful retailers. With the exception of the 
SFR7, who engaged a professional company to do monthly stock takes, all 
other successful retailers conducted stock takes on a rolling basis with stock 
value being determined on a weekly basis. SFR1 and SFR8 also conducted 
rolling stock takes with stock value being determined on a fortnightly basis. In 
all the instances, the stock take would indicate the size of shrinkage. When 


















Again, a clear trend is noticeable. Failed retailers yield a higher shrinkage 
average than their successful counterparts. The average in the successful 
group was 1.75% and the failure average was 3.0% compared to the EFG 
target of 2%. Assuming a R100 000 stock holding at any one point in time -
the successful retailer would have to replace the entire shop stock every 
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100k/1.75 or 57 months. The failed retailer would have to replace the entire 
shop stock every 33 months. 
The failed retailer would have to inject additional capital to cover the stock 
replacement every 33 months or provide for the loss as a cost of doing 
business. Hall (1995:14), in section 3.8, referred to this dilemma as 
"unpredictable emergencies". While shrinkage was more manageable or 
predictable by most of the successful retailers, it was clearly not predicted by 
most of the failed retailers. 
This is an important difference and is most certainly a differentiating criterion 
for success and failure. It can be concluded that the ability to manage 
shrinkage influences success and failure. Both groups of retailers operate the 
same point of sale and back office system, employ dedicated shop staff and 
retail the same items as the stock file and range is determined by the 
franchisor. Individual ability to manage shrinkage is obviously important. 
All case respondents also noted that inadequate training was provided for dry 
stock management. The emphasis on wet stock management was significantly 
higher than dry stock management. One possible reason was that the oil 
company was concerned about environmental responsibility, if fuel leaked 
from underground tanks. 
No effort or helping hand is extended on the dry stock management. Oil 
companies calculate their franchise fees on turnover before shrinkage. This is 
the most challenging area in the retail convenience business but receives little 
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oil company support. The oil company's emphasis is on merchandising and 
pricing - both functions dedicated to generating higher sales and thus higher 
franchise fees. 
In probing the level of support, various comments were received. FFR1 and 
FFR2 attributed their failure to the franchisor's inability to assist with dry stock 
management in spite of charging a franchise fee. FFR3 noted that stock 
management was a "heart and lung" function and it was not forthcoming from 
the franchisor. FFR4, FFR5 and FFR6 held similar views on the poor level of 
franchise support. 
SFR1 commented that, "the petrol company feels that because they are not 
supplying you with stock, as in the case of petrol -then it is not their baby." 
SFR2 concurred and responded that, "oil companies do not provide any 
support - even if one asks them they cannot provide any support. There is 
very poor communication. There should be an integrated loop between the oil 
companies across the brand and the dealers." In essence, SFR2 viewed the 
challenges in the convenience business as an "industry issue" and that greater 
benefit could be achieved if dealers and oil companies shared their views 
across the industry and not operate within an individualistic and brand 
dedicated style. 
While SFR3 commented that, the support was "non existent" SFR5 felt 
"helpless" and fielded a lone battle in a highly specialised retail business 
where franchisor support is integral to the success of the venture. SFR4 
insisted that, "they have absconded in their responsibility - they levy 8% in the 
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store and get a decent return on their investment - why don't they have a 
dedicated team like Pick and Pay does?" 
SFR7, unhappy about the level of franchisor support, employs the services of 
an external third party who conducts monthly stock takes and manages a 
hidden video camera. The camera is strategically located and the service 
provider restricts the visuals to the relevant sections and provides all the 
recordings where shrinkage was noted on one tape. The same company does 
the monthly stock take and charges R5 000 for the shrinkage management 
service. 
SFR8 responded that the franchisor provided no support and were "bullies -
they insist on what merchandise to carry - they are a law unto themselves - I 
had to buy sandwiches from Johannesburg some 600km away while I could 
have made them myself!" While SFR8 is clearly the kind of the goal and action 
- oriented entrepreneur that Borman and Motowidlo (1993:71-98) referred in to 
in section 3.5.2 - franchises by definition limit entrepreneurial flair. 
All case respondents adopted extreme care in managing high value stock 
items. Such items included red bull drinks, cigarettes, cell phone cards and 
oils. Such items were generally counted on a shift-by-shift basis. When asked 
about the physical mechanisms employed to manage shrinkage all 
respondents referred to the close circuit television and this was verified during 
the physical observation of the operations. The expert oil company view was 
that they contract dedicated suppliers to ensure a uniform standard. An 
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analysis of the stock turnover report revealed a number of items that been on 
the shelf for over six months. 
CASH MANAGEMENT 
Fuel retail businesses are generally cash businesses. All retailers do daily 
banking as was evident from the documentation analysis. In response to the 
question of shortages and the size of shortages acceptable per shift, the 


















The analysis of the above indicates that both failed and successful retailers 
implemented stringent control of cashiers. It is clear that the failure group did 
have a higher tolerance for cash shortages. SFR08 set R1.00 as a limit while 
FFR4 allowed R50.00 as the limit. The numbers are numerically insignificant 
but do reflect the degree of focus that each retail group applies. Successful 













































It was also found that failed retailers had further relaxed control in terms of 
debtors as they only had a 28% cover for accounts receivable as opposed to 
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successful retailers who had a 41% cover. In both instances, the security held 
was less than half the size of the monthly debtor's book and both operated in 
contravention of the law in terms of credit sales of petrol. 
The case study evidence lends support to Write's (1995:52-53) findings as 
noted in section 3.8.4. The extention of generous credit terms and the inability 
to ensure continuous collection is one of the reasons for cash flow problems 
and eventual failure. While the successful retailers managed the debtor's 
books, it appears that the failed retailers have not. 
The percentage of bad debts write-off was 15% for the failed category and 2% 
for the successful retailers. This finding supports Burn's view (1200:380), in 
section 3.8.4, that while credit sales is an intrinsic part of most businesses, it is 
the management of debt that more important. The cash flow strain for both 
categories was largely attributable to the cost of carrying accounts 
receivables. 
The working capital provision did not adequately provide for the debtors. The 
due diligence file does not have any debtor age analysis for most of the failed 
debtors. There was also no provision for monetary increases of debtors 
resulting from fuel price increases. This case finding is similar to the 
conclusions drawn by. Business Date (1996:7), in section 3.8.4, noting that an 
over extension of credit will lead to failure. 
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CASH FLOW MANAGEMENT 
The case participants were unanimous in their response that the oil company 
provides no support, in the form of professional advice and guidance when 
financial difficulties become evident. Their support structure is limited to 
protecting the oil company interest and the oil company representative is not 
trained to advise how to resolve financial setbacks. The expert oil company 
view agreed that this weakness does indeed exist. 
EFG did provide support and as the providers of the capital, it was in their 
interest to interrogate the reasons for cash flow crunches and to jointly 
develop a rectification plan with the retailer to prevent a failure. SFR1 
commented that, "all you get from the franchisor is what you can and what you 
cannot do and when you have a problem there is no one that could assist from 
the oil company". 
SFR2 accepts that while there is no such support at the moment, the oil 
company is in a unique position to facilitate the establishment of a highly 
skilled team that could step in and minimise the loss when the situation arises. 
SFR5 described the situation as a "cash flow fire" and that the oil company 
was not in a position to send a "rescue team" to identify what the reasons for 
the cash flow crunch are. SFR7 commented that, "the network manager is 
useless - I do not need him - he has no business experience and is paid to 
protect the oil company only. He only serves to police the retailer - and to ask, 
are the dip points locked?" The responses from failed retailers were similar. 
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While the oil company as the franchisor is expected to have such expertise -
in exchange for the franchise fees charged, a fair amount of responsibility can 
be placed on EFG and the fuel retailer. EFG attempted to assist by convening 
monthly management account meetings. This was a feeble attempt given the 
number of failures that were recorded. 
FFR7 noted that the franchisor had no system of management support, "there 
is no such support- they are not interested - if you fail they get someone else-
it benefits them to loose a retailer than to save a retailer". 
In order to test the efficacy of the credit meetings the researcher posed the 
questions in section E2.1 and E2.2, about management accounts and what 
remedial steps were taken once the management accounts were received. It 
was interesting to note that with the exception of FFR5, none of the case 
respondents maintained a cashbook. This is in spite of the fact that all fifteen 
case respondents had on line access to the bank accounts. 
SFR1 responded that he received management accounts when EFG did the 
accounts and they were generally inaccurate. He often asked the question: 
"where is the cash gone if the financials reflect a profit?" 
SFR2 noted that the financials "are received too late as the business is a 
dynamic one, and I do the analysis of the financials on my own." SFR4 
prepares the management accounts and "goes through the accounts and if 
something is wrong then we act immediately. Take an example of the phone 
account - if it is beyond the R6k mark then we investigate. The phone account 
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is generally higher in my area as there are no radio pads". SFR7 observed 
that, "most of the cash is absorbed by rent and wages". 
FFR1 spent time at EFG in advance of operating her own business and 
responded that, "the management accounts did not help prevent my situation." 
FFR2 maintained her own set of management accounts but to no avail. FFR5 
reported that he was perplexed about the growing overdraft and was unable to 
get a clear explanation from EFG, eventually resorting to employing a retired 
banker and paid him from his other business. FFR5 was forced to exit the 
business shortly after this. 
FFR6 also had regular management accounts prepared and felt comfortable to 
financially analyse the accounts on his own - "I did study the management 
accounts and also understood it. I would investigate why some items like 
packaging was always overstated. I then investigated and found out that the 
oil company wanted us to use branded plastic packets for the shop and that 
they were more expensive." 
FFR7 responded that he goes through the financials with the accountant, "I 
look at the stock levels - do you have more stock than you need? An example 
is the chemicals used in the car wash - if we used more chemicals and the 
sales were the same as last month, then I will investigate." 
EFG prepared the monthly management accounts and submitted the 
legislative returns. Monthly review meetings were called to correct deviances 
from the targeted budget. All respondents noted that the financials were 
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generally inaccurate and that most of the review time was spent on correcting 
cost allocations without substantive discussions on remedial efforts for cost 
over runs. It was clear from the respondent interviews that the EFG 
management accounts review process was a failure. A scrutiny of the minutes 
of these meetings confirmed the retailer views. This finding is further 
supported by Kiggundu (1988:169-243), who noted in section 3.8.3, that the 
lack of accounting and financial management skills affects success negatively. 
Both EFG and the oil company performed no independent audit, resulting in 
retailers using stock purchases to draw goods for personal use from the 
business. This was found to be applicable to most retailers. On random 
examination of bulk purchase invoices from Makro and Trade Centre, there 
were single unit items that were clearly not intended for resale. It was also 
found that none of the EFG retailers maintained a cashbook - cash flow 
management was a "mental process" as all the retailers had online access to 
their bank accounts 
Regarding cash flow management and the tools used for its management, as 
prompted in sections E2.6 and E2.7, none of the retailers had a system of 
cash flow management but managed the cash flows daily in a variety of ways. 
SFR1 stated that, "No, you cannot tame the animal. It is a bottomless hole. In 
2001, I had to take an advance on my home loan and the R160k that I put in 
was swallowed. In January 2004 I put in another R120k from my bond ..." I 
manage my cash flows by deferring expenses, do we need to buy uniforms 
now? Can we service the compressor next month?" 
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SFR2 noted, "retail is the only place you can learn cash flow management. 
This industry is a very unique industry - the difference is that the fuel retail 
industry is the only industry where you have to pay in advance - and I manage 
my cash flow continuously in my head". SFR6 stated that, "I could jump off a 
building to get the cash flow right." Finally, SFR8 reported that "I manage my 
cash flow by instinct...I worry all the time - will I have enough money?" And, 
she regretted not having a cash flow tool in place. 
FFR1 responded that cash flows are a function of how the oil company 
processes your order and that the retailer is at their mercy. FFR2 also 
indicated that she had no tool in place and neither did the oil company - "they 
just continued to make operating the business increasingly difficult with their 
unrealistic and non supportative views." 
FFR3 commented that, "Yes, cash flow is king - so it is treated royally. I check 
the inflows from the shop and forecourt and check what payouts have been 
made. I also looked at the card transactions and cheques issued. This will 
provide an idea of what is in the bank." 
FFR4 and FFR5 reported that they had no system of cash flow management. 
FFR6 responded that he did have a system of cash flow management, "I tried 
to interact with the oil company - if today there was debit due of R100k then I 
would make every effort to ensure that the funds are there. Actually, I spend 
most of my time "getting cash in." He then went on to explain a banking 
system instead of a cash flow management system. FFR7 reported that he 
"mentally work out" the cash flows and that he had no such system. 
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In conclusion, the failed retailers appeared more helpless and destitute than 
the successful retailers. The ability to manage cash flows is crucial in the fuel 
retail business. The general responses to the methodology used illustrates 
that the case respondents had no reliable tools of cash flow management and 
that the franchisor and EFG had both failed to provide such a tool. 
The general resentment towards the oil company training has its root in this 
failure. The fuel retail business generates substantial amounts of cash against 
low margins and the need to manage the cash flows to ensure that the cash is 
accumulated to meet the next payment for the fuel drop is crucial. The number 
of different approaches adopted by both categories of retailers indicates that a 
franchise system does not actually exist. Burn's (2001:39) inference in section 
3.8.3 that the influence of training cannot be proved is partially supported from 
the case evidence. 
Cash flow in the fuel retail business is a function of cash sales, credit sales, 
card sales, wet stock purchases, dry stock purchases, accounts receivable 
and stock turns. This can be illustrated as follows: 
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ILLUSTRATION 6.2 
CASH FLOW BUILD-UP 
A = cash sales 
B = credit sales 
C = card sales 
D = wet stock purchases 
E = dry stock purchases 
F = accounts receivable deposits 
I = cash in bank 
J = uncleared deposits 
K = uncleared payments 
L = increase or decrease in fuel prices 
FCF (Free Cash flow) = SUM (A + C + F +1 + J) - SUM (B + D + E+ K) 
The operational working capital is adequate when the FCF value is the same 
on both sides of the equation. The (I) number has to be at the level that 
finances the debtor purchases. In other words if the debtor purchases is 
R3 000 per day, and accounts are collected by the 15th of the following month 
the cash resources as indicated by I should reflect a total of 45 days x R3 000 
- that would theoretically will be the previous months debtor collections. The 
most common error made in the calculation of working capital is the use of 
thirty days as accounts receivable instead of 45 days as was evidenced from 
the due diligence report. 
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It was expected that the respondents would reflect a system that considered 
all these variables. Focusing on the cash collection daily without regard for the 
size and frequency of wet and dry stock purchases could result in a cash flow 
crunch, which would have no bearing on the profitability of the business but 
could result in business closure. 
Due to the size of the wet stock purchases (in excess of R100 000) at a time, 
the fuel drop size and quantity is crucial and once the initial amount has been 
set, higher fuel prices must be factored in. Most respondents took comfort in 
the fact that fuel price increases over time effects the working capital 
requirements - the L factor. The following indicates the impact of fuel price 
adjustments: 
Let us assume that a price increase of 5-30 cents range for a standard 30 000 
liter fuel (retail pump price of R4.00) with a three day stock turn and debtors 
book of R100 000 per month. The increased working capital required would 
be: 
ILLUSTRATION 6.3 
IMPACT OF FUEL PRICE ADJUSTMENT 
To finance Fuel purchase Fund debtors 
5 cents + R1 500 R1 250 
10 R3 000 R2 500 
15 R4 500 R2 750 
20 R6 000 R5 000 
25 R7 500 R6 250 
30 R9 000 R7 500 
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Clearly, price increases have a direct impact on working capital requirements. 
This has not been factored in the EFG loan model nor had it been included in 
the retail margin study by government. Illustration 6.3 excludes the 
implications that higher prices would have on bank charges - due to higher 
turnover with no incremental increase in gross margins. A five cents price 
increase would require an additional R1 500 working capital plus another 
R1 250 to fund the debtor. 
The quality of a franchisor offer should be reflected in the calibre of its 
franchisee. The fuel retail industry must take responsibility for the poor training 
in the financial mechanics of the business - otherwise what is the point of 
such a stringent recruiting system? 
It is advisable that a core competency profile be developed - this could be a 
research area for another researcher. The current practice of imposing a 
training regime in isolation of the business realities is detrimental to the 
retailer. The financial models should cover a working capital analysis sheet - a 
software driven that shows changes in the working capital. 
6.2.3.4 DUE DILIGENCE 
It is also acknowledged that failure amongst the historically disadvantaged 
retailers are higher than the average and most retailers do not get access to 
up-to-date financial and other important operating information required to 
make fact-based decisions before the sale is concluded. Gumede (2002) 
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noted that, "even in cases where such information has been availed, most of 
these investors have no way of verifying the information that they receive. It is 
the prerogative of every businessperson to conduct appropriate financial due 
diligence prior to buying a business but it does not always happen in this 
sector. 
Even when due diligence is conducted, it is performed by the would-be "Black 
economic funders" who have proved in more than one case not to have the 
interest of their clients at heart." This observation, although highly generalised 
does have some truth in it. Most of the EFG retailers, as was evident from the 
interviews did not conduct thorough due diligence investigations or have 
access to other funding options. 
Van Biljon's (2000:45) recommendation in section 3.6, was that, the first stage 
of the mentorship process was the due diligence. This would have ensured 
that the new retailer got involved from the outset and would perhaps have 
been in a better position to make a more informed decision about continuing 
with the venture. 
Gumede (2002:25), noted that the fundamental problems in the failure of most 
new comers seems to be primarily related to the lack of disclosure of financial 
and operating information to new buyers and valuation of service stations. He 
further suggested that failure was also due to poor financial training, operating 
and cost management, incorrect valuations and too high gearing. 
301 
The question of gearing is a generalization as all EFG retailers were highly 
geared (90% plus) and half of those highly geared retailers operated 
successful businesses. Notwithstanding this, Kirby and Watson (2003:68), in 
section 3.8.4, proved that lowly geared business have a greater chance of 
success. 
All the case respondents indicated that they did not participate in the due 
diligence study and did not understand the valuation methodology. This lack of 
understanding the fundamentals around the industry numbers was found to be 
a hazard in its own right. It would be incumbent on government, because of its 
regulatory processes, to take a keener interest in this aspect of the fuel retail 
business due to the knock on effect it has on fuel retail margins. 
Almost all the respondents did not understand the due diligence findings and 
had not had sight of it. This oversight by EFG and more importantly the 
retailers resulted in a poor appreciation of budget control and risk 
management. It was evident from the respondents that total reliance was 
placed on EFGs ability to conduct the due diligence. This could be seen from 
retailer's shallow appreciation of the dynamics around credit control and 
funding of the debtors book. In the case of FFR6, every effort was made to 
increase the fuel turnover by obtaining more account customers without the 
necessary security. This placed an increased burden on the already cash 
strapped business eventually leading to the collapse of the business. If the 
retailer were involved in the due diligence process a better appreciation of the 
debtor economics would have resulted in a different approach. 
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It was shocking to discover the hands-off approach of the oil company in the 
due diligence process. The allegation by SFR7 that, "oil companies do not 
care - there are thousands of other persons waiting to buy the franchise" can 
be substantiated by this approach. This view is also shared by Burns 
(2001:373), in theoretical section 3.8, who concludes that, "this never-ending 
cycle of start -up and exit is part of the dynamic of small business sector as 
small business responds to the ever changing marketing place." Franchised 
outlets are perceived to be safer small business options in spite of the 
previous holders of the business having failed. 
The oil company as the franchisor, had significant institutional memory of the 
site operations and expertise to add value to the due diligence approach. Their 
failure to play a more meaningful role in supporting the incoming retailer with 
certified information and advice has contributed to failure. While the expert oil 
company view that the responsibility for the due diligence accuracy is the 
purchasers is accepted, the FRA places the burden at the door of the oil 
major. 
6.2.4 GENERAL MANAGEMENT 
This section covers the general management issues of training and support, 
cost management and concluding statements from the case study 
respondents. 
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6.2.4.1 FRANCHISOR SUPPORT AND TRAINING 
Chapter four recorded the various advantages and disadvantages of 
franchising. While the case respondent's views as franchisees varied, there 
was general consensus on most issues. 
Franchisor support emerged as a critical issue amongst the case respondents. 
All fifteen respondents were critical of the level of franchisor support. SFR1 felt 
that, "you only take instructions from them, they tell you what to do and how to 
do it - the oil company is only interested in looking after their own interest -
they are there to make money." While this statement may be an opinion, it is 
perhaps not in keeping with the partnership approach that oil company's 
advocate. In the ultimate analysis, the franchisor should have developed 
systems of support in exchange for a franchise fee. 
It is obvious that the fuel retailer may not be fully aware that most franchises 
operate within such parameters. Franchises leave little room for personal style 
and approach - it has to be a tolerance of routine and the imposition of 
operating standards. 
This requirement of tolerance was noted by Hall (1995:109) and Johnson 
(1999:72) as reported in the theoretical section 2.10.5. There is little scope for 
Innovation, and conformity to systems and processes is the hallmark of a good 
franchising system. There is little opportunity for the entrepreneur to impose 
his own personality on the business. While SFR1 is clearly aggrieved by the 
situation, compliance is key for franchise success. 
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SFR2 noted that support did exist on the shop side as the oil company had a 
specialist company that assists with the convenience shop. The support on the 
fuel side was, however, non-existent. This was also the opinion of SFR3 who 
responded that "truthfully, there is no support. Oil companies only provide 
training in HSE and merchandising". Again, the idea of support may be varied 
and misunderstood. Health and safety are critical drivers in the South African 
fuel retail business due to it's vulnerability to violent robberies. 
SFR4 responded that, "I think that it is what you put in - there is no support 
from the oil company". The approach of self-investment in time and effort 
within the operating requirements appears to be the approach that should be 
adopted. In this way, no false expectation is created. 
Stanworth and David (1998:56) views, as reported in section 2.10.5, correlates 
with SFR4 response that the majority of young franchises are typically small 
scale entrepreneurial ventures facing considerable challenges. Siropolis 
(1994:144-145), in the same section 2.10.5, described this as a myth. 
Franchisees like FFR4 are not free to run their businesses as they see fit and 
entrepreneur influence is limited. Franchisor's do not want their franchisees to 
improve the way they do business - they often look for persons who 
understand their systems but do not have any wish to improve them. 
SFR6 noted that, "the oil company failed to support new site openings, they 
have an unsympathetic approach when projected volumes are not met". SFR7 
was also very critical of the poor level of support and referred to the oil 
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companies as bullies - "they have treated some of my friends very badly, if 
you return a debit then you are placed on hard cash, they are like policemen, 
they know that if they get you out of the site that there are thousands of other 
persons waiting to replace you". Here again, a fair degree of subjectivity may 
have crept in - although there are many examples of the heavy-handed 
manner in which oil companies treat small fuel retailers. 
In comparing the benefits and disadvantages of franchising, as noted in 
chapter four, the fuel retail business appeared to be different to other 
franchised businesses in South Africa. 
Fuel retail businesses, unlike other established franchises did not have the 
same ability to raise debt finance. While the fuel retail sites, like other 
franchises operated within franchise specific accounting systems and controls, 
most banks viewed retail service stations as high-risk businesses. 
Franchisors generally identify potential market areas and establish franchise 
outlets in those geographic locations to exploit the market opportunities. In 
most cases, the franchisor secures an order and uses the franchisee to 
execute the supply function. Consumers are familiar with particular brands of 
products and services and become brand loyal. A privately owned business 
has an absolute disadvantage in this respect. Both successful and failed fuel 
retailers viewed the brand strength as one of the main advantages of 
operating within a franchise. 
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However, as would be noted in the following sections the franchisee training 
programme was not adequate. The success of franchised business is largely 
dependant on the skills transfer that takes pace between the franchisor and its 
franchisees. The franchisor provides training and start-up support to ease 
entry into the business. Such support mechanisms does not exist in the fuel 
retail sector. The case study findings differed with Stanworth and Purdy 
(1998:56) view as reported in section 2.10.2. The idea that franchising 
removes a good part of the risk associated with starting of a new business by 
providing support and advice during the most trying parts of setting up and 
operating a small business , was found to be untrue. 
As apposed to a one-man business whose ability is limited in influencing 
suppliers and other service providers, a franchisee is part of a larger network 
of businesses. Franchisees can therefore demand and secure a wider range 
of services at lower prices. This could include health care, pension funds, 
saving facilities and insurance. This aspect of franchise benefits was found to 
be lacking in the fuel retail sector. Fuel retail sites operated as stand alone 
units thus reducing the positive benefits that accrue from joint functioning. 
It was also expected that the experience and expertise of the franchisor would 
benefit the individual fuel retailers in times of hardship. This is a critical 
contributory factor for the success of franchise businesses. The new 
entrepreneur acquires the valuable expertise and experience of the franchisor. 
A proven franchise may eliminate many problems that are associated with the 
initial start-up by assisting with site selection, planning, staff training, opening 
of business and its consequent smooth running. Prospective franchisees are 
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thus able to start a business with little or no previous training in a given 
industry. 
While this advantage was highlighted by Johnson (1999:72) and Rodkin 
(1996:16-18) in section 2.10.4, as a distinct advantage of operating a 
franchised business, it would appear that the Oil company as franchisor had 
no role in start-up process of the new retailer. The case study evidence also 
shows that transfer of skill and the business experience of the franchisor was 
limited in all instances. 
Fuel retailers had limited benefit from such expertise and generally operated 
as sole operators. Franchisees need support and guidance in their business 
activities. The franchisor generally provides this kind of expertise to the 
franchisee on a regular basis. The franchisor did not participate in the 
operational aspects of the businesses. 
In the case of FFR05, the retailer incurred substantial monetary losses, as he 
did not know that the fuel prices on the card machine must be changed 
monthly for price adjustments. This resulted in the retailer charging the old 
reduced fuel prices. In chapter 2, section 2.10.1 Kuehl and Lambing 
(1994:110) defined a franchise as an arrangement by which the "process" 
could be used by the franchisee. There was no evidence of such a process 
from the case information and this failure contributed to the demise of FFR05. 
The disadvantage of franchising was more pronounced in the fuel retail sector. 
All retailers complained of the loss of independence. While conformity to the 
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franchisor's system is critical if consistency amongst franchisees is to be 
maintained, the 24-hour trading hours and rigorous imposition of national 
franchise standards in all trading areas lead to the loss of income. The control 
exercised by the franchisor to regulate the provision of a service to the 
motorist leaves little opportunity for the retailer to impose his own personality 
on the business. While this is acceptable within a franchised format, the idea 
of mentoring as indicated in theoretical section 3.6 was not amongst the 
interventions employed by the oil company. 
The capital costs for the construction of a fuel retail outlet can be exorbitant. 
While the franchisor has a stepped fee structure in exchange for not providing 
any guarantees of success for the franchisee, the initial payment for the 
business is based on future cash flows that may never be realised. 
While the non-profit initial fee and slow-to-accumulate royalties may in the 
short term place a financial constraint on the franchisor, there was no 
evidence from the case information to suggest that the franchisor was at a 
financial disadvantage. This was due to the license fee and turnover fee 
charged. 
The turnover fee was based on total sales and prejudices the franchisee as a 
significant composition of total sales comprised low margin items like pre paid 
phone cards. 
The basic assumption that the franchisor has all the requisite expertise and 
skills became a serious point of contention, especially amongst failed retailers. 
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This finding correlates with Johnsons (199:72) finding as reported in section 
2.10.5. The failure to fulfill the expectations of the franchisee led to a strained 
relationship between the failed retailers and the oil company. 
The nature of a franchise relationship places a call for equal effort by both 
parties. The franchisee's expectation of huge profitability in the initial stages 
was not realised and it was found that this strained the franchisor and 
franchisee relationship. 
The benefits of franchising in the fuel retail sector seems limited to the oil 
company using franchised insignia and visuals, have dedicated franchised 
support systems and brand specific advertising. While Kuehl and Lambing's 
(1994:113) ideas in section 2.10.4 on the benefits of instant recognition were 
supported by the case study evidence, Cross's views (1994:2-4) that the 
benefit of association is only valid if the franchisor's responsibilities are met 
found greater support. 
The expert oil company view conceded that the level of support is not at the 
desired level,nor was there any feedback or recognition, the importance of 
which was highlighted by Rauch and Frese (2000:15), in the theoretical 
section 3.5.2. and reinforced by Burns (1998:28), in the same section, who 
referred to money as a "badge of achievement". There is no evidence from the 
case information showing that any kind of feedback mechanism existed. 
An analysis of previous occupation and training was done to get a clearer 
perspective on the need and level of training. 
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6.2.4.2 OCCUPATIONAL EXPERIENCE AND TRAINING 
None of the case respondents in the failed category had any retail industry 
experience while four of the eight retailers (50%) in the successful category 
did. SFR1, SFR4, SFR6 and SFR7 had previous fuel retail experience. SFR1 
responded that previous experience in the industry is critical as, "you would 
know the tricks of the trade" and SFR4 also agreed. This was reinforced by 
SFR7 who commented that, "experience would be a great help - the problem 
is that you would get no help when on site." SFR7 responded that previous 
experience is essential and recommended a kind of "buddy system" for those 
who do not have previous experience. 
Is previous experience then a criterion for success? While, Bates (1990:4) 
noted in section 3.8.1 that previous knowledge of operating a business 
lowered the degree of uncertainty about costs, the value of previous 
experience, based on the case findings remains an open question. The fuel 
retail business operates as a franchise and a solid training programme should 
be sufficient preparation for operating a fuel retail site. Hisrich and Peters 
(1998:72) views, recorded in section 3.8.1, that industry experience is of 



















Admin clerk (3 years) 
Municipal Accountant(2 years) 
Insurance Manager (12 years) 
Accounts Executive/Teacher (0.7 years) 
Motor mechanic (16 years) 
Municipal manager (5 years) 
Fuel retailer (3 years) 
Corporate Engineer (2 years) 
Teacher (17 years) 
Retail Business manager (1 year) 
Teacher (15 years) 
Fuel retailer (2 years) 
Fuel retailer (5 years) 
Medical technologist (6 years) 
It would also appear that, from the occupational backgrounds reported, that 
fuel retailers in the EFG case study have been accepted from varied 
backgrounds ranging from the public service to education. SFR2 holds a 
doctoral degree in chemical engineering while FFR5 had a technical 
qualification in motor mechanical repairs. FFR2, FFR6 and FFR7 had 
commerce and administration degrees but failed nevertheless. Is education 
then a criterion for success? It would appear not. 
However, the case study findings collabourate the research results of Glas 
(1996:389-423), as noted in section 3.5.1, who stated that entrepreneurs came 
from various social groups like former employees of middle and large state 
owned enterprises and former top and middle managers. Only SFR6 and 
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SFR7 had same industry backgrounds, all other retailers came from 
government and management positions. 
There is also partial support from the case study findings for Maslows, Hertzog 
and Vrooms theories of motivation - displaced managers and young 
professionals, if unfulfilled in their current jobs will seek to be self-employed for 
greater fulfillment. 
The length of time spent in previous occupations and age varied amongst the 
case respondents. It would appear that the length of time spent in the previous 
occupation would be on par to the time that the same persons would spend on 
the fuel retail site. Nothing conclusive can be derived from the previous 
occupation, age, experience or educational qualifications, although successful 
retailers did have more experience. 
Three out of the eight successful retailers had previous fuel retail experience. 
SFR1, SFR6 and SFR7 had all spent an average of 3 years as fuel retailers. 
The same three retailers have an additional of six, twenty- four and eight years 
experience respectively. In the case of SFR6, previous experiences had 
definitely come to the fore. The fuel outlet he operated had failed to achieve 
the projected volumes and the retailer made every effort to develop the non-
fuel income of the business in spite of the oil company's reservation whether it 
would succeed. The site now does the highest non-fuel income in the network. 
Given the repetitive nature of operations in the retail fuel business - a longer 
training period and on site training is the best preparation for success as 
opposed to previous experience. 
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The case evidence from the successful retailers lends support to Bruederl, 
Presisendoerfer and Ziegler's (1992:227-242) finding, noted in section 3.8.2. 
The is no significant difference of failure and success between those 
entrepreneurs who had business specific experiences and those who had 
none. 
6.2.4.3 TRAINING AS ADEQUATE PREPARATION 
The case respondents had unanimously agreed that the oil company training 
is not adequate preparation to operate a fuel retail outlet and suggested, 
based on their on-site experience, a number of items for inclusion when 
developing a master training curriculum. The Oil Company stipulates that 
training is a prerequisite before one-steps unto a site, giving the impression 
that the course is adequate preparation. 
Admittedly, training always has value - but incomplete and superficial training 
could lead to serious consequences. Worst still, is the creation of false 
confidence in the minds of new fuel retailers about their level of competence 
when leaving the training courses. 
There was complete agreement as to the contents of the course. The course 
included basic financial control, stock management, health, safety, and the 
point of sale system. There was also complete agreement that the course is 
grossly insufficient for the purposes it may have been designed for. No person 
coming out of the oil company-training course is in a position to operate a fuel 
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retail outlet. In the case of FFR5, who did not attend the course at all, the 
disadvantage is exponentially increased. The largest portion of his losses was 
incurred in the first six months of operations - thus making recovery 
impossible. The course would have alerted him to the potential pitfalls but not 
provided responsive and preventative strategies. 
SFR2 also noted that the training could have been condensed to one week 
and that it did not elucidate the real problems in terms of running the site - it 
was a "snap shot" while SFR4 acknowledged that the course "did help a bit". 
SFR5 had arranged to spend two months on site prior to taking over the 
operations on his own and found this to be immensely useful. 
SFR7 commented that she thought that the course was, "a worthless waste of 
money - you cannot in two weeks train a person to operate a service station". 
She was also of the view that she could employ an accountant to prepare 
financials and budgets and that there should not be an official training course 
- there should only be a one month on site training programme. 
SFR7 concluded that she had learnt "a lot on her feet". Previous experience or 
proper training was key in managing this unique business of controls -
otherwise it would be a "shock to the system." She further described her on 
site experience and training as doing a "living MBA". 
The oil company disqualified FFR1 due to the lack of "experience". She then 
worked for about six months at EFG managing some of the site operations 
and was later allowed to operate her own business. The problem with this 
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approach was that the training was not site specific - her hands-on experience 
was obtained from the fuel only operation and the business she eventually 
purchased included a convenience shop, bakery and fast food. FFR2 
commented that the training did not prepare her for the "ordeal on site". 
FFR3 regrets not having the opportunity to physically train on site and notes 
that, "experience is the best teacher - I should have been given the 
opportunity to physically run the site for three months before taking over the 
operations". He further describes the oil company training course as a "crash 
course" and not adequate. Very little on the course was about the inherent 
risks in the business. 
FFR4 responded that the course was too "theoretical" and that practical 
experience or on site training was important.FFR6 noted that, "oil companies" 
are removed from the people who are providing a "life to their image" - the 
courses are conducted by people who have never run sites - and there was 
even a person who failed at his site and was now providing training to others. 
Professional and site specific training is key to success and clearly, the current 
training is inadequate, especially when persons from varied non-retail 
backgrounds enter this specialised industry. The suggestion by Ellermen 
(1999:25-35), in section 3.8.3, about the need for the entrepreneur to learn 
those skills specific to his or her environment has found relevance in the case 
study findings 
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All case respondents noted that no "refresher" courses were offered. There 
was no "evaluation" of the course training on site once the retailers took 
ownership of their respective outlets. SFR1 recommended that the "mechanics 
of the entire business should be explained - from the layout of stock to the 
disruption of supplies" Attention should be paid to the life blood of the fuel 
retail business which operates on a cash basis - "there was nothing in the 
course that crystallised this for us". 
SFR2 commented that training is not sufficient "in the way that it is handled" -
this is exasperated by the failure of the oil company to do on the job 
evaluation. I do not have a commercial background but I have learnt, by being 
on site that "cash is king." SFR4 made an observation that training should 
provide a preview into the life of a retailer - "if you think that you can keep 
office hours then you are doomed to failure." His point is that such an 
observation cannot be appreciated from a theoretical class room training 
course. 
SFR6 also commented that he was requested by the oil company to provide 
computer point of sale training to a new dealer only to discover that the 
prospective dealer was completely computer illiterate. Due to the intensity and 
backlash towards the perceived poor training, the researcher set out to 
investigate the training offer independently from the case respondents and 
spoke to the national sales manager of the oil company, Mr. Keith Pinn, who 
facilitated access to the course materials. After studying the training manuals 
and speaking to the training manager, the researcher concurred with the case 
respondents. The actual training programme is attached as APPENDIX 10. 
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Firstly, the course structure is too general and does not deal with site-specific 
requirements as these differ from business to business. The rationale for 
hosting such courses in Cape Town, at excessive costs, is not clear - one 
would expect that the training should be more provincially accessible allowing 
retailers to obtain "refresher training" and be able to contact the training center 
in the first few months of operations with on site difficulties. The training 
schedule is scanty at best, light on key financial matters and is clearly not 
adequate for on site operations. 
The course does not allow for any evaluation - except for trainees comments 
on the course presentation on the last day of the training. It appears that these 
comments - from apprentice and naive retailers who are uninformed about the 
practical operating realities of the business - may be taken as an 
endorsement of a quality training offer. 
Clearly, an evaluation of the training benefits, months after the course can only 
be qualified if those trained retailers are re-interviewed - even telephonically. 
Such a review mechanism does not exist and is the fundamental cause of 
failure in the learning process. Retailers are also required to pay about 
R40 000 for the training. It would seem that training is seen as an "income 
stream" rather than a preparation programme for small business. 
Government allows oil companies to own one site per province for training and 
even relaxes the vertical integration provision, allowing the oil company to take 
both the retail and wholesale profits. The rationale was to facilitate the training 
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process. This was not evident in the oil company approach. It is even more 
concerning to note that there is no training facility in the biggest market of 
Gauteng that serves about one third of the total network. The world banks 
advisor, Ellermen (1999:25-35) pointed out in section 3.8.3, that the 
"entrepreneur should learn those skills that allow him or her to deal with the 
the environment on his or her own terms". The case results show no evidence 
of such support. 
The training does not have an external affiliation with professional training 
bodies established in South Africa, like the Sector Education Training 
Authorities. A retailer can be on site for twenty years - and never see the 
inside of a training room after the initial orientation. There is no site-specific 
training. 
The financial curriculum was of specific interest to the researcher. The 
researcher was concerned to note the diminished status that financial 
management occupied on the wider training curriculum. As clearly shown on 
APPENDIX 10, the crux of financial management is non-existent. Cash flow 
planning, cash management tools, business valuation models, pricing theory, 
the development and execution of a shrinkage policy, working capital provision 
and case study of failed retailers are not covered. There is sufficient reason to 
believe that the training offer is almost a "public relations course to highlight 
the branding and visual standards" of the franchise. The fact that all EFG 
retailers - trained within the last four years - did not know the difference 
between a gross profit percentage and mark up percentage is an indictment 
on the oil company training course. Kiggundu (1988:169-243), noted in section 
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3.8.2, that the of accounting and financial management skills affects success 
negatively - the case analysis has produced strong evidence to support this 
view. 
The conclusion is that the training course is the first link in the spiral towards 
failure, and could become the first area of remedial care, due to the following 
reasons: 
• The course work is too general and not site specific. Consider the 
anecdotal information from the pilot case - the business generated 
electricity card sales for R1.2 million per month. Controls and processes 
was not covered, contributing to the retailers inability to manage the cash 
flows and eventually losing half the sales to the local Spar due to this; 
• The oil company and the incoming retailer places heavy reliance on the 
outgoing retailer to affect a handover. The oil company staff arrives only 
on the actual day of takeover to verify the stock numbers. This is a 
fundamental flaw in the process. Such a critical responsibility cannot be 
placed in the hands of someone eager to exit the system and in most 
cases is disgruntled with the oil company. This handover should form 
part of the practical demonstration of training; 
• The training sequence is incorrect. New incoming dealers may not 
understand or conceive in their minds what a dip stick or mechanical 
meter maybe. The course makes the assumption that the incoming 
retailer is familiar with site operations. A site orientation programme in 
advance of attending the formal courses would have been more 
appropriate; 
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• The business is fundamentally about controls, stock management and 
cash management. Less than 50% of the course is dedicated to this; 
• The case respondents confirm that they have left the course with a false 
sense of understanding the fundamentals of the business - only to 
realise on site that the challenges are beyond their immediate ability or 
stage of development; 
• Practical training is an important prerequisite - an apprentice type 
approach accompanied by a "buddy" system. The best option would be 
to shadow the existing retailer for at least two months on a full time basis. 
The oil company has complete legal control over this; 
• The training materials must include the tools of the trade - MS Excel 
models for cash flow management, a calibrated container to measure 
that pumps are not overthrowing or under throwing and administrative 
and financial ability to accurately compile and submit legislative returns; 
• Valuation of business and due diligence checklist should again be part of 
the hard core training curriculum; and 
• No refresher training and evaluation of training is done. The development 
of human skills is the highest form of empowerment. A review and 
evaluation mechanism would go a long way to ensuring sustainable 
training. 
It was also interesting to note that a trained retailer within one brand (say 
Caltex) would have to under go training again if the retailer switches to another 
brand (say Engen). The retailer would have to go through the whole process of 
training although the operational requirements are identical. Is this perhaps a 
captive market for generating income? Market intelligence and company policy 
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would require different points of emphasis but not complete orientation about 
operating a retail fuel site. A teacher trained as an educator should be able to 
teach at any school. 
The case respondent's views and the evaluation of the training curriculum 
justify a review of the training courses offered. This is pivotal to the research 
question on the reasons for success and failure. It could be argued that the 
case included a fair split between failure and success and that both failed and 
successful retailers attended the same training courses. 
Whilst this may be valid, the case responses clearly illustrate that successful 
retailers had more experience than failed retailers and that it was their 
previous experience that provided a solid grounding for success. Franchises 
should by definition have developed systems and processes. 
Kuehl and Lambing (1994:110) in section 2.10.1, referred to a "process" 
capable of supporting the new business entrant. It would appear that such a 
process did not exist and contributed to the failure. 
The quality of training was found to be a critical success factor. There should 
also be a good basis for support and compliance. 
A good example to substantiate this is the pilot case examined in the early 
stages of this research work. The fuel retailer operating a fuel outlet at the in 
the greater Johannesburg area was visited by a senior member of the oil 
company retail team who was on his way to a meeting in Johannesburg. It was 
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in the morning after a long weekend and the shop stock levels were low and 
needed replenishment. The Retail manager insisted that the retailer's lease be 
terminated and that the site should be vacated. The reasons given were 
"breach of operating standards - stock levels not adequate." 
The oil company then put in an offer to buy the site and bidded the lowest 
price amongst eight offers received by EFG. The difference between the oil 
company offer and the highest offer received was R1.5 million. The oil 
company also informed the evicted retailer that they would frustrate any new 
purchaser, as the oil company has to approve the incoming retailer! The 
researcher has found that this kind of dealing is prevalent in the retail business 
and is one of the causes of failure. There is no organ of state that currently 
deals with any of this. The costs of litigation for the small fuel retailer against a 
giant oil company has on many occasions resulted in the retailers surrendering 
to the impositions of the oil company. The industry needs an ombudsman or 
arbitrator. 
The sentiments from successful retailers are in tandem with the views 
expressed by the unsuccessful retailers. FFR1 considered the oil company as 
"not principled and inflexible" when it came to problem solving. FFR2 was 
evicted from the site for inability to pay for wet stock and remains very 
aggrieved by the methodology adopted by the oil company. There was no 
room for discussion or arbitration. The retailer has approached the courts for 
relief and the matter is still in the judicial process - some two years later. 
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FFR3 noted that, "I feel that I speak for all fuel retailers when I say that oil 
companies do not have an assistance plan." FFR5 responded that "they were 
never there when I took over the site. They have done everything wrong - all 
the other way around. I was put into the site with no help from the oil company. 
So, from day 1, I was on a wrong footing and doomed for failure." 
The most scathing responses came from FFR6 who commented that, "I am 
sorry to say that oil companies do not know how to run a business - many 
things that take place on site - they are informed by the retailer. Their 
employees or network managers cannot add value - as they will talk about 
ordinary things like cleanliness - not substantive business issues - value in 
them visiting the site is minimal". 
The views of a proven franchise concept, by Trutko, Trutko and Kostecka 
(1993:7) as noted in section 2.10.5, can be supported from the case evidence. 
They noted that the development of a business from a proven concept through 
to the sale of its first franchise is typically a long expensive and risky process 
for the franchisor. All indications are that a functional business model did not 
exist as indicated by FFR6. Johnson's (1999:72) view that the ultimate risk lies 
with the small business owner is supported by all the case participants. 
Lastly, FFR7 noted that, "If I say very badly- it will be an understatement. Oil 
companies do not care about their retailers." The researcher acknowledged 
that failed retailers who have exited their businesses must feel aggrieved 
about their experiences and that some of their comments are laden with 
emotion and sensitivity. Notwithstanding this, the aggregation of the comments 
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leads one to believe that the price regulated status has led to some degree of 
exploitation and that there is an urgent need for government to implement a 
basis of fair play. 
The relationship management or a retailer's failure to manage that relationship 
is one of the contributing factors of failure. The retailer would be under fear of 
the lease being terminated and this approach undermines the spirit of the 
national objectives of growing and developing small business. Clearly, the oil 
company support is inadequate. The oil company representative should be 
trained and skilled to administer financial and operational care when the first 
sign of difficulty manifests, to prevent the ultimate failure that so often results, 
due to the inability of the retailer and the oil company to read the symptoms in 
good time. Both the categories of failed and successful sites have 
sophisticated computer systems and the information is available online to the 
oil companies. 
Johnson's views (1999:72) as recorded in section 2.10.4, that it is in the 
interest of the franchisor that the franchisee is successful is questionable given 
the case study evidence,, particularly the views of FFR7. There was no 
evidence to show that a remedial plan or management support as 
interventions in times of crisis ever existed. This is in spite of the good 
accounting systems and controls - failed retailers received little support. 
This inability is the root cause of failure. The oil company is in a position to 
verify the value that a fuel outlet is being traded for, have historical sales and 
performance details, they conduct interviews and pre-qualification tests and is 
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therefore in a very strong position to ensure that the right jockey is on the 
horse, that the retailer is properly trained and that an oversight role that is 
normally expected from the franchisor is indeed in place. Sadly, the support 
from inception to on site functioning is poor resulting in "forced failures" of 
many small businesses. There was no evidence from the study to support the 
finding of the British Franchise Association (1996:2), as noted in section 
2.10.1, that the probability of success is five times greater as a franchisee than 
a comparable start up venture. 
6.2.4.4 GROSS PROFIT AND MARK UP 
The researcher sought to identify differences in approach and acumen in the 
area of financial management and hoped that this would further contribute to 
the search for the differentiating factors for success and failure. It was clear in 
the interview process that the case respondents were helpless when it came 
to understanding and rectifying a spiraling over draft. It was also clear that the 
oil company training on the mechanics of financial understanding was not 
acceptable for the size and scope of the fuel retail business. The training 
schedule attached as APPENDIX 10, did not address this issue. 
In attempting to address the research questions, the researcher conducted a 
test to qualify the retailer's appreciation and understanding of financial 
management by posing a simple question as noted in section E2.1, what is the 
difference between a GP and a markup? The responses were unexpected. 
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None of the case respondents was able to clearly differentiate between a 
gross profit percentage and a mark up. SFR3, SFR5, SFR7 and SFR8 
responded that "I do not know," while SFR1 attempted to explain what a gross 
profit is - "gross profit is actual profit less expenses" and partially explained 
that a mark up is, "by how much you increase the cost price". 
SFR2 suggested that the "gross profit is what you are selling versus the cost 
price - the gross profit must reflect the percentage." While this is partially 
correct, it does not clearly differentiate between the two and is reflective of a 
poor understanding of such a basic yet fundamental concept in the fuel 
retailing business. SFR4 suggested that a mark up is what you are marking up 
while a gross profit is what you are making - if mark up is 40% then gross 
profit percentage is 33%". SFR6 responded that a "the gross profit is what 
your cost was versus the retail price - and a margin is when you add on say 
10% to the cost". 
FFR1, FFR2, FFR6, FFR7 responded that they did not know while FFR3 
suggested that "a gross profit is a percentage expressed on what profit you 
have made from the item. The mark up is what you have put the price up by to 
make the selling price." While the response is partially correct, the latter could 
also read as the gross profit is what you have put the price up by to make the 
selling price. 
FFR4 suggested that "gross profit percentage is expressed in terms of the 
selling price and the mark up is the percentage by which you mark up the 
product to get the selling price." While the first part of the response is concise, 
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the latter part could also mean that the gross profit is the percentage by which 
you mark up the product to get the selling price. 
Finally, FFR5 responded that, "markup - take the cost and add a percentage -
and the gross profit is without taking expenses." 
The researcher's perception when posing the question to all case respondents 
was that they were doubtful about the clear difference, although they checked 
pricing on a daily basis. The system would reflect that a gross profit 
percentage is the profit over the selling price expressed as a percentage and 
the markup is the same profit over the cost price expressed as a percentage. 
A loose grip on this is reflective of poor training and shallow understanding. 
The loose grip and shallow understanding is more prominent amongst the 
failed fuel retailers. It can therefore be concluded that failure to apply the 
different costing would result in lower margin income and could lead to failure. 
After all, the EFG loan model was based on future cash flows earned from 
targeted gross profit amounts. 
The researcher had the opportunity to address the national retail dealer 
council in June 2004 and requested support and input for the research work 
from the leading retailers. One retailer got up and responded that there was no 
need to research such a question - "the only reason why retailers fail is due to 
the lack of understanding of what a mark up is - they under price and 
therefore do not make profits." The retailer was partially correct in his analysis. 
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The following table 6.26 reflects the actual gross profit and mark up 
percentages achieved in each of the case respondent sites. 
TABLE 6.26 





























Shop, forecourt, bakery 
Shop, forecourt, bakery, Food 
Shop, forecourt, bakery 
Shop, forecourt, Fast food 
Shop and forecourt 
Shop, forecourt, bakery 
Shop, forecourt, fast food 
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TABLE 6.27 
GROSS PROFIT AND MARK UP PERCENTAGE 











































The above table provides very significant data analysis. The gross profit 
margins and mark up is fixed by government regulation for petrol sales. The 
only variable gross profit and mark up percentages would come from non-fuel 
sales. The target gross profit for the convenience shop is 28%, the fast food 
about 57% and the bakery 60%. Only FFR5 operated a shop and forecourt 
only in the failed category whilst all successful retailers operated forecourt and 
shop only with the exception of SFR2 and SFR6. It is important to recall at this 
time that almost all retailers had difficulty in clearly differentiating between 
gross profit and mark up percentages. The ratios were calculated as 
suggested by Bragg (2002), Fisher (1993), and Ramsden (1998). 
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Firstly, the successful category mostly offered a forecourt and shop service 
only. The failure category had a more complete offer. This required greater 
management and a broader skills base. While it cannot be concluded that 
successful retailers had a "bread and butter" offer compared to the failed 
retailers - the differences is indeed very noticeable. Is it possible that the 
successful category were successful due to the limited offer and thus 
remained focused while some of their failed counterparts had too many 
income streams to manage, allowing inefficiency to creep in? 
For the category that only offered shop and forecourt, the average gross profit 
and mark up percentages were 7.96 and 8.64 in the failed category 
respectively. The successful category yielded 9.39 average gross profit 
percentage and 10.41 average mark-up percentage. This is a significant 
finding. The successful retailers generated a higher average gross profit and 
mark up than their failed counterparts. 
The failed retailers who offered forecourt, shop and bakery yielded an average 
gross profit percentage of 9.98 and mark up of 12.12 percent. None of the 
successful retailers operated a forecourt, shop and bakery combination. 
The average gross profit and mark up for the full offer was 8.76 and 9.59 
respectively in the failed category. In the successful category, the same 
averages were 12.30 and 14.02 percent. Again, this clearly illustrates that a 
significant difference was found in both categories. The total average in both 
categories differed significantly. The successful category yielded an average 
of 10.24 and 11.41 gross profit and mark up percent overall while the failed 
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category yielded a 9.09 and 10.00 percent overall. Incorrect gross profit and 
mark up was found to be a significant contributor to success and failure and 
was not covered in detail in the training course. The targeted gross profits 
were not achieved in the failed category. Halls (1995:20) findings, as reflected 
in section 3.8.4, also showed that failures had a lower gross profit margin than 
successful enterprises. 
Both the oil company expert view and the fuel retailer Association highlighted 
that non- achievement of the targeted gross profits leads to under pricing and 
the consequent inability to generate sufficient free cash flow. While the 
averages in both table 6.20 and 6.21 indicate that successful retailers 
generated higher gross profits, within the targeted range, it is important to 
statistically confirm this due to the small number of respondents considered. 
6.2.4.4.1 STATISTICAL TESTING FOR MEAN DIFFERENCES 
A parametric test is a test that requires a parametric assumption, such as 
normality while a nonparametric test does not rely on parametric assumptions 
like normality. As the assumptions of normality might not hold in the current 
study, both the parametric and nonparametric statistics are calculated. 
According to Salkind (2000:173) in doing parametric tests, a t-test is a 
commonly used test to measure the significance of the difference between two 
means of two independent, unrelated groups. The "Independence" is defined 
by Rosnow and Rosenthal (1999:331-334) when the results in one group are 
not influenced by the results in the other group. Theoretically, the t-test can be 
used even if the sample sizes are very small as is the case in this research. 
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In considering the non-parametric test, the Mann-Whitney provides a test of 
the difference between two independent groups. It does not specifically test for 
differences between two means as does the t-test, but it tests the null 
hypothesis that the two groups sampled from populations with identical 
distributions. Clayton (1985: 289) mentions that this is a popular alternative to 
the t-test. 
Test statistics such as the t-test, are used to tell the researcher about the true 
state of the population - through making inferences from the sample. Field 
(2005:31) explains that there are two possibilities in the real world (in the 
actual population): 
• there is, in reality, an effect in the population, or 
• there is no effect in the population 
Field (2005:31) further explains that although there is no way of knowing 
which is the true situation, one can decide which of the two is more likely by 
looking at the test statistic and the associated probability (p-value). 
A general decision rule is set against which the p-value is evaluated when 
deciding whether the observed effect in the sample is also true for the 
population. For the current study this is 0.05. Therefore all p-values less than 
0.05 are considered as an indication of an effect in the population. 




T- TEST FOR THE DIFFERENCES IN INDEPENDENT GROUPS 
t p-value 
Gross profit % -1.08 0.301 
Mark up % -0.78 0.449 
It would appear that none of the differences is statistically significant. The lack 
of significant results is not surprising as it is well known that significance is a 
function of sample size. The Mann-Whitney U test results for differences 
between success and failure groups confirm the t-test results. Statistical 
significance is, however, a function of sample size, with the smaller groups it is 
understandable that few statistical significant results would be found. The 
practical effect sizes needs to be computed as indicated below. 
TABLE 6.29 
MANN-WHITNEY U TEST FOR DIFFERENCES IN INDEPENDENT 
GROUPS: 
SUCCESSFUL VERSUS FAILED RETAILERS 
Mann-Whitney U Z p-value 
Gross profit % W. -1.27 0.203 
Mark up % 20. -0.92 0.355 
In situations like this (small sample sizes) one should compute effect sizes. In 
the Table 25 below the t statistic was converted to Cohen's d using the 
formula: d= 2t(df) as suggested by Rosnow & Rosenthal (1996:331-340). 
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TABLE 6.30 
COHEN'S d FORMULA 
Gross profit % 




















Cohen (1988:25) hesitantly defined effect sizes as "small, d = .2," "medium, d 
= .5," and "large, d = .8", stating that, "there is a certain risk inherent in offering 
conventional operational definitions for those terms for use in power analysis 
in as diverse a field of inquiry as behavioral science" 
Although Gross profit % and Mark up % was not significant, Cohen's d shows 
medium effects for all three these variables. The differences between failure 
and success are still important from a practical point of view. Therefore, failed 
retailers had lower gross profits and mark ups than successful retailers. The 
researcher then proceeded to question various aspects of controls and 
administration. 
6.2.4.5 CONTROLS AND ADMINISTRATION 
This section was included in the interview to identify whether variances existed 
in style and approach to controls. When asked about the frequency of price 
and gross profit checks, the following responses were received: 
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TABLE 6.31 






FR6 Three times a week 
FFR7 Daily 
SFR1 When new stock is received 
SFR2 Weekly 
SFR3 Daily at random 
SFR4 When new stock is received 
SFR5 When stock is received 
SFR6 Daily 
SFR7 When stock is received 
SFR8 Weekly 
It is evident from the above that the failed retailers did not conduct price 
checks as frequently as their successful colleagues did. In the previous 
section, it was also found that there was a very loose appreciation of the 
concepts of gross profit and margins. It can conclude that successful retailers 
are successful due to their diligent approach to retail convenience marketing. 
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TABLE 6.32 








SFR1 When new stock is received 
SFR2 Daily 
SFR3 Daily 
SFR4 When new stock is received 
SFR5 When stock is received 
SFR6 Daily 
SFR7 Computer is set to default margin 
SFR8 Weekly 
Again, a clear pattern was found. Successful retailers conducted gross profit 
checks more frequently than their failed counterparts did. 
TABLE 6.33 




FFR4 Not too often 












Failed retailer's analysed stock information like stock turnover, top sellers, 
dead stock and fast moving stock less frequently than the successful retailers. 
The analysis of dry stock is an important aspect of retail convenience 
marketing. In order to get a clearer grip on the issue of stock management, the 
researcher queried the existence of the stock control system of two difficult 
stock items, namely newspapers and empty bottles. 
TABLE 6.34 
CONTROL SYSTEM FOR NEWSPAPERS AND EMPTY BOTTLES 
FFR1 No such system 
FFR2 Never occurred to me 
FFR3 I do not have this in place 
FFR4 No reconciliation done 
FFR5 Yes, I had a system 
FRR6 No control in place 
FFR7 Yes, I have a system 
SFR1 I have such a system 
SFR2 Counted on every shift 
SFR3 I have this on my stock file 
SFR4 Balanced on every shift 
SFR5 No I have no system 
SFR6 Probably the only area I do not check 
SFR7 Count as they come in 
SFR8 Yes, I do have a control system 
The comments illustrate that successful retailers have a stronger grip of stock 
control for empty bottles and newspapers than failed retailers. In some cases 
like in FFR3 - no such system existed. These are high shrinkage areas and no 
or little control provides an indication of a "hands off' approach. 
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6.2.4.6 FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT TOOLS 
When asked what financial management tools were used the following 
responses were noted: 
TABLE 6.35 
FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT TOOLS IN PLACE 
FFR1 No management tool 
FFR2 Used EFG budget system 
FFR3 No such tools used 
FFR4 Combination of budget/actual 
FFR5 EFG system 
FFR6 No tools 
FFR7 No tools 
SFR1 Used EFG system 
SFR2 I used Pastel accounting 
SFR3 I used Excel spreadsheets 
SFR4 Budget and expense analysis 
SFR5 No tools used 
SFR6 No such tools 
SFR7 Used EFG system 
SFR8 No such tools 
The EFG system was an online risk management tool. Retailers were required 
to complete the daily cash and cheque payouts together with daily fuel and 
non-fuel sales. The system only enhanced recording efficiency and had no in 
built intelligence to flag incorrect gross profits or markups. Both failed and 
successful retailers depended heavily on the EFG system as a safety net for 
managing cash flows and the failed dealers experienced the bitter 
consequences of relying on an electronic system with little understanding of 
the theoretical dynamics. It was interesting to note that only SFR2 used an 
external system - the pastel accounting package. It is inconceivable that the 
oil company did not develop a cash management software programme as part 
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of the training course. This would have assisted greatly in identifying in 
advance the potential of cash flow crunches that would eventually lead to 
failure. 
The point of sale and the back office system are stock and cash management 
tools. A useful embellishment would have been the linking of such data to a 
daily management account. FFR3 noted that there is a need for some type of 
management tool and the general findings support this view. 
6.2.4.7 LEGISLATIVE RETURNS 
This question was asked to test the retailer's spectrum of understanding the 
regulatory aspects of the business. 
VALUE ADDED TAX RETURNS 
With the exception of SFR2, no other retailer processed VAT returns on their 
own. While it is accepted that this is generally an accountant's responsibility, 
the "hands off approach is definitely a disadvantage from a management 
perspective. It is also accepted that the VAT completion issue was not a 
differentiating factor for success and failure. In order to test the researcher's 
suspicion that an accountant would not accurately complete the return 
consistently, the VAT returns for SFR3 was recalculated and found that a 
variance existed in the calculations as the accountant did not factor - and 
would not have known - that the retailer had increased the sub lease rental 
recovery to the workshop tenant. 
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The illustration is included to substantiate the researcher's view that while 
retailers adopted "a hands-off" approach to the administration of the VAT 
return a careful scrutiny was required due to the cash flow implication of value 
added tax. 
When questioned about other legislative returns like unemployment insurance 
and skills levy similar responses were received. It is not the researcher's 
suggestion that such administration should burden the retailer but that the 
retailer should fully understand the mechanics and methodology to prevent 
future litigation and to have a better grip on business issues. 
6.2.4.8 STAFF DEPLOYMENT 
In the course of the interviews, the question of staff deployment was raised. 
The 2004 Retail Margin Study indicated that 50% of the gross profit of fuel 
outlets was applied to wages. This was an area of "efficiency" that warranted 
scrutiny. The responses were noted as follows: 
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TABLE 6.36 
















The successful retailer had employed on average (excluding temporary 
workers) 32 people while the failed retailers had employed 27 people. This is 
in spite of the fact that, on average, failed retailers had a wider convenience 
offer that their successful colleagues. The actual non-fuel averages reflected 
the same position - failed retailers employed on average 9 people for the non-
fuel business while successful retailers employed 15 persons. Nothing 
intelligent could be gathered from the information. While it was empirically 
confirmed by Philips and Kirchoff (1989:65-74) in section 3.8.1, that the 
survival rate was greater in companies that had an absolute growth in 
employees, the case evidence doe not support this finding. 
6.2.4.9 WAGES AND SALES MATCHED 
All retailers operated different shifts. When asked whether the wage cost 
pattern reflected the sales pattern, the following responses were received: 
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TABLE 6.37 
WAGES AND SALES MATCHED 
FFR1 No, did not arrange 
FFR2 Never occurred to me 
FFR3 No, high all the time 
FFR4 No 
FFR5 Never thought of this 
FFR6 Yes, patterns match 
FFR7 No, carry higher wages 
SFR1 Yes, patterns match 
SFR2 Wages, match sales 
SFR3 Hour by hour sales match wages 
SFR4 wages matches sales 
SFR5 Wages match sales 
SFR6 Do not match 
SFR7 Matches 
SFR8 Do not know, never did the 
analysis 
The responses from the two categories were very clear. Successful retailers 
organised shifts to service the business needs during peak times and slack 
times and therefore the wage pattern is correlated with the sales pattern. With 
the exception of SFR5 and SFR8, all successful retailers were matched. The 
non-fuel staff allocation for SFR6 was twice that of the fuel allocation. This is 
proportionate to the gross profit earned in both areas. 
Failed dealers were poorly matched and in the cases of FF2 and FFR5, this 
"never occurred to them." We can safely conclude that the management of 
manpower costs is a differentiating factor for success and failure. The Monthly 
management accounts would not reflect this but a monthly operational plan 
would detail this. 
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6.2.4.10 TIME SPENT ON ADMINISTRATION 
TABLE 6.38 
















It is evident from the above table 6.38 that failed dealers spent on average 
more time on administration than their successful counter parts. One 
conclusion that can be drawn is that successful retailers delegate the 
administration (not an income producing activity but a serious control issue) or 
have dedicated persons managing the administration. The general responses 
confirmed the on site observations of the researcher. 
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6.2.4.11 TIME SPENT ON BUSINESS DEVELOPMENT 
TABLE 6.39 
















It is clear that successful retailers spend more time on business development 
than their failed counterparts. This is a significant difference between failed 
and successful retailers. Lastly, all respondents commented that they did keep 
abreast of business issues in the industry and the most common sources of 
information was from the internet, newspapers, Fuel Retailers Association and 
rarely from the oil company representatives. It was also interesting to note that 
none of the respondents commented on government's new licensing 
dispensation or the looming deregulation of the industry. It was observed that 
successful retailers and their staff appeared enthused in their daily working 
environment. 
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6.3 EXOGENOUS FACTORS 
In examining the causes for failure and success, the exogenous variables 
were also examined. SFR1 commented that reason for his success is "me". 
SFR2 responded that, "there were no extra ordinary happenings but my 
success can be attributed to hard work and controls." SFR4 commented that, 
"I do everything - nothing is too menial and I control everything." SFR6 
responded that, "rigorous staff selection is key to success." SFR7 concurred 
with the SFR6 viewpoint and noted, "one thing is the staff- this is a huge part 
of the success. I have incentives in place for the top three attendants who 
served most cars. I have also taken out life policies for my staff- they have the 
power to ruin your business and are actually a bigger threat than the oil 
companies". 
SFR8 also responded that, "I am successful because of my investment in time 
- I have the drive to succeed and want to make it work- this required serious 
sacrifices on my part, including a salary sacrifice for at least eight months". 
FFR1 stated that, "I was undercapitalised from the beginning - and thus one 
thing led to another hence my failure". FFR2 apportioned direct responsibility 
to the, "dysfunctional support of the oil company - they engineered my failure 
as they wanted me out". 
FFR3 responded that, "there were two reasons for my failure. Firstly, the lack 
of support from the oil company, as I was ignorant and helpless in some 
situations and did not know what to do. Then there is the financial difficulty or 
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a lack of working capital and I could not see how I was getting into difficulty. I 
feel if I knew the reasons then I could react and if I had more knowledge then I 
would have been successful". FFR4 was very definitive and stated that, 
"inability to manage cash was the reason for failure". 
FFR5 noted that, "I was not making money -the gearing was wrong-when I 
look at it now - if one goes into business with the wrong gearing - you are 
bound to fail. Things got worst and I put in R500k into the business over the 
R400k that I borrowed." 
The experience of FFR5 has been described by Cressy and Olofsson 
(1997:87-96), in section 3.8.3, who noted that the main reason for increased 
capital requirements is the rising expenses, leading to more debt and higher 
gearing. 
This also proves the postulation proposed by Kirby and Watson (2003:68), in 
section 3.8.4, who found that there is a correlation between insufficient capital 
on one hand and the susceptibility to crisis on the other hand. The case study 
evidence fully supports this finding. 
FFR6 held a similar view, "The financial provision was correct and although I 
was refinanced twice through the oil company, the operational budget was still 
not correct and EFG/Oil company budgets were wrong twice". 
Lastly, FFR7 responded that although he failed initially due to insufficient 
awareness and training about what to expect in the retail business, it is clear 
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that successful retailers achieved their respective positions of success due to 
their hard work and perseverance, extraordinary sacrifice and careful staff 
selection and appointment. 
Failed retailers on the other hand blamed their failures on poor financial 
planning, inadequate training from the oil company, inability to manage cash 
flows and insufficient orientation about the retail fuel businesses. While the 
reasons for success and failure in the EFG case example vary from individual 
to individual, a common underlying theme surfaces in the case of successful 
retailers. They are obviously more vigilant about their financial prowess whilst 
failed retailers sink into cash flow quick sand with no ability to wriggle out 
again. Training and financial astuteness appear to be the two levers that could 
steer one out of financial difficulty or provide a pre-emptive basis to guard 
against the cash flow crunch. The other exogenous variables examined were: 
RETAIL MARGIN ADJUSTMENTS 
Government approves a margin adjustment annually based on the outcome of 
the retail margin study. This increase was not factored into the EFG model and 
represents an additional source of income to the retailers. 
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TABLE 6.40 























Source: Department of Minerals and Energy, Website January 2004 
GRAPH 6.11 
RETAIL MARGIN INCREASES 
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Margin adjustments from 2000-2004 
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The graph 6.11 illustrates that retail margin increases have been steadily 
increasing since March 2000. EFG retailers had access to higher margins 
compared to the original provision in the budget. The projected income was 
calculated on a margin income of 25.2 cents per litre. The actual margin in 
2004 was 39.8 cents a litre or an accumulative increase of 14 cents. This is 
equivalent to R14 000 for every 100k litres. While the margins are adjusted to 
accommodate for increased operating costs, the net effect is that higher 
volume sites benefit more from retail margin increases. 
EFFECTS OF MONTHLY FUEL PRICE ADJUSTMENTS 
The EFG case respondents did indicate that the monthly price adjustments 
affected their cash flow planning and was a contributor to their failure. The 
failed and successful retailers were subjected to the same price movements 
and this was not found to be a strong differentiating factor for success and 
failure. The following illustration does, however, indicate that the monthly price 
movements did affect profitability. Neither the EFG budget projections nor the 
government margin study incorporated these monthly movements. 
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TABLE 6.41 
EFFECT OF MONTHLY FUEL PRICE ADJUSTMENTS 
Date of price change 
07 March 2001 
01 April 2001 
02 May 2001 
06 June 2001 
04 July 2001 
01 August 2001 
05 September 2001 
03 October 2001 
07 November 2001 
05 December 2001 
02 January 2002 
















































































Source: Fuel price changes Central Energy Fund, Website January 2005 
Almost all EFG retailers complained that the higher fuel prices had a negative 
effect on working capital provision. The average delivery size of 41 625 litres 
was used to calculate the actual affect on working capital for successful fuel 
retailers and an average of 37 825 litres for failed fuel retailers. The aggregate 
annual effect of price adjustment for petrol 93 was 23 cents. The highest price 
increase was 18 cents and the highest decrease was twenty-six cents. The 
successful retailers had to provide for an additional R7 493 for the highest 
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price increase as recorded in April 2001. The failed fuel retailers 
corresponding increase in working capital needs were recorded as R6 711. 
The range of increases and decreases expressed as a percentage of 
turnovers was found to be insignificant. The affect of the price increase on 
every R1 000 000 of turnover for successful retailers was 0.75% while the 
same average for failed retailers was 0.67%. In other words, the price 
adjustments did not place a serious enough burden on the cash flows that it 
could be isolated as a significant differentiating factor for success or failure. 
The aggregate affect of the price adjustments for successful retailers on an 
annual basis was that an additional R9 574 of additional working capital was 
required. Failed retailers required an additional R8 574. While the EFG model 
did not provide for the increase and decrease in available cash flows due to 
monthly fuel price adjustments, the omission had no material effect on 
success and failure. 
The price adjustments did have a very significant impact on profitability. While 
the aggregate affect on working capital was only R9 574 and R8 574 for 
successful and failed retailers respectively, the affect on profitability was found 
to be significant. Fuel price adjustments, especially when prices fell, resulted 
in stock losses for the retailer. 
This stock loss was quantified using the margin of 32.6 cents as at February 
2002. Based on the average stock levels, successful fuel retailers incurred an 
average loss of R13 569 and failed retailers an average loss of R12 154. This 
stock loss was not accommodated in the EFG loan model and represents a 
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significant loss of profit. The official government margin study also failed to 
provide for this stock loss thus rendering the margin study inaccurate. This 
also means that the retailer had to endure the loss with no ability to manage 
the situation due to the delivery regime in place by the oil majors. 
FLUCTUATIONS OF INTEREST RATES 
This was incorporated in the analysis due to the high level of gearing. 
Retailers had no control of the rates in spite of the interest and capital holiday 
that EFG negotiated in the first year. 
GRAPH 6.12 
MONEY MARKET INTEREST RATES 
Let us also consider the interest rate affect for the case respondents. Firstly, 
both successful and failed retailers have been subjected to the same interest 
rate movements. The following graph provides details on interest rate 
movements. 
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MONEY MARKET INTEREST RATES: 1999/2004 
(monthly averages) 
Jan-99 May-00 Sep-01 Jan-03 May-04 
Sep-99 Jan-01 May-02 Sep-03 
\^\ JI BAR Repo - — 12m NCD — Prime 
Source: Bureau of economic analysis, University of Stellenbosch, February 
2005 
The graph illustrated a uniform movement of the prime rate with the 
Johannesburg Interbank Exchange rate and the Reserve banks repo rates. 
The period under review for the case study respondents was between 
February 2001 and February 2002. The graph 6.12 illustrates that interest 
rates were steady between the months of May 2000 to September 2001. 
There was a general increase from January 2002 till July 2002 with interest 
rates flattening between October 2002 and April 2003. 
Most case respondents entered the loan redemption cycle in the first half of 
2002. The structure of the loan provided for a capital moratorium in the first 
year where only the interests costs were serviced. This moratorium only 
provided a cash flow relief and the EFG retailers were required to service the 
full cost of the debt with capital and interest after the first year. The graph also 
illustrates an increase of about 400 basis points of the prime rate in the first six 
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months of the loan period and then settling at a higher level for the next six 
months. 
While the rates did fall sharply between April 2003 and October 2003, the 
audited financial statements used in the case study analysis was for year 
ended 2002. None of the retailers responded that the increasing interest rates 
were responsible for their failure. None of the EFG retailers responded that the 
rising interest rates were a reason for failure and again the increasing rates 
were applicable to both the failed retailers and successful retailers. The 
interest rates, although significant in considering the factors of differentiation 
between success and failure, cannot be isolated as the key reason for failure. 
The case evidence almost reflects the views of Kuehl and Lambing (1994:20), 
recorded in section 3.9.2, who described as a myth that business failures are 
high during recessions and low during good economic times. Their assertions 
that most small business failures is not caused by the economy, a bad product 
or high interest rates but by owners incompetence and lack of experience has 
found some support from the case evidence. 
6.4 GENERAL 
The researcher included in the questionnaire a last opportunity for the 
respondent to provide a "philosophical" overview of their experience in the 
retail fuel business. The intention was to gain insight into their deeper thoughts 
and feelings - and to move the discussion away from the hard - core finance 
and managerial issues. This was an attempt to get their "last thoughts" on the 
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FFR3 No, I am very frustrated 
FFR4 I did until relationship strained 
FFR5 No, made no money 
FFR6 No, I never did 
FFR7 Yes 
SFR1 Yes 
SFR2 Not anymore, thrill is gone 
SFR3 Yes 
SFR4 Yes, I do very much 
SFR5 Yes 
SFR6 Yes, although not enough time 
SFR7 Yes 
SFR8 Yes, now I do 
It was clear from the responses that failed retailers did not enjoy their 
businesses as much as the successful retailers did. The researcher also 
enquired whether the case respondents would exit if the opportunity to expand 
to another site were present or whether they would expand to another site and 
why such a decision was not taken. SFR1 stated that "I am in no hurry to 
move on - I am chasing the financial shadow - need to make up all I put into 
the business and would definitely want to expand to another site". 
SFR2 responded that, "I need to sort out some personal things and will then 
look for a smaller business - so I would exit and am not looking to expand to 
another site". SFR3 stated that, "If a better opportunity came by then I would 
consider exiting but would like to expand to another site - and would not want 
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to leave right now as I enjoy the business" SFR4 had a similar position, "No, I 
enjoy the business and do not want to exit - rather I would like to expand to 
another site". 
SFR5 noted that his business was really taking off and that he has no plans for 
exiting. SFR6 stated that, "I cannot exit as I have financial commitments but 
would like to expand to a low income area". SFR7 stated that she was 
comfortable at the moment and had no reason to contemplate an exit and 
would most certainly want to expand to another site. Finally SFR8 stated that 
there was no need to exit at the moment and would like to expand to another 
site. 
Failed retailers held a distinctive different view to the question of exiting the 
business and expansion. Firstly, FFR1 indicated that she was trying to exit for 
the last year and is held hostage by the oil company and does not want to 
have anything to do with fuel retail outlets. The oil company has not approved 
the different potential buyers she had presented to them. 
FFR2 observed that, "the oil company worked me out on trivial reasons as 
they wanted to appoint someone else to operate the site - I do not want to 
expand to another site and would have preferred to exit on my own terms and 
conditions and not be forced out". FFR3 stated that, "I would exit if I had the 
opportunity - but I cannot as I need to pay off my car and house. I would 
consider expanding to another site". FFR4 responded that, "I would have 
exited before I was forced out but the low possibility of settling all the debt kept 
me in the business. I would have expanded to another site". 
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FFR5 also noted that, "I was trying to get my money back so I stayed on until I 
sold and would have considered moving to another site if it made money". 
FFR6 stated that, "I could not leave because of the financial exposure - I did 
not want to desert the business. I would not expand to another site". FFR7 
responded that he would exit if he could sell the business at the right price and 
would not consider expanding while the current site is not stable. 
When evaluating the comments that the retailers submitted it was clear that, in 
the case of failed retailers, the objective to exit sooner was pursued vigorously 
but only if the failed retailer had the opportunity to recover the investment 
made. The situation is best described as "passing on the snake". The sale of 
such a business to a new retailer had the potential of a similar fate as long as 
the new retailer was not sufficiently trained and familiar with the operational 
and financial realities of the fuel retail business. He is destined to become a 
failed statistic in a long chain of hopefuls, with the oil company as a 
disinterested onlooker. It is this phenomenon that requires urgent intervention 
by the regulators. These businesses must be valued at the correct price and 
the new retailer must be fully trained to operate that business. 
The comments of the successful retailers were not surprising. Success is 
based on the desire to expand and grow and all the successful retailers 
indicated that they not only enjoyed their businesses but also wanted to 
expand to other sites. To obtain further expressions in this area, retailers were 
asked if they would recommend the retail business to a friend. 
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TABLE 6.43 







FFR7 Not to a weak person 
SFR1 Yes, if geared correctly 




SFR6 No, only to my enemy 
SFR7 Yes, but will inform them 
SFR8 No, I will be afraid for them 
The responses as summarised above are a serious rebuke for the industry 
and stakeholders. Failed retailers, understandably so, have a strong personal 
bias against the industry that has failed them. Successfully retailers were 
mildly disposed to the industry with a few strong exceptions. In order to probe 
their responses further the next question was posed: What advise would you 
offer to the oil company, government and other stakeholders? 
SFR1 responded that, "Government must have more control and for too long 
Government has left the industry to do as it pleases and oil companies have 
realised this and they therefore have been taking advantage and gaining more 
control - The Oil company should provide support, be more understanding 
and less of a policeman and more of a partner. 
The call made by SFR1 was acknowledged by Kirby and Watson (2003:191), 
in section 3.9., who noted that the unstable and unreliable legal framework for 
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the development of small business stunts small business development and 
success. 
SFR2 responded strongly that, Oil companies as the franchisor sees itself as 
the be all and end all. They have unlimited freedom to do as they will. This is 
monopolistic. The dealer is at the receiving end - you cannot buy what you 
want, you must take what they ask you. Only the economics of the depot is 
considered not the retailer and so there is no partnership. Regarding Black 
Economic Empowerment, government has not done enough to make sure that 
the mechanisms are robust or to ensure sustainability, especially access to 
finance. If they had a mechanism then one would not need an EFG. 
Then there is this idea of paying upfront for product and needing a guarantee. 
As retail industry goes this too is unique. These requirements have outlived 
the industry and there needs to be a change. Government has introduced 
subsidies to look after other industries. We have small margins and very 
onerous requirements. 
The oil industry should take the opportunity of establishing a rescue team. This 
is to ensure sustainability, especially when a dealer is in trouble - when it is no 
fault of his own like in the case low volumes against projections. Southway 
Motors is a good example. There is massive construction work and he is still 
being charged the same rentals. This is not a "partnership approach" actually 
we are "not in business together" - you are a retailer and I am the oil 
company." 
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SFR3 noted that, "Government should reduce the levy drastically due to the 
improved efficiency of the South African Revenue Service". SFR4 responded 
that, "Government should make sure that oil companies train people properly 
and the oil companies should provide lots and lots of training covering finance 
and labour issues. The fuel industry is more about loyalty to yourself and you 
have to put everything into it". 
SFR5 urged Government to play a greater role, "From one oil company to the 
next it is a monopoly - this needs to be changed. The fuel payments 
methodology is another great disadvantage as they have direct access to your 
bank account. The oil company needs to examine their rental structure - I am 
paying R46k a month to them". SFR6 responded that, "Government should 
look at the wage situation, attendants have a key role in the success of the 
business and the dealer margins should be big enough to ensure a reasonable 
wage. There is also too much adjustment in the fuel prices. Oil companies 
should not build too many sites around each other - look at Phoenix highway 
- three new sites have been built there in the last year". 
SFR7 stated that, "The oil companies should sell the land to the dealers. The 
oil company is in the property business not in the oil business. If you pay a 
R1M for the retail outlet, you are only paying for goodwill as no asset is being 
bought. Government should also get all the dealers to join the Fuel Retailers 
Association. They have the expertise at looking at these things - together with 
them the dealers can make a good intellectual group". 
361 
SFR8 noted that, "Government should make sure that Oil companies should 
not focus on their own commercial interests only. They should not just take 
and take and take and must be committed to giving something back. Why 
shouldn't fuel deliveries be on consignment? They could even look to stagger 
payments - can even add to my rental." 
FFR1 stated that, "Oil companies are bullies and their staff are simply 
dedicated to protecting the oil company's interests. The network managers are 
poorly trained and do not understand the fundamentals of business. I seriously 
doubt that the network manager would be able to run the site if I handed him 
the keys. Government has a responsibility to intervene in this skewed industry 
and normalise it like other industries." 
FFR2 also commented that, "Government as the regulator has a greater role 
to play - not just managing fuel prices. The Oil companies are exploiting their 
dealers and the dealer council bodies have no ability to represent us, in fear of 
reprimand at their own sites. An independent third party needs to examine the 
rental structure and operations - actually government should commission such 
a study." 
FFR3 commented that, "Government should appoint a watch dog body or an 
ombudsman and the oil company should allocate resources to the site by 
using a specialist group of advisors and specialist financial persons to 
intervene - they should not just be interested in the graphics of the site. I 
would also advise retailers to self- develop themselves before undertaking the 
retail business. Lastly, I wish somebody would develop a risk management 
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programme for the management of cash flows and financials. It must be a 
predictive approach then I will know in advance when I am heading for 
trouble." 
FFR4 advised that, "Government should not trust oil companies - what they 
tell you and what happens is different. They also gave figures - wrong figures 
to EFG. The price paid was therefore not right. The oil companies because 
they are so big - they should look at individuals - they must also consider the 
dealer - not only themselves. I lost R500k - you should never take everything 
at face value. I was cheated by the representative of the oil company. They do 
this 9/10 times - I have also heard things - I cannot believe what they would 
do to make a quick return. Why don't you as a researcher do a tally of dealer 
changes - see how many, why? - people are passing on their failures - so 
you have failure in perpetuity with the oil company as a disinterested third 
party." 
Longenecker and Moore (1991:13-14), in section 3.5.2, has referred to start-
up risk. FFR4 has invested his life savings and guaranteed the bank loans and 
is clearly aggrieved by the failure. The emotional stress of coping with failure 
was increased as the entrepreneur identified so closely with the venture that 
the "business failure was seen as a personal failure". 
FFR6 commented that, "When Black economic empowerment individuals are 
appointed, the sponsors must report line by line to government - why can't oil 
companies have an in-house financing mechanism for empowerment?" 
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Finally FFR7 advised that, " Government needs to intervene especially for 
small emerging black businesses - without the help of Government many 
more would fail - many black entrepreneurs have failed and the system is 
designed that black people will not succeed as each person must find funding 
and hence high gearing. Oil companies need to know that they are not treating 
dealers as their customers - not treating them as partners - how would they? 
Look at their policy of paying cash before they receive stock - this affects 
dealers in a significant way - because you have to have money that you would 
recover - if you have to pay R130k for a drop of fuel it would take about three 
days to sell the product and you have already paid for it. 
Before receiving my order, I must place my order for the next drop. The 
supporting mechanism is also weak. The network manager support is very 
weak. Oil companies do not want to pay qualified and experienced people. 
They employ people who have very little experience - they become more 
stretched and cannot provide retailers with quality support. In some cases, you 
do not the see the network manager for six months - unless you are in trouble. 
Is this a partnership? There is also very little flexibility - if you are not on the 
automatic stock replenishment system - you are not on their preferred 
customer list" 
The word tables in the cross case analysis relied strongly on the 
argumentative interpretation and comparison. The evidence was presented 
followed by cross case analysis from multiple sources of information. The 
interpretation was then included as a separate item. This will allow the readers 
to make their own conclusions. 
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6.5 CONCLUSION 
This chapter summarised the findings from multiple sources of evidence. This 
included interviews, documentation, observations and expert third party views. 
The case results were first presented in order to facilitate independent 
assessment of the case evidence and were then followed with a detailed 
analysis. 
The startling findings were at variance with conventional views on the reasons 
for failure. The results showed that age and education was of little relevance. 
The ideal of franchisor support was not evident and resulted in the lack of 
confidence in the franchise system. Training was highlighted as a burning 
issue, while the effect of exogenous factors like petrol price increases and 
interest rates was limited. The following chapter presents the case report. 
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CHAPTER 7 
THE CASE STUDY REPORT 
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
7.1 INTRODUCTION 
The purpose of this study was to identify the reasons for the success and 
failure of fuel retailers in the Republic of South Africa. The primary purpose 
was to conduct a detailed case study analysis and to extract evidence from the 
case information to support the findings. There is ample case evidence, from 
the case study suggesting reasons for success and failure. 
7.2 CONCLUSIONS FROM THE CASE STUDY EVIDENCE 
South African financial institutions have historically been the bankers to large 
corporations that dominated the economy. Providing start up capital and 
assessments to small business is not part of the institutional memory and skills 
set of bankers in most South African banking institutions. This is exacerbated 
by the fact that bankers have difficulty in providing small quantities of capital 
profitably. 
It was for this reason that private individuals could not easily access capital to 
purchase retail outlets. Most black entrepreneurs did not have sufficient 
collateral to raise loans on the money market. The EFG system was seen as a 
welcome intervention to facilitate the financing needs of would be 
empowerment retailers. The financing mechanisms used the future free cash 
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flows of the business as security. This was possible as retail margins were set 
by government and one could with reasonable accuracy; through a target 
costing approach determine the free cash flow on a monthly basis. The case 
study findings were as follows: 
7.2.1 FUEL RETAILER PROFILES 
Age, gender, family teams, professional affiliations and education were found 
to have no influence on success and failure due to the franchised nature of the 
industry. It was found that the average age in the failed category was 37 years 
while the average age in the successful category was 38 years. There was no 
evidence to suggest that age was a critical factor for success and failure and 
the oil company target range of 25-40 years appears to be an over 
exaggeration of the importance that age plays. 
Three of the failed retailers operated as husband and wife teams while only 
two such teams were in the successful category. Given the nature of the retail 
business and the demand on time, family teams should in theory, enhance the 
ability to control the details in the fuel retail business, but no evidence 
emerged to suggest that such combinations had any bearing on the research 
proposition. 
Professional affiliations were also not a differentiating factor in the research 
dilemma. While affiliations to professional bodies allowed fuel retailers to 
enhance their understanding about current issues and challenges facing the 
367 
industry- it was not a factor that played an influencing role in differentiating 
success and failure. 
The levels of education in both the failed and successful categories were on 
par. The levels ranged from a basic matriculation to a doctoral degree in 
chemistry within the successful group and from a matric to an honours degree 
in Public Administration in the failure group. There was no evidence to suggest 
that university graduates have a higher success rate although one is tempted 
to make such a conclusion in a general sense. 
7.2.2 CUSTOMER OFFER DOES NOT DIFFERENTIATE 
SUCCESS AND FAILURE 
The range of offer in the case study did not influence success and failure. It 
did not matter whether a retail outlet had the complete offer of a forecourt, 
shop, quick service restaurant and carwash or not. The imposition of full 
trading hours without due regard for economic return was an important 
discovery. The franchise agreement stipulated, without regard for need or cost 
that the retail outlet must operate on a twenty-four hour basis. The expense 
allocation in terms of wages, electricity and security represented a sunk cost 
with no proportionate benefit. 
Although no economic reason exists for some farm, urban and industrial sites 
to be burdened with such compliance, all retailers complied out of 
apprehension of the oil company. While image, brand and convenience are 
important considerations for the oil company, the rigidity is indicative of the 
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level of control that the industry has developed over the past fifty years over 
the small fuel retailer. 
7.2.3 WAGES IS A SIGNIFICANT COST COMPONENT 
The fuel retail business in South Africa employs some 50 000 attendants. 
Total manpower cost for forecourt activities are estimated to be 50% of the 
gross profit (fuel only), according to official Government studies carried out by 
the Small Business Advisory Bureau of North West University in 2004. The 
case study average was recorded as 38% of total gross profit illustrating that 
non-fuel income is a significant generator of profit. 
Although a substantial portion of the retail margin is applied to wages, the 
general level of pay is hardly a living wage. The study did find that failed 
retailers paid R487 per week and successful retailers paid R344 on average to 
their attendants against the industry average of R350. Successful retailers 
demonstrated a greater capability in managing the wage cost item. 
The ability to manage this cost line was found to be a differentiating factor for 
success and failure. This report does not in any way suggest that the minimum 
wage levels should be ignored - on the contrary, it is the management of the 
shift labour costs that leads to effective wage cost management. 
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7.2.4 TURNOVERS AND VOLUMETRIC PERFORMANCE 
It is generally believed that higher volume at the fuel retail businesses is the 
only criteria for success. This perception, as presented by the rival theory was 
disproved from the EFG case study evidence, as the failed category yielded a 
higher average volume than the successful category. While there is no doubt 
that the higher volumes would enhance the probability of success, there was 
no evidence to show that low volumes sites are doomed to failure. Only two of 
the failed retailers failed to achieve both the fuel and non-fuel targets and this 
contributed to their failure. 
This confirms that while high turnovers and volumetric performances increase 
the probability of success - these variables are not the only determinants for 
success and failure. The case evidence shows that high volume sites like 
FFR2 and low volumes sites like SFR3 have other drivers for success and 
failure. International experience shows that Belgium had an average of 87 0001 
as compared to Germany's 300 000 I and that both operated in non-regulated 
markets. 
The South African industry average was 173 000I as compared to the case 
study average of 345 000I for failed retailers and 350 000 I for successful 
retailers. This equated to R0.68 spent on non-fuel income for every one liter of 
fuel sold. The volume range was 170 000 litres to 700 000 litres, while the 
shop range was R160 000 to R340 000 non-fuel turnover per month. There 
was no evidence in the case study findings to support the rival theory that 
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higher volumes and increased shop turnovers were a pre-requisite for 
success. 
In evaluating the reasons for the failure of the non-performing sites, a number 
of issues must be noted. The EFG model was flawed in that the impact of 
inflation on general expense items was not factored in over time. While this is 
true, neither was the increased margin that government approved in 
consequent months. Using the base year as 2000, the margin increased from 
30 cents to forty cents or a net increase of 10 cents. This increased portion of 
the margin would have generated additional gross profit against the fixed cost 
structure and would have compensated for the inability to meet the original 
projection. It can therefore be concluded that with the exception of FFR7, all 
other failures were triggered by reasons other than inability to meet the 
budgeted projections. 
While countries like Germany, Austria and Australia have higher averages of 
fuel sales per month, other countries like Greece, Italy, Belgium and Ireland 
have averages of only 108k, 158k, 85k and 135k respectively - and all below 
the South Africa average of 173k. Clearly, regulation and liberalization of 
market prices does play an influencing role. 
It also appears that other countries have a lot more service stations than 
South Africa. Notwithstanding the fact that the car population in each of the 
countries must be factored for valid conclusions to be made, the number of 
service stations does not in itself seem to be a problem. This also collapses 
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the rival theory that volumes and turnover are key determinants for success 
and failure. 
7.2.5 THE RSA OIL INDUSTRY FAILS THE SMALL FUEL 
RETAILER 
Franchisor support was highlighted as a burning issue from all fifteen case 
respondents. The general view was that the oil company simply looked after 
their own monetary interest at the expense of the small fuel retailer. The 
researchers view was that the retailer was not fully aware that most franchises 
operated within such parameters. Franchises leave no room for personal style 
and approach - it is a tolerance of routine through the imposition of operating 
standards. 
There was total concurrence on the poor quality of service from the network 
manager who called on the business. Retailers complained that the network 
manager added no value to their business, in terms of quality advice and 
expertise as could be measured by increased sales and profits. Retailers did 
not see the network manager as a business consultant as they believed that 
they themselves possessed on average, greater know-how and problem 
solving capability. 
In many cases, retailers viewed the visit as a courtesy call and relied on expert 
third parties like their accountants for quality advice. The approach of self -
investment in time and effort within the operating requirements appeared to be 
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the approach that was generally adopted. The case evidence did reflect a 
heavy handed approach at times. 
It must be noted that, failed retailers who have exited their businesses must 
feel aggrieved about their experiences and that some of their comments were 
laden with emotion and sensitivity. Notwithstanding this, the aggregation of the 
comments leads one to believe that the unregulated industry status has led to 
some degree of exploitation and that there is an urgent need for Government 
to implement some basis of fair play. 
The support from inception to on site functioning is average resulting in "forced 
failures" of many small businesses. The EFG support mechanism also failed 
on many occasions. The initial valuations and premium payment to sellers just 
to place empowerment dealers on site were indeed a disservice to the cause 
of black economic empowerment. The aggregate information held between the 
oil company and EFG was sufficient to provide sound risk management 
support. The stand-alone approaches of the both companies weakened the 
retailers' fight for survival - from inception to on site operation. 
7.2.6 FAILURE TO PERFORM DUE DILIGENCE CHECKS LEADS 
TO FAILURE 
The study found that due diligence checks was a significant consideration that 
influenced success and failure. It was found that amongst the successful 
retailers the due diligence checks were understood and that the financials, risk 
assessment, valuation and business sustainability issues were well conceived. 
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The opposite was true for failed fuel retailers. The majority of the failed 
retailers did not understand and made little effort to have the due diligence 
findings understood even after being on site for two years. This was one of the 
causes of their failure as entrepreneurs. A good foundational understanding 
would have led to a pre-emptive approach to business management. 
It was also found that the valuation model was not understood by both 
categories of retailers. The price paid for the business was excessive in some 
instances and the working capital requirements were understated in most. This 
created a cash flow crunch that eventually led to a debt trap - the servicing of 
debt beyond the financial ability of the business. This occurred in spite of the 
risk management system implemented by EFG to manage the cash inflows 
and outflows. 
Both the categories of failed and successful sites had sophisticated computer 
systems and the information was available online to the oil companies. The oil 
company is in a position to verify the value of the site, have historical sales 
and performance details, they conduct interviews and pre-qualification tests 
and is therefore in a very strong position to ensure that the right jockey is on 
the horse, that the retailer is properly trained and that an oversight role that is 
normally expected from the franchisor is indeed in place. The case findings 
suggests otherwise. 
Another evident reason for failure was the management of debtors and the 
minimising of its effects on cash flows. In the failed category, it was found that 
private individuals used service stations as a mini bank. The average debtor's 
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cover in the successful class was 41% as compared to 28% in the failed 
category without proportionate working capital cover. 
The information management system of the oil companies did not facilitate the 
due diligence process. In all cases, it was found that the source of data and 
information was from the exiting fuel retailer - the seller. This is in spite of the 
fact that the all the cases under examination were fully franchised outlets. The 
oil company had complete access to the turnover gross profit report, depot 
delivery routines, no stock movement reports, trading area information, 
competitor development intelligence, business call reports compiled from 
monthly meetings and other general information that is important for the due 
diligence process. 
The case evidence reflects that, with the exception of the turnover information 
no other information was provided for the due diligence study. This led to a 
distortion of the numbers by EFG and a consequent overcapitalisation of the 
loan. The seller had no interest or legal obligation to provide material 
information. A scanty due diligence and verification exercise was a 
contributory reason for failure. 
7.2.7 VALUATION OF BUSINESS 
It was found that no fixed or accepted methodology for the valuation of service 
stations existed in South Africa. This has led to exploitation by business 
agents attempting to get the highest price and thus a higher commission and 
to sellers looking to recoup losses from trading activities. The oil industry 
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response until recently was that of a bystander. The incoming retailer 
becomes the victim due to the unique nature of the industry. 
It appears that the biggest problem in the retail business is the gross 
overvaluing of retail sites. It is not uncommon to have a service station that 
has accumulated a trading loss to be sold at a premium hence commanding 
excessive goodwill value. The same goes for new retail sites as the poorly 
informed purchaser would pay upfront "key money", the amount of which is 
based on some projected volumes, which in many cases would never be 
achieved. 
It was also interesting to note that while government had a predetermined 
methodology for the calculation of the wholesale margins through the 
marketing petroleum activities return, no effort has been made to formalise the 
returns of the fuel retailer. The failure to establish such a valuation mechanism 
has contributed to failure and exploitation of the fuel retail small business. 
The EFG valuation model was generally well accepted but poorly understood. 
While the multiple of free cash flow method is a common way of valuing 
businesses, the EFG valuation methodology was flawed due to the following 
reasons: 
• The requirement of a 10% sweat equity contribution was not strictly 
applied. In most cases the initial sweat equity formed part of additional 
borrowed funds thus resulting in a 100% geared loan with no provision in 
the cash flows for servicing of the additional debt; 
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Many of the retailers had to make dramatic lifestyle adjustments and 
were not able to live on the reduced income in comparison to the 
incomes previously earned. Some ventured out to jointly operate their 
fuel outlets and other businesses like supermarkets, butcheries, real 
estate, mining and motor mechanics. All retailers in the failed category 
maintained other economic interests and lost grip of their businesses, 
leading to loss of control and ultimate failure. The EFG model did not 
make provision for an adequate level of drawings; 
In many instances, EFG operated on a push-pull basis. It was found that 
there were two forces at work. Firstly, there was an urgency to get the 
loans out and secondly there was the concern that the seller will not sell 
thus leaving EFG with no business income. This led to premium 
payments and payments greater than the multiple of twenty four times 
the free cash flow - at the expense of the retailer; 
It was also found that all debtor collection days were assumed to be 
seven days from date of statement. The general collection days ranged 
from 7-30 days displacing valuable cash flows; 
The loan evaluation process did not involve the new retailer at all levels 
of the due diligence investigation, compromising the quality of buy-in and 
placing total reliance on the EFG system; 
The interest costs of bank overdraft facilities was excluded thus 
overstating the free cash flow and increasing the loan repayment 
amount; 
The provision for shrinkage was standardised at 2.0% of turnover. This 
was found to be a very optimistic number as the actual shrinkage 
amongst the failed category was 3.0%; 
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The aggregate gross profit margins targeted were too optimistic-
especially with shop target margins of 28%. Failed retailers achieved an 
average of 8.76 % versus the successful category of 12.30% for both the 
shop and forecourt. The reduction in gross profit percentages reduced 
the free cash flow amount; 
It was also found that the budget provision for all consequent years did 
not factor in wage and other variable cost increases on a realistic basis; 
The monetary loss due to fuel price adjustments was not included in the 
budget or the working capital amount resulting in stock adjustment losses 
being absorbed into the gross income and thus decreasing the free cash 
flow; 
Fuel price adjustments and its consequent effect on profitability due to 
stock losses was ignored in the valuation process, resulting in 
overpayment of goodwill, on average of R250 000 more based on the 
EFG cash flow method. This resulted in additional debt servicing costs 
through overpayment on the purchase price; 
The retail margin study and the retail margins that result from it did not 
include any gearing. The EFG model did not adequately accommodate 
this in terms of expense trade offs in other areas to ensure that the cash 
flows were sufficient to service the debt; 
It seems that EFG was attempting to grow its loan book as quickly as 
possible. This resulted in poor quality due diligence studies and risk 
management; 
The working capital provision was inadequate in most cases; 
The electronic system developed by EFG as a risk management tool was 
being developed during the loan rollout phase. This resulted in many 
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versions being tried and tested without a proper system of risk 
management at inception of the loan; 
• The ability to react to the risk management findings seemed limited. The 
budget over runs could not be contained due to the non performance of 
the loans in the first instance; 
• Most of the failed retailers did not generate the correct mark up 
percentages - this should have been a relatively easier slippage to 
correct. This was the most notable failure of the retailer, the Oil company 
and EFG; and 
• The retailers were not fully apprised of the cost constraints and in many 
instances exceeded their budgets. 
While the preset margins and target costing approach would in theory provide 
a good basis for budget planning, the case study evidence reflected a state of 
poor control as evidenced by the financial results. 
7.2.8 INADEQUATE TRAINING 
The development of human skill is the highest form of empowerment. Given 
the legacy of apartheid and its consequent implications on the black 
entrepreneurial class, training must be used as the intervention to better 
position black economic empowerment. There is a general lack of integration 
of entrepreneurship into education at all levels of the South African system. 
Many people have become successful entrepreneurs with little formal 
education. This is largely due to contact with family members who have small 
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business ventures and this serves as a stepping-stone to develop 
entrepreneurial capacity. 
The general training programme was found to be inadequate and the use of 
the same weak foundation for the empowerment retailers, operating under 
much more stringent conditions given the level of the gearing, was one of the 
contributors to the failure of the EFG retailers. 
Respondents reported that they viewed training as a key determinant in the 
functioning and successful execution of their daily business activities. It was 
found that the oil companies viewed training as a formal requirement and that 
no effort was made beyond the initial training to revisit the fuel retailer for 
refresher training. The implication is that fuel retailers approved ten years ago 
may not be subject to further training with the same intensity as was originally 
done when they first started operating their businesses. 
The training was found to be so brand specific that a Caltex trained retailer 
wishing to operate an Engen site would have to undergo the whole Engen 
training course to be approved. There was also no reliable assessment of the 
training except for the evaluation and comments of the trainees - who at the 
time were new to the industry. Training was viewed as a necessity for taking 
over the site and not as preparation for operating the business. 
Retailers viewed the training as a snapshot approach and expensive 
compared to the benefits obtained. There were no hands on or apprentice type 
approach and in many cases actual on site operations was a challenge. The 
380 
course structure and content, the excessive costs and the scheduling of 
courses only when an economic number of trainees were available 
compromised the national effort to develop and skill entrepreneurs. The 
course does not allow for any evaluation - except for trainees comments on 
the course presentation on the last day of the training. No independent third 
parties are consulted. It appears that trainee comments - from apprentice and 
naive retailers who are uninformed about the practical operating realities of the 
business - may have been taken as an endorsement of a quality training offer. 
It was also found that the training costs for a particular oil company was as 
much as R70 000. Notwithstanding the cost recovery that is required, it would 
seem that training was developed as an "income stream" rather than a 
preparation programme for small business. Government permits oil companies 
to operate one site per province for training and to absorb both the retail and 
wholesale profits to fund this initiative. This is not evident from the case 
findings. It is even more concerning to note that there is no training facility for 
the EFG retailers in the biggest market of Gauteng - resulting in retailers 
bearing huge travel and accommodation costs to travel to Cape Town for 
training. This effectively shut the door on refresher and additional training. 
The training did not have an external affiliation with professional training 
bodies established in South Africa like the Sector Education Training 
Authorities. A retailer can be on site for twenty years - and never see the 
inside of a training room after the initial orientation. There is sufficient reason 
to believe that the training offer is almost a "public relations course to highlight 
the issues of branding and visual standards" of the franchise. The fact that all 
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EFG retailers - trained within the last four years - did not know the difference 
between a gross profit percentage and mark up percentage is an indication on 
the quality of franchise training in the oil industry. 
The case respondent's views and the evaluation of the training curriculum 
justify a review of the training courses offered. This is pivotal to the research 
question on the reasons for success and failure. It could be argued that the 
case included a fair split between success and failure and that both failed and 
successful retailers attended the same training courses. 
While this may be valid, the case responses clearly illustrate that successful 
retailers had more experience than the failed retailers and that it was their 
previous experience that may have provided a solid grounding for success. 
Franchises should by definition have developed systems and processes. The 
quality of training is a critical success factor. 
7.2.9 MONTHLY PRICE ADJUSTMENTS 
Almost all EFG retailers complained that the higher fuel prices had a negative 
effect on working capital provision. Based on average delivery sizes, the range 
of increases and decreases expressed as a percentage of turnovers was 
found to be insignificant. The aggregate annual effect of price adjustment for 
petrol 93 was twenty-three cents. The highest price increase was 18 cents and 
the highest decrease was twenty-six cents. The successful retailers had to 
provide for an additional R7 493 for the highest price increase as recorded in 
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April 2001. The failed fuel retailers corresponding increase in working capital 
needs was recorded as R6 711. 
The effect of the price increase on every R1 000 000 of turnover for successful 
retailers was 0.75% while the same average for failed retailers was 0.67%. In 
other words, the price adjustments did not place a serious enough burden on 
the cash flows that it could be isolated as a significant differentiating factor for 
success and failure. The aggregate effect of the price adjustments for 
successful retailers on an annual basis was that an additional R9 574 of 
additional working capital was required. Failed retailers required an additional 
R8 574. While the EFG model did not provide for the increase and decrease in 
available cash flows due to monthly fuel price adjustments, the omission had 
no material effect on success and failure. 
While the aggregate effect on working capital was only R9 574 and R8 574 for 
successful and failed retailers respectively, the effect on profitability was found 
to be substantial. Fuel price adjustments, especially when prices fall results in 
stock losses for the retailer. 
This stock loss was quantified using the margin of 32.6 cents as at February 
2002. Based on the average stock levels, successful fuel retailers incurred an 
average loss of R13 569 and failed retailers an average loss of R12 154. This 
stock loss was not accommodated in the EFG loan model. The official 
government margin study also failed to provide for this stock loss thus 
rendering the margin study inaccurate. This also means that the retailer had to 
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endure the loss with no ability to manage the situation due to the delivery 
regime in place by the oil majors. 
7.2.10 CASH IS KING 
The study found that good cash management was an integral part of success. 
The single largest item of cash outflow were for fuel drops and unlike other 
retail businesses that generally obtained credit terms for product or discount 
settlements for early payments, retailers had to pay cash in advance. An 
absolute condition of the franchise agreement was that retailers had to provide 
a guarantee for at least two drops of fuel while signing a direct debit authority 
giving the oil company full access to the business bank account. The 
uniqueness of the industry and imbalance of power between the giant oil 
company and the small business retailer is clearly illustrated in this example. 
The oil company operated on a zero risk basis passing on the burden of risk 
and the expense of advance payment to the small operator. 
The EFG model used the cash flows generated as security and the inability to 
generate the required levels or to cap the level of expenses often resulted in 
an accumulation of the deficit in the bank overdraft. This was found to be a 
general phenomenon amongst the failed retailers. The EFG system of risk 
management failed to address the situation at inception, eventually leading to 
the retailer's failure. In many of the failed cases, it was found that EFG simply 
increased the overdraft levels instead of isolating the problem, to solve the 
cash flow crunch and in that way condemned the retailer to eventual failure. 
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Although the EFG model was based on cash flows, the mitigation of risk and 
ability to manage the cash flow generation was almost non-existent. EFG 
failed the retailer in their attempt to manage the cash flows. The inability to 
take action at the critical junctures of non-compliance resulted in an 
embellishment of the problem until the business could no more carry the 
burden of servicing not only the original loan debt but also the monthly 
accumulated trade loss. 
The credit meeting notes indicated that the risk management ability was weak 
and that credit management staff did not have a complete appreciation of the 
operation of the business they were tasked to credit manage. One particular 
new site retailer, Malvern convenience Centre had purchased a closed circuit 
television system to enhance the security of the business but paid for the 
system in cash. 
This led to a substantial unbudgeted cash outflow resulting in an immediate 
cash flow crunch. Instead of EFG investigating why the oil company failed to 
install the security system on a new site, as was the standard practice or 
negotiating to covert the purchase to a lease agreement, they simply re-
adjusted the budgets. This readjustment coupled with the oil company failure 
to achieve the projected volumes and shop turnovers eventually led to the 
retailer's failure, both of which had little to do with the retailer. 
It was also found that the management of accounts receivable was a key 
variable in the cash flow equation. Although the granting of credit against 
unsecured deposits was noted in the due diligence report, EFG failed to 
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administer the risk at inception but rather allowed the seller to transfer the 
debtors book with the exposure - and was paid for the unsecured volume 
through the multiple of free cash flow methodology applied. 
The EFG model used monthly cash flows for servicing debt but ignored the 
account receivable collection dates. In the case of FFR7, the collection period 
was sixty days. The cost of carrying the debtor's book, the collection period 
and provision for bad debt was not provided for in the budgeted cash flow 
projections. 
It was also found that the shrinkage provision in the convenience shop was 
under-budgeted. The provision of two percent of non-fuel turnover represented 
an industry average for experienced and well trained retailers. The expectancy 
imposed on new empowerment retailers with no or little retail experience of the 
same targets was found to be unreasonably optimistic. The average shrinkage 
numbers reported in the failed category was 3% and the successful category 
was 1.75%. The 3% shrinkage number illustrated that the entire non-fuel stock 
holding would have to be replaced every 33.3 months while the successful 
retailer would only need to do this every 57 months. 
EFG provided for 2% shrinkage or total stock replacement every fifty months. 
The failed retailer would have needed to make this provision 17 months earlier 
- a good explanation for many of the failed retailers exiting within the first year. 
It was also found that the wet stock management system imposed by EFG and 
the oil company worked in all circumstances in terms of reconciling purchases 
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and sales. The oil company developed a system of central reporting for wet 
stock data. This provided for a third party analysis and an early warning 
system for stock variances. This system was incapable of dealing with short 
deliveries or pumps overthrowing. 
It was also found that none of the EFG retailers maintained a cashbook. Many 
relied on "mental calculations" and bank statement analysis to manage the 
cash flows. The totality of the cash flow management effort comprised of 
looking at the bank account and "back of a cigarette box" calculation. While 
this approach had merit, complete dependency on this approach, as the only 
source of information was short sighted. 
7.2.11 IMPOSITION OF DEPOT ECONOMICS 
The composition of fuel prices in the Republic of South Africa is a transparent 
process. Refinery gate prices represent a true import parity pricing system 
known as the basic fuels price. Government also determines the wholesale 
price by aggregating the balance sheets and the profit and loss accounts of all 
the marketing companies. The "zone differential" covers the cost of transport 
from the refineries to bulk depots while the "service differential" covers storage 
costs and transport costs from the depots to the service stations. 
It was interesting to note that the oil majors have not queried the size of the 
service differential with the same intensity as they do with the wholesale 
margins nor has government reviewed this on a regular basis although the 
transport differential has been growing over the years to fund the operating 
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costs at depots. Depots have been rationalised and a number of joint depot 
operations are in place whereby oil companies share the depot infrastructure 
and costs. At the time of the compilation of the case study report, the rand 
equivalent of the service differential was 5 cents or a 30 000 litre fuel drop was 
expensed at R1 500. This could be for a delivery R50km from the refinery 
gate. 
Oil companies have managed to successfully impose delivery constraints to 
optimise their transport economics. In other words the oil company presets the 
delivery sizes and combinations that the small fuel retailer can order thus 
imposing the order size without due consideration for the retailers ability to pay 
for the product and need to hold such a level. It was also found that deliveries 
were controlled for the whole country from the Cape Town head office to 
further strengthen the control. Retailers have no control over this imposition. 
7.2.12 STOCK MANAGEMENT 
It was found that both the successful and failed retailers implemented similar 
wet stock control systems. Retailers did daily stock takes, reported the wet 
stock numbers to the oil company for monitoring and managed the stock take 
process. The oil company took a hand's on approach to wet stock 
management. The main pillars of the control system were based on the 
integrity of the oil company delivery system. 
Retailers placed heavy reliance on the truck meter reading and the accuracy 
of the dispensing equipment. Unlike any other retail product, the retailer buys 
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and sells fuel without having sight of the physical product. Oil companies are 
required by the Trade Metrology Act to annually calibrate the pumps to ensure 
that it does not under throw or over throw. In spite of the best control 
mechanisms, only a physical test using an assised container would reveal any 
discrepancies. The distribution of such test containers on the training course 
would have been very useful gesture by the oil company. 
The delivery of "sealed parcels" or deliveries that are fully loaded for a 
particular retail site and adjusted for temperature was seen as a great 
improvement from the retailer's perspective. Notwithstanding this, oil 
companies still used router transport to deliver product and retailers continue 
to view this with suspicion. 
7.2.13 GENERAL MANAGEMENT 
While the findings showed that both failed and successful retailers 
implemented stringent control over cashiers, it was clear that the failure group 
did have a higher tolerance for cash shortages than the successful retailers 
did. It was found that the SFR08 set R1.00 as a shortage amount while FFR4 
allowed R50.00 as the limit. The numbers were numerically insignificant but 
did reflect the quality of focus that each retail group applied. 
The case study evidence indicated that the failed retailers did not conduct non-
fuel price and gross margins reviews as frequently as their successful 
counterparts did. Failed retailers also analysed stock information like stock 
turnover, top sellers, dead stock and fast moving stock less frequently than the 
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successful retailers. It was also found that failed retailers had further relaxed 
control in terms of debtors as they only had a 28% cover for accounts 
receivable as opposed to successful retailers who had a 41% cover. In both 
instances, the security held was less than half the size of the monthly debtor's 
book and both operated in contravention of the law in terms of credit sales of 
petrol. The percentage of bad debts write-off was 15% for the failed category 
and 2% for the successful retailers. 
This had a direct bearing on the size of working capital required and bank 
overdraft. The failed retailers showed an increase on the original limits of 
240% while the successful category increased by 172% over the same period. 
While it is conceded that the increase in the overdraft levels was due to other 
excesses, a substantial portion was absorbed in funding unsecured debtors. 
The value of debtors in real terms increased over time due to increasing fuel 
prices. Successful retailers did have a higher sense of "attention to detail." 
The case study evidence also showed that the EFG retailers did not have a 
firm hand in the compilation of management accounts or the return of 
legislative information. With the exception of SFR2, no other retailer processed 
VAT returns on his or her own. While it is accepted that this is generally an 
accountant's responsibility the "hands off' approach is a disadvantage from a 
management perspective. 
It was found that there was limited or no transfer of skill in some areas. It 
would be difficult for the retailer who has little understanding of how value 
added tax is calculated to analyse the VAT reconciliation information supplied 
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by the accountant. This general approach was similar with other legislative 
returns like unemployment insurance, motor industry bargaining council 
returns, skills development levy, workmen's compensation and joint service 
board levy. It is not the researcher's suggestion that such administration 
should burden the retailer but that the retailer should fully understand the 
mechanics and methodology to prevent future litigation and to have a better 
grip on the business issues. 
The failed category of retailers did not manage critical cost components like 
wages. Successful retailers organised shifts to service the business needs 
during peak times and slack times and it was found that the wage pattern was 
largely correlated with the sales pattern. Failed dealers were poorly matched 
and in some cases, this "never occurred to them." The management of 
manpower costs was found to be a strong differentiating factor for success 
and failure. 
It was evident from the case information that failed retailers spent on average 
more time on administration than their successful counter parts. Successful 
retailers delegated the administration (not an income producing activity but a 
serious control issue) to key personnel while maintaining an oversight role. 
They were thus able to spent about thirty percent of their time, more than twice 
the 15 % effort by failed retailers on business development. 
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7.2.14 RENTAL AND FRANCHISE FEES 
The size of the monthly recoveries by the oil companies is worthy of special 
note. It was found that the average oil company recovery for franchise fees 
and rental was an average of 20% and 24% of gross profit for the successful 
and failed categories respectively. This means that for every R1.00 of gross 
profit earned in the successful category the oil company retains 20 RSA cents. 
This appears to be excessive and could justify some expert's view that 
"retailers are glorified managers for the oil company." The excessive 
recoveries also indicate that the oil company takes 100% of the gross profit 
every five months. Most of the real estate that belongs to the oil company is 
"old real estate" as only about fifty new sites are built in the county every year. 
It can be concluded that oil companies view their real estate assets as key 
income areas. Oil companies also benefit twice when margins are adjusted. 
Firstly, wholesale margin increases are earned and when the regulators grant 
retail margin adjustments, real estate recoveries are increased as the margin 
is linked to the rental formula. 
The capital costs for the establishment of the retail asset is substantial. This is 
particularly true given the oil industry approach to commendable safety and 
environmental care in their approach to retail property development. The 
franchised shop infrastructure differentiates the different oil brands and has 
provided convenience to the South African motorists. The oil company, as the 
franchisor is entitled to fair compensation for the risk of capital and marketing 
expertise. 
392 
There must, however, be a reasonable approach to cost recovery. Oil 
companies own four in ten sites that generate sixty percent of the volume. One 
can therefore conclude that the best and most productive sites belong to the 
oil companies. In many cases, "gold platting" takes place whereby retail sites 
are built at excessive cost and the oil company seeks to recover this through 
the rental and franchised income. The goodwill recovery for new to industry 
sites appears to be a further recovery by the oil company for the investment 
made. 
7.2.15 FRANCHISE AGREEMENTS 
It was found that the contract terms generally had short-term obligations. The 
EFG retailers all received five-year leases while other industry retailers 
received the standard thirty-six month lease. It is inconceivable to imagine that 
a partnership and business relationship could flourish under such a short 
duration. It was found that the retailers would comply with all franchisor 
requirements mainly out of fear that their leases would not be renewed on 
expiry. This is not at all conducive for the nurturing of small business. This is 
the ultimate form of control that the oil majors have over small business 
retailers. 
Compounding the problem is that contract terms are largely one-sided and do 
not protect the fuel retailer from unscrupulous sellers and from the oil 
companies themselves. Clearly these would be expected to be one sided 
because the balance of power during the negotiations is largely tilted towards 
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the oil majors, as they have control of all the information and systems, they 
generally own the property, they are the single supplier to the service station 
and they would have to approve the new incoming retailer. The South African 
competition Authorities have to date not challenged this practice. 
It was commendable for the oil company to grant five-year leases to all the 
EFG retailers in line with the conditions of loan repayment to the IDC. Most 
retailers preferred a longer-term repayment period matched to a longer-term 
lease, as this would have eased the cash flow burden. 
7.2.16 FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT 
The case evidence illustrated the need for good financial skills. It was 
apparent that successful retailers had better financial planning and analysis 
skills than the failed retailers of managing key cost components like wages, 
shrinkage and gross margins. The funding model was based on future cash 
flows and the under achievement of the gross profit and markups has in all 
instances contributed to poor financial results. The successful retailers did, 
however, yield higher mark up percentages. 
The failure of EFG to produce accurate and punctual management accounts 
exasperated the situation. This compromised the risk management process 
and stalled the implementation of remedial plans resulting in the accumulation 
of "slippages" to a point of no return. The training system did not provide 
quality financial training further disadvantaging the retailer. 
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7.2.17 OCCUPATIONAL EXPERIENCE 
According to the Global Entrepreneurship Monitor 2001 South African 
Executive Report, 40% of start up businesses is in the retail, hotel and 
restaurant sector. A possible reason for this high number is that employees in 
these industries, once having acquired the requisite skills, ventures out on 
their own. 
The retail fuel business has evolved over the last decade from a fuel business 
to a sophisticated convenience centre offering fuel, convenience shopping, 
bakery, fast food and car wash. Clearly, the skills base required to support 
such a wide retail offer is above the average of other small business ventures. 
While it was found that none of the retailers in the failed category had any 
previous retail experience, only 50% in the successful category did. The 
remaining fifty percent in the successful category did, however, have superior 
academic skills including a doctoral degree in engineering, a medical 
technology degree and an education degree. 
It was found that previous experience in the industry was critical, as "you 
would know the tricks of the trade." While the case study evidence supported 
the view that previous experience does play a significant role for success, 
training and up-skilling, especially within a franchised environment was more 
relevant. Franchisor support should compensate for the lack of such 
experience. The fact that none of the failed retailers had any previous 
experience while half in the successful category does again raise the question 
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about the quality of training offered by the oil majors as both groups were 
exposed to the same training curriculum. SFR7 recommended a kind of 
"buddy system" for those who do not have any previous experience. This is 
supported given the serious gaps that exist in the current training courses. 
7.2.18 LIFE STYLE ADJUSTMENT 
The case study results showed that the EFG retailers spent on average 11 
hours a day on site. It was also found that successful retailers spent more time 
at their businesses than failed retailers did. In all instances, the small business 
retailers made significant lifestyle adjustments to ensure the success of their 
businesses. On average the retailers stayed within 12 km from their 
businesses implying that, in most cases, they have moved homes, transferred 
children schooling and had to adjust to new social settings. This is reflective of 
the quality of commitment that the EFG retailers made. 
In many cases, the respondents agreed that, "the business owns them and 
that they did not own the business" The research evidence also revealed the 
extent and imposition on personal lifestyle. It was found that the business 
operated in all cases twenty-four a day seven days a week making it 
necessary for the retailer to be on call all the time. Retailers had limited leisure 
time. 
Lastly, it could be concluded from the case study evidence that the reward 
received for the level of sacrifice was inadequate. The Northwest University 
study used R153 000 retailer drawings per annum for the calculation of the 
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retail margin. This was benchmarked to a deputy director level salary in the 
public service exclusive of other benefits like pension and medical aid. 
Notwithstanding the fact that the retailer would have made other drawings and 
that the drawings was only for the forecourt activities, the compensation was 
found to be low relative to other small business ventures of a similar capital 
structure. 
It was found that the average drawings amongst the successful retailers were 
R180 000 per annum as a total salary i.e. for the operation of both the fuel and 
non-fuel business. The average salaries drawn by failed dealers were 
R147 000 for both the fuel and non-fuel business. This fell short of the fuel 
only average of R153 000. It can therefore be concluded that excessive 
drawings was not a cause for failure in the failed category. 
The rationale for the use of a deputy director's salary in the margin calculation, 
still, remain unclear. A deputy director in the public service does not take the 
entrepreneurial risk, does not have to manage labour and people, does not 
have to work 11 hour days, does not have to make significant lifestyle 
adjustments on the scale that a fuel retailer does and was therefore found to 
be a poor benchmark for use as a compensation measure. Entrepreneurial 
return on investment is perhaps a more acceptable benchmark for reward. 
Clearly, the fuel retail business imposed a severe restriction on the retailer's 
time. There are long hours, seven-day weeks, low margins, high personal risk 
to life and sometimes an average return on investment. Retailers making the 
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decision to operate retail sites have the right to full disclosure of information 
and quality support starting with adequate training. 
7.2.19 THE RETAIL BUSINESS IS ABOUT CONTROL 
The research found that the fuel retail business was about control - the control 
of cash, the control of both wet and dry stock and the control of expenses. 
Good control was found to be a springboard for success while poor control 
was found to be the reason for failure. The implementation and execution of 
control measures was found to be a key determinant in the success category. 
The training courses did not provide sufficient training in this area - to the 
detriment of the retailers. 
Each fuel retailer had a specific type of control system. The control process 
was not an item on the oil company training schedule. Small retail business is 
about the ability to manage the "controlled" aspects of the business. This 
required no ingenuity or entrepreneurial flair - just a tolerance of routine. The 
loosening of control was the first slip towards failure. While the franchisor had 
a limited participation in the areas of control, they had a better infrastructure of 
persons and systems to affect and support such control. 
The loss of control amongst the failed retailers in the area of dry stock 
management was evident in the case study analysis while the implementation 
of control systems amongst the successful retailers contributed to success. 
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7.2.20 REGULATORY REFORM 
All fuels sold in South Africa were imported before 1954. The demand for fuel 
increased after the Second World War to the extent that South Africa 
developed its own refining industry. The industry evolved from the legacy of 
apartheid, characterised by clandestine operations and a veil of secrecy to its 
current march to a more transparent and liberalised industry. 
The purpose of regulations was to ensure consumer protection, social 
balancing in terms of security of supplies and to prevent monopoly control 
being exercised. Government's efforts to police these controls have not been 
entirely successful. While the fuel retail sector continues to be regulated by 
government in the form of price control and the prohibition of vertical 
integration and self-service, slippages have crept into the system that would 
require government's urgent intervention. 
Firstly, the linking of retail margins to the rental formula by oil companies is 
tantamount to vertical integration. The retail margin study uses an average 
rental recovery and whenever margins are increased for the retailer there is an 
adjustment to the rents being charged leading to further dominance by the oil 
company over the small fuel retailer. This compromises both governments and 
the small fuel retailer's ability to create a successful small business sector. 
Secondly, the case evidence revealed an imposition of depot transport 
economics on the small fuel retailer in spite of a service differential allowance 
in the price build up. The small retailer is forced to receive uneconomic loads 
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and to prepay for it. In many instances, was evident that the combinations 
would result in some products like diesel at residential sites, being carried for 
longer periods due to the slow stock turns. 
Thirdly, it was found that retailers provide diesel products to the oil company 
customers through their forecourts at reduced margins. The cost to dispense a 
litre of diesel to the oil company customer is the same as dispensing a liter of 
petrol to a member of the public. Oil companies take 48 hours to refund the 
retailer while the retailer paid in advance for the product. The average margin 
received by the retailer for this transaction was found to be substantially lower 
at seven cents a liter versus the retail margin potential of about 40 cents a 
liter. While the retail margin study separates this out in the final calculation it 
fails to capture the cost of servicing this transaction in terms of the liquidity of 
the business. This places a disproportionate burden on the small retailer. 
Oil companies also recover goodwill costs for new service stations built based 
on projected volumes. Their investment decisions are based on the recovery 
of a lump sum capital amount. The sites are often "gold plated" and the new 
retailer bears the cost of this in the goodwill recovery. Government's intention 
through the regulations to ensure efficiency and low fuel costs are 
compromised leading to an increased burden being placed on the motorist. 
While efforts are made to prevent advertising and promotion at service 
stations to keep fuel prices down, the more critical and substantial breach of 
regulations have gone unnoticed. 
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The case study evidence also indicated that new sites commanded a goodwill 
price with no trading history. In cases where the oil projections exceeded 
actual performance the cost of the shortfall was borne solely by the retailer. 
The introduction of convenience shops and bakeries has led to a further 
concentration of power in the hands of the oil majors. Retailers are forced to 
buy from specific suppliers, to carry unreasonable stock levels with no 
assistance to manage the shrinkage levels and to maintain stringent brand 
standards. 
7.3 RECOMMENDATIONS 
Based on the case study evidence, the following recommendations are 
proposed: 
7.3.1 SIMPLIFY THE COMPLIANCE ENVIRONMENT 
The imposition of regulations and laws on the small retailer was found to be 
too onerous and should be brought in line with global best practice of 
simplifying the working and compliance environment. This is particularly true 
for the different municipalities, which impose a joint service levy based on 
turnover. The retail fuel industry generates high turnovers against low gross 
margins and any imposition of levies on turnover prejudices and unfairly 
burdens the retailer with a disproportionate burden as compared to 
contributions from other sectors of the economy. This archaic requirement 
needs to be revisited. 
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The EFG model required that all retailers operate as proprietary limited 
companies thus forcing each of the retailers to conduct statutory audits as 
required by the companies act. The closed corporation format would have 
served the same purpose. The margin study does not provide for market 
related audit fees. 
7.3.2 ESTABLISHMENT OF A CENTRAL TRAINING UNIT 
It is recommended, given the inadequate levels of training in the industry that 
a central training board be established. This is relevant given government's 
drive for a greater participation of black economic empowerment. Training 
provided at present by the oil industry assumes a "normal" human resource 
environment when in fact it is not. The retailer training should be administered 
by one of the SETA's (Sector education training authority) and be accredited 
by the South African Qualifications Authority. 
This would elevate the need for quality training and ensure sufficient 
preparedness by this small business sector. This would also prevent 
exploitation by oil companies of new retailers in terms of the excessive training 
fees imposed at a location and time convenient to the oil company only. The 
current oil company training is very brand specific and does not adequately 
address the key fundamentals of financial management and administrative 
care. 
402 
It is further proposed that government regulate the practical aspects of training 
through the allocation of training sites on a regional basis but not under the 
jurisdiction of the oil company. These training sites should have a special 
board comprising members of the dealer council, members from the South 
African Petroleum Industry Association as representative of the oil company, 
officials from the department of labour, representative from the fuel retail 
organization, members from the franchise council of South Africa and a 
representative from organised labour. The regional sites should be 
administered as "labouratory sites" and be identified with due consent from 
government to prevent the industry from holding key retail sites for profit rather 
than training. 
Based on the case findings, the existence of such a centre would have 
reduced the number of failures for the following reasons: 
• The training would be a continuous improvement programme; 
• The certification of the course would necessitate relevant training; and 
• The course curriculum and structure would be more "preparatory" than 
"information" as is currently the case. 
7.3.3 ESTABLISHMENT OF A LABOURATORY SITE 
It is further recommended that a "labouratory site" be established to provide 
hands on practical apprentice type training. This experiential type training 
should form the main part of the Sector Education Training Authority training 
curriculum. Prospective retailers should spend adequate time on such a site to 
understand the demands of the business and to be practically trained in the 
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areas of controls, cash flow management, retail convenience marketing and 
stock management. This approach would enhance the retailer's theoretical 
understanding of the retail business in a "live" situation. 
This would also give the retailer the opportunity to reflect and make an 
informed decision on whether this type of business is really what he or she 
wants to be involved in. The labouratory site should be operated 
independently from the oil company due to their historical approach to training 
and should ideally be operated by the fuel retailer association body or motor 
industry federation due to the extensive intellectual capital and expertise that 
exists amongst its members. Successful retailers can be used to develop 
specific skills amongst other retailers. This approach would expose role 
models to the retailer network. The suggested mechanism would generate 
sufficient cash flow from the retail margin income to fund the training. 
Such a site should also be accessible to all fuel retailers for refresher and 
other specialist training. There should not be any restriction, as is currently the 
case, where a retailer would have to wait for the scheduling of an oil company 
training course, which is planned according to the economics of the number of 
trainees. Training and trainers should be constantly available to the retailer. 
The suggested network of retail sites managed and operated by retailer bodies 
through a broad based board structure would be the ideal solution to the poor 
state of training that currently exists. 
It is also envisaged that these provincial labouratory sites would service the 
training needs of pump attendants and cashiers. There is no such 
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infrastructure currently. The industry relies on the informal provision of training 
by the oil companies and private companies to service this need. The 
involvement of the Sector Education Training Authority would ensure that a 
market driven training programme is implemented. This should include adult 
basic education training, literacy classes, basic computer training and other life 
skills that make training meaningful. 
Government cannot rely on the private sector or the Liquid Fuels Charter to 
force a change as the Charter does not include attendants. The Petroleum 
Products Amendments Bill 2005 is the only opportunity that government has to 
address the serious gap that exists on the human resource front. Training 
must be a key-qualifying requirement of the licensing dispensation. 
It must be noted that the majority of the persons employed as attendants and 
cashiers are from the previously disadvantaged background. Apartheid 
education resulted in a vast number of these individuals, missing out on the 
education opportunity. According to the Global Entrepreneurship Monitor 2001 
South African Executive Report, only one in four black adults had a tertiary 
education as at 1996. 
It is strongly recommended that government use the licensing dispensation 
that is due for implementation in 2006 to correct the human resource deficit. 
This would create the opportunity for poorly educated attendants and cashiers 
to improve the quality of their lives. Failure to do so will condemn them to be 
locked into an industry with no scope of economic advancement and with a 
high probability of job loss in a deregulated environment. This initiative would 
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allow attendants and cashiers to be absorbed into the mainstream economy 
when government deregulates the industry and removes the prohibition of self-
service. 
7.3.4 INDUSTRY VALUATION METHODOLOGY 
Government's approach of target costing falls short of an enabling 
environment without due regard for the economic realities confronting retailers. 
Empowerment retailers will only increase participation and ownership through 
geared funding mechanisms and the non provision of debt service costs in the 
retail margin study is self-defeating of government objectives as stated in the 
Draft White Paper of achieving a 25% participation level by historically 
disadvantaged South Africans by 2010. 
A pre-requisite for the incorporation of geared finance into the retail margin is 
the development of an industry valuation model. The valuation model should 
seek to ensure an adequate return on investment for the entrepreneur. The 
model should seek to prevent the creation of regret capital through gross over 
pricing of retail outlets. Such a valuation model will stabilise the industry and 
facilitate more informed decision taking by potential and future participants in 
the small retail sector. 
This model should over time replace the retail margin study, as government 
would have at its disposal real numbers of the industry as a whole as opposed 
to a sample of the total industry. Every purchase and sale of a retail fuel outlet 
should be subjected to the valuation model test. While it can be argued that 
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government's role is one of an economic regulator and that valuation 
methodologies would fall outside of its sphere of control, in cases where 
market failure exists, intervention is necessary. The non-fuel input cost 
variables must be provided by the franchisor -the oil company. 
This approach would also ensure that the decision on the appropriateness of 
making the investment and the level of investment is in the hands of the 
investor. New participants in the industry would have a better chance of 
survival and the aggregate result would be that a more efficient investment in 
the retailing network is maintained. The model that is most accepted by 
bankers for funding of businesses is the net present value model. 
7.3.5 APPOINTING AN INDUSTRY OMBUDSMAN 
The research findings coupled with other retailer experiences begs the 
appointment of an independent third party person to arbitrate between the 
gigantic oil company and the small retail business owner. The organs of the 
state in terms of the judiciary functions could also serve the same purpose but 
the cost of engagement in terms of time and finance is prohibitive for the small 
fuel retailer. 
The general view in the fuel retail industry is that it is a futile exercise to legally 
challenge the oil company due to their size. It was found that most retailers 
eventually surrendered to the will of the oil company. A number of the EFG 
retailer's experienced the same demise in spite of EFG's plea to the oil 
company. The small business sector of the industry makes a significant 
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contribution to the economy. The capital cost of owning a retail outlet is large 
by small business standards and the current communication infrastructure like 
the dealer council bodies and retailer associations have limited successes in 
conflict resolution in the past. 
While no evidence of wide scale exploitation by oil companies exist, the case 
sampled within the EFG case study have revealed some extremely 
contentious findings in approach and heavy handedness. The Petroleum 
Products Amendment Act 2005 provides for arbitration and such an 
intervention would provide a fair and just environment for small retail business 
to thrive. 
It is therefore recommended that an ombudsman office be established to 
serve this need. The funding of the office of the ombudsman can be obtained 
through a levy placed on the licenses that government intends issuing. 
7.3.6 ORDER ON DEMAND 
The purchase of fuel is the largest single item of purchase in the fuel retail 
business. The size and frequency of the drop is generally determined by the 
oil company to optimise transport economics. This has an unintended 
consequence of placing a cash flow burden on the small fuel retailer. 
The legal basis for the imposition of the cash -on -delivery basis from any of 
the legislation that governs the South African petroleum industry could not be 
referenced in documentation reviewed. It is recommended that government 
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and the oil industry agree that no legal basis exists for an archaic norm that 
has evolved over time and adjust the processes in place. 
The rationale of holding a deposit equivalent to two drops of fuel and imposing 
cash on delivery system is unclear and prejudices the small fuel retailer. The 
retailers receives no compensation for the loss of the market related income 
from sinking deposits in unproductive assets and has little control on the size 
of the fuel drop in terms of quantities. The oil company owns the tanks and 
controls the delivery routine. 
It is recommended that an order on demand mechanism be considered as a 
resolution. This would save the retailer on working capital costs funded 
through the bank, as the stock in the tank would be a real time cost relative to 
sales. 
The depot economics is not market sensitive as the distribution is designed to 
optimise haulage without regard to actual demand. The inefficiencies are 
underwritten by the fuel retailer due the delivery schedules in place. The 
retailers subsidises market distribution "corrections" by reselling to "oil 
company customers" at reduced margins on cash on delivery basis. 
The benefit of such an intervention is substantial for the retailer and a win -win 
situation could be recorded as the entire system is then market sensitive. This 
would mitigate, as evidenced by the case study findings, against failure. It is 
only under these conditions that the current onerous requirements of the oil 
company can be justified. 
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7.3.7 REAL ESTATE RECOVERIES AND FRANCHISE FEES 
The capital costs for the establishment of the retail asset is substantial.This is 
particularly true given the oil industry approach to commendable safety and 
environmental care in their approach to retail property development. The 
franchised shop infrastructure differentiates the different oil brands and has 
provided convenience to the South African motorists. The oil company, as the 
franchisor is entitled to fair compensation for the risk of capital and marketing 
expertise. 
There must, however, be a reasonable approach to cost recovery. The case 
study evidence reflected on average that the oil company received at least 
20% of the gross profit as compensation for capital and expertise. Oil 
companies own four in ten sites that generate sixty percent of the volume. One 
can therefore conclude that the best and most productive sites belong to the 
oil companies. In many case "gold plating" takes place whereby retail sites are 
build at excessive cost and the oil company seeks to recover this through the 
rental and franchised income. 
It is recommended, based on the EFG case experience, that government 
conduct an independent review of the rental recoveries as the retail margin is 
calculated inclusive of the rental recoveries. In other words, government 
increase of retail margins result in higher monopoly rental recoveries for the oil 
companies at the expense of the motorist. The franchise fee for non-fuel 
income was found to be reasonable and incentive based. 
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7.3.8 RETAILER PROFILE 
The case study evidence indicated the degree of uniqueness that exists in the 
retail industry. The perceptions of service stations as massive cash cow 
businesses are prevalent and widespread. Many retailers would have chosen 
other small business sectors had they been well informed at inception. 
This perception, although not entirely false, has created false hope in many 
instances leading to the destruction of confidence and loss of capital. It is 
recommended that the oil company develop a profile of an ideal franchise 
retail operator. This could take the shape of a gap analysis model measuring 
key variables of management, occupational experience and the entrepreneur. 
Any prospective retailer could then know in advance his or her shortcomings 
and be pre-skilled in the areas requiring improvement rather than becoming a 
failure statistic. 
The case study information approach is not suitable for profiling such a 
retailer. Individual oil companies would have a sufficient sample size in their 
respective networks to prepare such a profile. This objective could be 
advanced through further research, using a quantitative methodology thus 
ensuring greater generalization. 
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7.3.9 MULTIPLE SITE OWNERSHIP 
Many franchisors are opposed to individuals owning more than one retail 
business. The evidence from the case study information shows that a 
sufficient number of the successful retailers would prefer to expand to other 
sites. It is recommended that the oil company investigate the possibility of 
reviewing their policy on multi-site ownership programmes. 
The greatest advantage of such an approach would be that retailers would 
expand their income generating ability to capitalise on opportunities that 
require the same skills and they could reduce the aggregate costs by 
rationalising the management structure, as it would enhance general success 
in the retail sector small businesses. 
7.3.10 DEVELOPMENT OF A CASH FLOW MANAGEMENT TOOL 
The management of cash flow was found to be a critical success factor. It is 
recommended that the franchisor consider the case evidence and investigate 
the possibility of developing a software programme modeled around the 
current point of sale system that provides a daily cash flow management tool. 
This would enhance the retailer's ability to manage a critical area of the 
business and remove unnecessary stress and anxiety that was so strongly 
communicated in the interview process. 
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7.3.11 REGULATORY REVIEW 
The industry is currently in legislative limbo resulting in exploitation of the 
small fuel retailer. There are a number of practices in the industry that run 
contrary to good business practice. It is therefore recommended that 
government conduct independent research into these practices and seeks to 
implement a fair and just regulatory regime. The investigation should include 
the following: 
• Rental recoveries 
• Delivery and load restrictions 
• Training 
• Vertical integration breaches 
• Possible quarterly petrol price adjustments 
• The relaxation of cash on delivery 
• Possible consignment stocks 
7.3.12 THE NEED FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
This research work was conducted through a qualitative approach limiting the 
case findings to the subject sites. The findings cannot be generalised to a 
greater population of service stations in the Republic of South Africa. The case 
study findings do, however, provide a strong basis for further research work on 
a quantitative basis as the groundwork has been established through the case 
study findings. Other researchers could begin with the qualitative finding 
encompassing the recommendations made above. 
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7.4 EXEMPLARY CASES 
Yin (1990:146-151) recommends that a case study report should be 
"exemplary." The report attempted to capture this as follows: 
• The individual cases were unusual and of general public interest as it 
presented two issues of current importance. Firstly, funding of black 
economic empowerment as required by the Liquid Fuels Charter 2000 
and secondly, the report processed case study data on the regulative 
aspects of the industry proposing recommendations for consideration by 
policy makers; 
• A sense of completeness was achieved in that the collection of 
information and its analysis had reached an analytical periphery - further 
findings and investigations were of decreasing relevance. The critical 
pieces of information was collected and analysed and the rival theory 
proposition that success and failure was a function of turnover was 
sufficiently dispelled. The collection of data was done over a four-year 
period during which time the industry was going through a legislative 
metamorphosis. This enhanced the quality of the study as this research 
provided another view to the raging debate in the fuel retail industry; 
• The design of the case study assisted in dealing with personal bias. 
Different perspectives were entertained. This included viewpoints from 
industry stakeholders, government officials and retailers both within and 
without the case study; and 
• The report and its recommendations are engaging in the sense that it 
represents the actual experiences of a group of retailers. Readers of this 
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research could compare and contrast their own life experiences against 
the case evidence. 
7.5 CONCLUSION 
This chapter presented the case study report. The key findings were 
presented followed by a set of recommendations. The report summarises the 
cross case findings and it is hoped that quantitative researchers would expand 
on and test the findings of this case using the qualitative results as a good 
starting point. Firstly, the findings were aggregated into a general body of 
information and then classified into reporting areas followed by the 
recommendations. 
There was sufficient evidence from the research findings to nullify the rival 
proposition that success and failure of fuel retailers was a function of sales 
and volumes only. The case study evidence supported the research 
proposition that the reasons for failure and success were due to factors other 
than size. 
The 47% per annum failure rate recorded in the study was attributed to a 
number of factors from both within and outside the control of the fuel 
entrepreneur. While gender, education levels and age were not found to be 
critical success factors, the ability to manage the key components of target 
costs was critical. The management of manpower costs and the efficient 
application thereof was found to be the most significant variable in the cost 
build up and differentiated successful and failed retailers. 
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There was also evidence of substantial imposed costs from both the regulatory 
environment and the franchisor. The monthly adjustment of fuel prices had an 
impact on working capital and generally resulted in net stock price losses. 
Both these variables were not factored into the calculation of the retail fuel 
margin resulting in the understating of the true costs. The loose regulatory 
environment with outdated legislation also marginalised the fuel retailer. 
It was also found that the oil companies optimised their fuel delivery regimes 
at the expense of the small business owner through the automatic 
replenishment system of wet stock controlled through a central ordering 
system. While wet stock control mechanism was in place for the fuel business, 
the non-fuel business received limited support for stock and shrinkage 
management. 
The franchise agreements reduced the entrepreneur to a worker status in spite 
of the individual time, capital investment and lifestyle adjustment. The limited 
lease tenure and exorbitant franchise recovery costs placed an additional 
burden on the fuel retailer while allowing the franchisor to optimise the benefits 
of real estate ownership along the value chain. 
The case study evidence also supported the retailers view on the inadequate 
level of business support and training. This was an important finding and 
negatively influenced the quality of the due diligence checks and business 
valuation. In many cases, the budgeting was optimistic with little or no 
recourse for remedial action leading eventual failure. 
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Finally, the research objectives included an examination of the causes of 
business decline and to propose a turnaround strategy to create viability and 
profitability. The primary objective was to identify the reasons for failure and 
success of fuel retailers and to make recommendations to reduce the failure 
rate. Predictive financial indicators that herald business decline have been 
identified together with trends and patterns about management. The study 
findings correlate with the international findings of the Global Entrepreneurship 
Monitor (2005:17), where South Africa ranked 25 out of 35 compared to 20 out 
of 34 in 2004. 
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APPENDIX 1 
THE CASE HISTORY 
RETAILERS FINANCED BY THE ENERGY FINANCE GROUP (EFG) 
1. INTRODUCTION 
This section provides a brief history of the small business fuel retailers 
financed by the Energy Finance Group (EFG); the retailers that are the subject 
of scrutiny in this case study. The history of the EFG as a company, it's 
functioning, financing methodology and the management of the loan book is 
provided. The site identification, candidate selection and loan criteria is also 
discussed. The researcher has obtained express consent to disclose the 
nature and details of the company and support functions for the purposes of 
this research. This Appendix will illustrate that each fuel retailer was afforded 
an equal chance of success and the loan and management of the loan was 
the same in all circumstances. In spite of this uniformity in approach, almost 
half the fuel retailers failed. 
2. BACKGROUND TO THE ENERGY FINANCE GROUP 
The shareholders of EFG were Engen, who owned 40% of the company and 
appointed one director to the board, Eikos Risk Application owned 10% with 
no board representation and the balance of the 50% was equally held between 
five private individuals. 
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The company was established from a need to fund fuel retailers due to the 
significant financial barriers that existed for prospective fuel retailers, 
especially the black economic empowerment retailers. The head office was 
situated in Derby Downes in Westville and the company employed 40 people 
in its credit risk, insurance, information technology and operations divisions. 
Wholesale funding was obtained from both the Industrial Development 
Corporation and Gensec bank. The funding was secured against a 
reinsurance guarantee issued by Hanover Re to the Industrial Development 
Corporation and Gensec bank. The company had signed agreements to fund 
Shell, Engen, Caltex and Exel fuel retailers. Based on the respective market 
shares - this funding arrangement would have applied to 75 % of the fuel retail 
businesses in South Africa at the time. The case study only covers the 
Industrial Development Corporation funded loans and not Gensec bank so as 
to ensure that clear reasons for success and failure amongst the original group 
of EFG retailers were clearly identified. 
The signed agreements allowed EFG to take cession of the shares in the 
funded companies should a default occur. In other words once a dealer has 
failed, EFG together with the oil company would appoint a caretaker retailer 
until another funding arrangement was concluded. This would represent a 
failed site. The initial loan from the Industrial Development Corporation was 
R25 Million. 
EFG had also secured preferential arrangements with ABSA bank and all 
funded sites were required to bank with ABSA. A blanket overdraft facility, 
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against another guarantee of R10 Million issued by Hanover Re was also in 
place. This meant that EFG funded sites could access working capital facilities 
from ABSA bank through a special arrangement with EFG. 
Only the original loans from the EFG loan book were considered as the 
funding structure, cost of capital and other material terms differed substantially 
between the Industrial Development Corporation and Gensec Bank. Actually, 
the Gensec funding structure could indeed represent another case study 
profile for a future researcher. The original loans, that are those from the 
original Industrial Development Corporation loan book, were considered most 
appropriate as they represented the original and oldest loans on the EFG loan 
register thus providing a greater amount of data and in the case of successful 
sites, more meaningful analysis. This criterion was used to include and 
exclude cases from the multiple case analyses. 
3. THE FUNDING MECHANISM 
The company was set up in 1999 and began operating in 2000 to provide 
niche financing to service station entrepreneurs on a cash flow funding basis. 
EFG raised the capital from the Industrial Development Corporation then on-
lent the funds to prospective service station owners at a margin agreed to by 
the Industrial Development Corporation. Traditionally, loan by financial 
institutions to small businesses is given on a risk adverse basis by the bank. 
Small business fuel retailers had to have sufficient collateral to raise loans to 
purchase a business. This collateral could include property, other liquid assets 
and in some cases, the funding institution takes an equity stake in the 
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business. Service stations are franchised businesses and the franchisor or the 
oil companies concerned own all the physical assets of the business. 
This is especially true for service station operators as the only asset that the 
small business entrepreneur owns is the share in the "goodwill" or brand. All 
other assets on site, from pumps and tanks, to shop equipment are owned by 
the oil company. When purchasing a service station, the retailer has simply 
prepaid for the future cash flows. This claim to the future cash flows is 
generally for the duration of the franchise agreement. In the EFG case, the 
lease duration was five years. This means that the loan was a five- year loan. 
In other words, the oil company generally grants a five- year lease and the 
cash flows generated in those five years become the future value of the 
business. There is no guarantee for perpetuity in the lease conditions although 
this is not generally a problem. 
In some cases, the small business fuel reseller owns the property but these 
are generally smaller sites that offer limited convenience to the motorist -
none of the EFG sites fell into this category. The reasons for failure and 
success would be the same for either an oil company owned and leased site 
or for a fuel retailer owned and operated site. This is due to the regulated 
nature of service stations in South Africa. Profit margins are set by 
Government and are the same for both categories of service stations. 
The EFG funding model used future cash flows as security and lent funds 
against the future earnings. All loans were paid into a Proprietary limited 
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company and the shares were ceded to EFG as security and in the case of 
inability by the fuel reseller to make loan repayments EFG would then exercise 
its option to take cession of the lease and then appoint a new dealer. The 
Proprietary limited structures also required that all annual financial statements 
must be audited. This proved to be useful in this research, as all the subject 
business had audited financials for the 2002 year. The reason for using the 
2002 financials was that at the time of doing the research, most 2003 
information was not available. In some cases, where fuel retailers had exited 
the sites before this date, the last financials were used. 
EFG also provided insurance and financial support services to its clients. 
According to the loan register, the original R25 Million from the IDC was 
applied to fund the purchase of the following 21 service stations: 
450 























Source: EFG Loan Register 2003 
4. THE BUSINESS AND RETAILER IDENTIFICATION AND THE LOAN 
PROCESS 
Twenty- one (21) loans were issued from the original IDC batch. There were 
eight (08) successes and seven (07) failures. Six of the subject sites could not 
be included for analysis as explained in the later sections. Note the definition 
of failure provided in section2.3. Failures refers to the "financial inability to 
continue operating" the business or in this case the inability to service the loan 
repayment. 
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The decision to adopt a case study approach is further explained as follows. 
Willing buyers and sellers transacted and EFG facilitated the funding. The 
basis of the funding was the use of the future free cash flows as security. The 
free cash flow generated was determined using historical information and 
discounted by applying 80% of the free cash flow only. 
Once a deal has been identified, EFG risk management staff would conduct a 
due diligence on the business. This included volume and turnover 
performance for the last two years, an analysis of the operating expenses, a 
review of the debtor's age analysis and a trading area analysis. Once the free 
cash flows have been determined, the numbers are inputted into a 
standardised EFG valuation model. The model calculates 80% of the free cash 
flow and multiplies it by a factor ranging from 20-24. A multiple of twenty 
represented a discount price and a multiple of 24 represented a premium 
price. This can be illustrated as follows: 
Illustration 
Valuation of Business 
Gross profit 
Less: Expenses 
Free cash flow before tax 
Discounted value of business 
Premium value of business 
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R100 000 
R 50 000 
R 50 000 
20xR50 000orR1000 000 
24xR50 000orR1200 000 
The loan repayment for both the cases was calculated at 80% of R50 000 or 
R40 000. Once the credit committee approves the valuation and an initial 
interview is conducted with the applicant, from details completed on the EFG 
application form, then a request is made to the oil company for the approval of 
the candidate. The oil company, to either approve or decline the candidate 
then applies the normal process requirements. This involved a panel interview; 
the preparation and presentation of a business plan and if the candidate is 
successful to this point, then attendance to a formal training programme is 
mandatory. 
EFG also developed a custom designed risk management programme that all 
fuel retailers were trained on by the EFG in-house training department. This 
involved tracking the daily cash flows and expense management. The EFG 
management accounting team would prepare monthly management accounts 
and meet with the retailers to implement corrective plans when expenses 
exceeded the budgets. 
The oil company also required a fuel guarantee for at least two hundred 
thousand rand to cover two fuel drops in case of a returned payment. EFG 
issued an insurance guarantee to cover this. The following table summarises 
the loan process: 
453 
LOAN AND OIL COMPANY REQUIREMENTS 
1 EFG Loan application 
Sitildentification 
Oil company franchise 
application 
Oii company interview and 
testing 
EFG and fuel retailer due 
diligence study 
~OlS company training course 
EFG system training 
Payment of sweat equity 
EFG loan valuation model 
illlltiilllP^^^ 
Budgeted Income statement 
Fuel guarantees 
Legislative requirements 
Stock take and working 
capital requirements 
Insurance ana risk 
management 
Monitoring and performance 
New applicants completes form providing 
personal and financial details 
The prospective retailer brings privately 
negotiated deal to EFG and Oil company 
Standard Oil company requirement ensuring 
credibility and ability checks 
New retailer is subject to testing for 
"acceptance" as retailer. Retailer then presents 
business plan to oil company 
EFG and prospective retailer conduct a 
detailed study of business (Finance, debtors, 
expenses etc.) 
Retailer then attends the training course at an 
average cost of R40k on aspects of retailing 
including safety and security 
Retailer trained on specially developed system 
called BCS (Branch Control system). This 
provides direct on-line link to EFG of the fuel 
retailer bank account, daily banking, shift 
reconciliation, wage reports etc. 
All applicants were required to make a 10% 
payment 
EFG calculates the "value" of the business 
using the free cash flow as the basis. In other 
words, all loans were based on a multiple of 
free cash flow (20-24). In essence, this means 
that all loans were subjected to the same 
valuation formula. 
EFG and retailer agree the expense items for 
the duration of the five year loan 
Oil companies require a fuel guarantee of 
R200k which is issued through an insurance 
guarantee from an EFG subsidiary company 
called Garagesure 
EFG Management accounting team together 
will the retailer attended to VAT, tax 
registration etc 
On the day of takeover the wet and dry stock 
level is verified and the working capital 
requirements finalised and a facility is provided 
to the dealer 
All other insurance is secured through EFG 
risk and an operations Risk management team 
monitors on a daily basis the cash flows 
Retailer and EFG meet monthly to review 
454 
5. EFG CASES AS EXEMPLARY CASES 
The above table illustrates that the funding was done on exactly the same 
basis for each new business. The loan sizes may have been different 
depending on the size of the cash flows generated but each entrepreneur had 
the same or equal opportunity to make a success of their small business 
venture yet many failed. It is this phenomenon that needs to be researched. 
What are the differentiating factors for success and failure amongst the EFG 
fuel retailers? 
These were all private entrepreneurs who were only required to place a ten 
percent equity deposit for the acquisition of their fuel outlets. The valuation 
model used the same methodology for determining the value of the business. 
If the free cash flow was R50 000 then the value of the business was 
determined by multiplying the free cash flow by a multiple of 20 to 24. In this 
example, using the multiple of 20 the value of the business was determined as 
R1 million. The loan repayments were determined on cash flows and were the 
same percentage for all funded sites. 
It must also be pointed out that EFG had funded sites against cash flows and 
not only on volumetric performance. In other words free cash flows were used 
as a decision criteria and not volumes pumped or turnovers recorded. 
The overall results of the twenty-four entrepreneurs placed in these 
businesses are that more than half of them had failed, as per the definition of 
the failure provided in chapter two. This number is from the loan records of the 
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company. EFG, in the case of failure would take a cession of the shares, 
which was held as security, and then refinance a new entrepreneur at the 
same service station following the same conditions that was applicable to the 
previous failed entrepreneur. The funding again was based on a due diligence, 
valuation of the business and the loan had to progress through all the criteria 
as listed above. It must be pointed out that a particular site may be financed 
more than once over a period of time thus possibly giving more than one 
failure. If this happens in the case of say five sites, the number of failure 
observation would be increased. For the purposes of this research work, such 
re-financed sites were excluded, as they would have new retailers operating 
them. Only the original failures were considered. 
Only loans issued from 2000 to 2002 was reviewed. The statistics of failure 
from the same population has convinced the researcher that a case study 
approach was the best methodology to pursue the research question - the 
causes of failure and success amongst small businesses in particular small 
fuel retailers. 
This particular phenomena is the basis of the research as to why small 
business fail or succeed, in this case fuel retailers, given the standardised 
financing and training provided. Are there other reasons or attributes of the 
entrepreneurs that triggered success and failure and what are these reasons? 
The research seeks to identify the reasons for success and failure within a 
targeted group challenged by similar circumstances. 
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6. CONCLUSION 
This Appendix provided an insight into the case history. Fuel retailers with 
equal chances of success and failure within a supported environment had 
different outcomes in terms of success and failure. The ingredients for a good 
case study analysis are thus presented in the uniformity of the process and 
standardization of the loans approval requirements. The good split between 
failure and success - from the actual records also further strengthens the 
approach adopted. 
The background to EFG was also provided together with the loans and 
management process adopted. All businesses funded from the original 
Industrial Development were listed and reasons for uniquely qualifying them 
as part of the multiple case study was also provided. The discussion ends with 
a qualification of the case study - in that all applicants had an equal chance of 
success and failure. It is under these circumstances that a detailed in-depth 
case analysis could be done in pursuance of the research question: what are 
the reasons for failure and success amongst fuel retailers? 
The basis and conditions of the loan was the same in that: 
1. Loans were given to private entrepreneurs who were only required to 
place a 10% equity deposit for a loan repayable over five years; 
2. The valuation of the site and due diligence procedures were exactly the 
same for each fuel retailer; 
457 
3. Valuation was a function of free cash flow. In another words the value 
was determined as a factor of free cash flow. If, for example the profit 
was R20 000 per month then the value was determined as 20 times the 
free cash flow (R20 000 x 20 = R400 000); 
4. Each of the fuel retailers had undergone the same training courses by 
the oil company and the finance company covering the same curriculum; 
5. Attendance to the training courses was a pre-requisite before taking over 
the service station business; 
6. All the fuel retailers banked at the same commercial bank with same cost 
of capital; 
7. Each fuel retailer was subjected to an interview and had to prepare a 
business plan for approval by both the oil company and finance 
company; 
8. Each service station business was operated as a proprietary Limited 
Company and was therefore legally required to conduct statutory audits. 
This allowed the researcher to use the financial statements for further 
quantitative analysis to seek support for the qualitative findings; 
9. The funding was not based on volumes but on cash flows generated. 
This disregarded the obvious finding that low volumes will result in failure 
or high volumes would generate higher successes - indeed a rival theory 
that success or failure is a function of volumes has been included; 
All the loans were issued in 2000 financial year. The total sample will be 
included for the period as this again negates any externality effects. In other 
words, all service stations within the observation period would have been 
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exposed to the same factors such as interest rate shocks (if this occurred), 
high fuel prices, labour disruptions etc. 
APPENDIX 2 
TABLE SHELL OF DATA TO BE COLLECTED 
A. Background Information 
A1. Marital status 
A2. Age 
A3. Level of education 
A4. Other courses or educational programmes 
A5. Professional membership 
A6. Local dealer council membership 
B. Details of the service station operation 
B1. Trading hours 
B2. Customer offer 
B3. Recommended hours 
B4. Site classification 
B5. Franchisor support 
B6. Employment 
B7. Staff turnover 
B8. Average volumes 
B9. Average non-fuel income 
B10. Computerization 
B11. Computer literacy 
C. Financial information 
C1. Reason for owning service station 
C2. Purchase price of business 
C3. Purchase price includes 
Responses 
C4. Business valuation 
C5. Fair price 
C6. Funding 
C7. Sweat equity 
C8. Source of private funds 
C9. Effective Interest rate 
C10. Option to fix the interest rate 
C11. Due diligence study 
C12. Due diligence highlights 
D. Occupational information /Previous Experience 
D1. Previous occupation 
D2. Length of time in previous occupation 
D3. Decision for leaving 
D4. Length of time in service station 
D5. Expectations achieved 
D6. Previous service station experience 
D7. Necessity of experience 
D8. Oil company training 
D9. Training curriculum 
D10. Training duration 
D11. Training as precondition 
D12. Refresher training /re-skilling 
D13. Most valuable part of the training 
D14. Opinion on franchise training 
D15. Course as sufficient preparation 
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D16. Staff received similar training 
D17. Valuation of franchisor training 
D18. Most important aspect of training 
D19. Most important computer skills 
D20. Level of personal computer skills 
D21. Level of expertise on franchise system 
E. Management information 
E1. General 
E1.1 EFG/oil company requirements 
E1.2 Review of requirements 
E1.3 Hours in workday 
E1.4 Living distance from business 
E1.5 Typical day 
E1.6 Level of personal management 
E2. Finance 
E2.1 Difference between GP and mark-up 
E2.2 Monthly management accounts 
E2.3 Corrective mechanism 
E2.4 Financial skills 
E2.5 Financial analysis 
E2.6 System of cash flow management 
E2.7 Type of cash flow management system 
E2.8 Regular bank reconciliation 
E2.9 Cash book 
E2.10 Franchisor management support 
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E2.11 Kind of support from franchisor 
E2.12 Online access to your bank account 
E2.13 Overdraft 
E2.14 Original limit 
E2.15 Plan to reduce the overdraft 
E2.16 Monthly drawing 
E3. Wet Stock 
E3.1 Regular tank dips 
E3.2 Type of wet stock mechanism 
E3.3 Oversight of stock take process 
E3.4 Frequency of wet stock reconciliation 
E3.5 Variance tolerance 
E3.6 Processing of stock discrepancies 
E3.7 Pump and tank reconciliation 
E3.8 Pumps assise 
E3.10 Frequency of fuel drops? 
E3.11 Notable variances for stock receipts 
E4. Dry stock 
E4.1 Frequency 
E4.2 High -value items 
E4.3 Acceptable shrinkage percentage 
E4.4 Source of shrinkage 
E4.5 Physical receive of stock from suppliers 
E4.6 Shrinkage control mechanisms 
E4.7 Rectification if outside the tolerance 
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E4.8 Average loss 
E4.9 Franchisor support 
E4.10 Shrinkage control policy 
E5. Cash management 
E5.1 Cash shortages 
E5.2 Acceptable level 
E5.3 Cash deposit fees 
E5.4 Response and reaction 
E5.5 Sufficient insurance 
E5.6 Daily banking 
E5.7 Average banking time 
E6. Controls and administration 
E6.1 Frequency of shift balancing 
E6.2 Who balances shift reports 
E6.3 Recourse when shifts did not balance 
E6.4 How often were price checks done 
E6.5 How often GP's checked 
E6.6 Understanding of markups 
E6.7 Back office administration- frequency 
E6.8 Dry stock analysis (stocks turns etc) 
E6.9 Staff time sheets 
E6.10 Credit card transactions/ reconciliation 
E6.11 Daily payout analysis 
E6.12 Other controls (empty bottles etc) 
E6.13 Who does stock takes 
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E6.14 Debtors book 
E6.15 Average collection period 
E6.16 Do you have 1-1 security deposits? 
E6.17 Percentage of credit sales 
E6.18 Average bad debt write-off pa 
E.7 Management information 
E7.1 Monthly financial statements 
E7.2 Financial management tools 
E7.3 VAT reconciliation 
E7.4 Legislative returns 
E7.5 Management of your wage payouts 
E7.6 Number of people employed 
E7.7 Staff organogram/ positions in business 
E7.8 Number of shifts operated 
E7.9 Weekend/ staff shifts reflection of sales patterns 
E7.10 Implications if take you an extended holiday 
E7.11 Time spent on administration 
E7.12 Time spent on business development 
E7.13 Keeping abreast of business issues 
E7.14 Source of information 
E8. Human resource 
E8.1 Staff training/retraining 
E8.2 Type of training 
E8.3 Service providers 
E8.4 Use of the CHIETA learner ships 
465 
E8.5 Staff literacy levels 
E8.6 Programme for staff development 
E8.7 Spend training and development 
E8.8 Retailer work time spend on staff 
training/development 
F Exogenous Variables 
F1 Exogenous factors that has contributed to your 
current situation 
F2 Interest rates/economic shocks 
F3 Union activity 
F4 Increase in franchisor costs 
F5 Major shifts in turnover 
?6 Other 
G. General 
G1 Enjoy business 
G2 Exercising option to exit 
G3 Reasons for not exited 
G4 Recommendation to friends 
G5 Expansion to another site 
G6 Expectations 
G7 Opinion on level of franchisor support 
G8 Suggested changes/recommendations to 
Government, Oil Industry, motorists etc 
G9 Final thoughts 
G10 Copy of research work 
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APPENDIX 3 
LETTER OF INTRODUCTION 
22 June 2004 
To whom it may concern, 
This short note serves to introduce Mr. R Singh as one of my doctoral students 
completing research work into the reasons for the failure and success of small 
businesses with specific reference to fuel retailers in the Republic of South 
Africa. Ultimately, by means of this case study approach, it is hoped that we 
would be able to identify and document answers to such questions as: What is 
it that make some fuel retailers successful and others not - given the fact that 
fuel retailers operate within a franchised environment and within Government 
regulation? What can be leant from successful retailers and what can be done 
to reduce the risk of failure in general? 
This letter is directed to the selected EFG fuel retailer. I would like to thank 
EFG and the different oil companies for their co-operation in this important 
study. I would also like to thank those individual retailers for their time, 
experience and patience in responding to the interviews. Your cooperation is 
most essential if the case studies are to successfully guide and support the 
final findings of this research. On behalf of the University of Kwa-Zulu Natal 
Graduate School of Business, I wish to express my gratitude for your 
assistance. Should you wish to receive the results of this research, the 
researcher will be glad to make the necessary arrangements. 
Yours Faithfully, 
Professor A Bhattacharya 
Head of school of Entrepreneurship, UKZN 
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APPENDIX 4 
OPEN ENDED QUESTIONNAIRE 1 
Respondent Sheet 
Service station Reference 
Retailer 
Date of interview 
Email 
Telephone 
A. BIOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION 
A1. Marital status 
A2. Age 
A3. Level of education 
A4. Other educational programmes undertaken 
A5. Professional membership (FRA) 
A6. Member of local dealer 
B. SERVICE STATION OPERATIONS 
B1. Trading hours 
B2. Business offer (Car wash, shop, lotto, and fuel pumps, etc.) 
B3 Need to be 24 hours 
B4. Site classification (urban, rural, CBD, transient) 
B5. Franchisor support structure 
B6. Number of people employed 
B7. Staff turnover/retention period 
B8. Average volumes by grade 
B9. Non-fuel turnover 
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B10. Business computerization 
B11. Computer system competency 
C. FINANCIAL INFORMATION 
C1. Reason for getting into service station business 
C2. Price paid for business 
C3. Inclusion of the purchase price 
C4. Valuation of business 
C5. Fair price? 
C6. Business funding 
C7. Size of sweat equity 
C8. Source of own funds 
C9. Interest rate on signing the loan agreement 
C10. Option of fixing and floating rates 
C11. Die diligence study 
C12. Key findings of duel diligence study 
D. OCCUPATIONAL INFORMATION/EXPERIENCE/TRAINING 
D1. Previous occupation 
D2. Length of time in previous business/job 
D3. Reason for leaving 
D4. Length of time in the service station business 
D5. Expectation/need for achievement fulfilled 
D6. Previous service station experience 
D7. Necessity of previous experience 
D8. Oil company training 
D9. Training curriculum 
D10. Duration of training course 
D11. Training a pre-requisite 
D12. Refresher training after the inception training 
D13. Most Valuable part of training 
D14. Through practical experience / weakness in training 
D15. Training as sufficient preparation 
D16. Other members receiving similar training 
D17. Other training offered 
D18. Franchisor evaluation of training over a period of time 
D19. Most important aspect of training in the service station 
D21. Competency with computer system 
E. MANAGEMENT FACTORS 
E1. General 
E1.1 Specific management requirements from EFG or the oil company as pre-
requisite to site operation 
E1.2 Relevance of management requirements given current situation 
E1.3 Time spend on site 
E.14 Living distance from site 
E1.5 typical day at business 
E1.6 management of the entire operation 
E2 Financial management 
E2.1 Difference between GP and mark-up 
E2.2 Monthly management accounts 
E2.3 Implement of corrective mechanism 
E2.5 Analysis of financials 
E2.6 Cash flows management 
E2.7 Cash flow management system 
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E2.8 Bank reconciliation 
E2.9 Cashbook 
E2.10 Franchisor financial management support 
E2.11 Kind of financial support from the franchisor 
E2.12 Online access to your bank account 
E2.13 Overdraft 
E2.14 Original limits 
E2.15 Plan to reduce the overdraft 
E2.16 Monthly drawing 
E3 Wet Stock management 
E3.1 Regular tank dips 
E3.2 Wet stock mechanism in place 
E3.3 Management of stock take process 
E3.4 Frequency of wet stock reconciliation's 
E3.5 Average variance accepted 
E3.6 Processing stock discrepancies 
E3.7 Pump and tank reconciliation 
E3.8 Pumps dispensing of correct quantities 
E3.10 Frequency of fuel drops 
E3.11 Notable variances when stock was received 
E4. Dry stock management 
E4.1 Frequency of stock takes 
E4.2 Treatment of high-value items 
E4.3 Size of acceptable shrinkage percentage 
E4.4 Receiving of stock 
E4.5 Shrinkage control mechanisms in place 
E4.6 Actions when stock take results out of tolerance 
E4.7 Franchisor support 
E5. Cash management 
E5.1 shortages 
E5.2 Acceptable levels 
E5.3 Cash deposit fees 
E5.4 Action taken about bank fees 
E5.5 Insurance cover 
E5.6 Banking frequency 
E6. Controls and administration 
E6.1 Frequency of shift reports balanced 
E6.2 Person responsible for shift balancing 
E6.3 Recourse to unbalanced shifts 
E6.4 Frequency of price checks 
E6.5 Frequency of GP checks 
E6.6 Frequency of back office administration 
E6.8 Frequency of dry stock analysis 
E6.9 Card transaction methodology 
E6.10 Daily payout analysis sheet 
E6.11 Controls of empty bottles, newspaper etc 
E6.12 Total reconciliation 
E6.13 Debtors book 
E6.14 Collection period? 
E6.15 Security (1-1 or other) 
E6.16 Percentage of credit sales 
E6.17 Average bad debt to date 
F. GENERAL MANAGEMENT INFORMATION 
F1. Monthly financial statements 
F2. Financial management tools used 
F3. VAT reconciliation 
F4. Other legislative returns (Skills levy, UIF) 
F5. Management of wage and salary payouts 
F6. Number of persons employed 
F7. Employee participation in various sections of business 
F8. Number of shifts in operation 
F9. Weekends/ shift and wage patterns 
F10. Extended holiday/implication for business 
F11. Time spent on administration 
F12. Work time spent on business development 
F13. Keeping abreast of business issues 
F14. Source of business information 
G HUMAN RESOURCE 
G1. Staff on training 
G2. Kind of training 
G3. Providers of training 
G4. CHIETA Learner ships 
G5. Staff literacy 
G6. Programmes in place for staff development 
G7. Percentage of wage/salary bill spent on training 
G8 Personal time spent on training and development 
H. EXOGENOUS VARIABLES 
H1. Exogenous factors that have contributed to your current situation 
(interest rates, union increases for staff, sharp increases in franchisor 
costs, major shifts in volumetric performance) 
H1. Reason for current situation 
I. GENERAL 
I I . Enjoy this business 
12. Option to exit 
13. Reasons for not exiting sooner 
14. Would you recommend this business to a friend? 
15. Expand to another site 
16. Advice to different stakeholders for the betterment of the fuel retail 
business (Government, Industry, motorists etc) 
17. Final comments 
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APPENDIX 5 
OPEN ENDED QUESTIONNAIRE TWO 
1 WORKING CAPITAL ANALYSIS 
1.1 Calculation of original working capital amount 
1.2 Inclusion of capital and non capital items 
1.3 Consideration for stock turns 
1.4 Consideration for fuel price adjustments 
1.5 Consideration for no margin increases 
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APPENDIX 6 
CONSOLIDATED FINANCIAL INFORMATION 
FFR01 FFR02 FFR03 FFR04 FFR05 FFR06 FFR07 
Averaqe 
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Trade and other 
receivables 
Bank 


























































































































































































































Non Current Liabilities 
Long term borrowings 
Current Liabilities 
Current portion of long 
term borrowings 
Trade and other 
payables 
Bank overdraft 



















































































































INTERVIEW TWO - UNSTRUCTURED OPEN ENDED INTERVIEWS 
Failed retailers (FFR 01- FFR 07) 
FFR 01 16 July 2005 
FFR 02 17 July 2005 
FFR 03 18 July 2005 
FFR 04 01 October 2005 
FFR 05 04 October 2005 
FFR 06 20 July 2005 
FFR 07 06 October 2005 
Successful Retailers (SFR 01-08) 
SFR 01 15 August 2005 
SFR 02 24 July 2005 
SFR 03 15 July 2005 
SFR 04 26 July 2005 
SFR 05 27 July 2005 
SFR 06 28 July 2005 
SFR 07 22 September 2005 
SFR 08 05 October 2005 
INTERVIEW THREE 
EXPERT THIRD PARTY INTERVIEW 
Energy Finance Group 
ETP11 Mr. Grant Fincham, Financial Director, Durban 18 May 2005 
ETPI 2 Mr. Andrew Watson, Director, Durban 19 May 2005 
Industrial Development Corporation 
ETPI 3 Mr. Abel Malinga, 17 May 2004 
Engen Petroleum 
ETPI 4 Mr. David Chiat, Area Manager, Engen House Durban 20 May 2005 
ETPI 5 Mr. Lenny Chetty, Area Manager, 20 July 2005, Engen House 21 May 2005 
Fuel Retailers Association 
ETPI6 Mr. Peter Morgan, CEO, Johannesburg, 11 November 2005 
Government 
ETPI7 Mr. T Burger, Director of Petroleum Regulation and Gas, Department of 
Minerals and Energy, Pretoria, 10 June 2005 
Other 
ETPI8 Mr. Monison Sookay, Retailer, Durban 22 July 2005 
ETPI9 Mr. Colin McClelland, director South African Petroleum Industry Association 
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APPENDIX 8 
FUEL RETAILER COMMENT'S TO CASE STUDY REPORT 
Dear, 
Kindly find attached a draft copy of the case study report. You would recall at 
out interview and our consequent discussion that I had promised to send you 
the draft report. Kindly peruse and comment as you see fit. I would prefer if you 
use track changes on MS Word, as it would allow me to focus on the areas that 
you have raised. 
How to use Tracked changes: 
• Open the document from the email I have sent 
• This would be a word document. 
Then go to TOOLS - TRACK CHANGES - HIGHLIGHT CHANGES 
• Make sure that all three options are chosen. They are: Track changes 
while editing, Highlight changes on screen and highlight changes on 
printed document 
• Then email the tracked changed document to me. 
If you have difficulty in opening the document or using track changes please 
email me back and we could through the document together. Your assistance 





DETAILED LISTING OF RECORDS 
Electronic files 
File name 
Consolidated MS Exel spreadsheet AFS 
Interview records 
Interview 2 
Due diligence reports 
"Notes from supplementary readings" 
"legal" 
"Notes from observations 
"operational" 
"Notes from Engen training course 
"financial fundamentals" 
Researcher observation notes 
File location 
Flash diskl d:AFS.xls 
Flash disk2 d-.lnterviews.doc 
Flashdisk2 interview2.doc 
Flashdiskl d:DD.xls 
Flash disk 2 d.legal.doc 
Flash disk 2 d:operations.doc 
Flash disk 2 d: training.doc 
Flash disk 2 d.observation.doc 
Manual files 
Annual Financial statements 
Researcher notes from EFG site files and field notes 
Voice recordings of interviews 
Use digital sequence 
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Document list 
Due diligence report reference 
SFR01 - SFR08 Complete loan valuation, due diligence and budget report 
FFR01 - FFR07 Complete loan valuation, due diligence and budget report 
RRN 01 Researcher reading notes from legal files "legal" 
RRN02 Researcher reading notes from observations and site visits 
"operations" 




OIL COMPANY TRAINING CURRICULUM 
Practical Retailing Skills Programmeme 
Week 1 - Service Station 
DAY1 MONDAY 8 m NOVEMBER 2004 
Purpose 
Orientation/History 
Retail Market Overview 























DAY 3 WEDNESDAY 10'M NOVEMBER 2004 
Purpose 
Criteria test 














Service Station Structure and Staff Analysis 











DAY 5 FRIDAY 12TH NOVEMBER 2004 
Purpose 











DAY 6 SATURDAY 13TH NOVEMBER 2004 
Purpose 
Labour Relations 
Labour Relations Act 
Continued 





Practical Retailing Skills Programmeme 
Week 2 - Convenience 
DAY 1 MONDAY 15TH NOVEMBER 2004 
Purpose 
Introductions 
Convenience Market Overview 
Engen's Marketing Strategy 
Bakery 









DAY 2 TUESDAY 16TH NOVEMBER 2004 
Practical Duties 













DAY 3 WEDNESDAY 17TH NOVEMBER 2004 
Practical Duties 








Site Visits 1.48 hours 
Merchandising exercise 
DAY 4 THURSDAY 18'H NOVEMBER 2004 
Practical Duties 












Practical Duties 5.00 hours 
Stock Take 
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DAY 5 FRIDAY 19'M NOVEMBER 2004 
Purpose 
NACS - Feedback 
Community Involvement 
Dealer Business Plan 
Promotion - Practical 
Promotion - Practical 
Course evaluation & wrap-up 
Duration 
1.00 hours 
1.00 hours 
1.15 hours 
1.00 hours 
1.30 hours 
0.30 hours 
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